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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
' ' 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 6th June 1983 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the 
Assembly. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
S. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part 
of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (Doe. 941 ). 
7. China and European security (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 945 
and amendments). 
8. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
9. China and European security (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 945 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. lager, Provisional President, in th'e Chair. 
1. Opening of t6e session 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter, and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Provisional President declared open 
the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assem-
bly of Western European Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Address by t6e Provisional President 
The Provisional President addressed the 
Assembly and paid tribute to the late MM. Bizet 
and Le Montagner, members of the French 
Delegation, and to the late Mr. Hermann 
Schmidt, member of the Delegation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
4. Examination of credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6 (I) ofthe Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary Assem-
12 
bly of the Council of Europe informing the 
Assembly that the credentials of the representa-
tives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had 
been ratified by that Assembly, with the excep-
tion of the representatives and substitutes of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and of 
Mr. Pecriaux, substitute member for Belgium. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratifica-
tion by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously 
ratified the credentials of the above. 
S. Election of t6e President of tu Assembly 
Two candidates were nominated for the pre-
sidency, namely: MM. Blaauw and De Poi. 
In accordance with Rule l 0 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly proceeded, by roll-
call, to a secret ballot. 
The sitting was suspended while the votes 
were counted. 
The sitting was suspended at 3.45 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.05 p.m. 
The Provisional President announced the 
result of the vote: 
MINUTES 
Votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Blank or spoiled papers . . . . . . 3 
Effective votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Absolute majority . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
Mr. Blaauw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Mr. De Poi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
The Provisional President declared Mr. De 
Poi elected President. 
On the invitation of the Provisional Presi-
dent, Mr. De Poi took the Chair. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
7. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly 
Five candidates had been proposed for the 
posts of Vice-President, namely: Sir Frederic 
Bennett, MM. Berchem, Bonnel, Pignion and 
Unland. 
FIRST SITTING 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
Sir Frederic Bennett and MM. Berchem, Bon-
nel, Pignion and Unland were elected Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for 
the first part of the session 
(Doe. 941) 
The President proposed the adoption of the 
draft order of business for the first part of the 
session. 
Speaker: Mr. Mulley. 
The Assembly adopted the draft order of 
business for the first part of the session. 
9. Nomination of members to committees 
In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 bis of 
the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified 
the membership of the six committees as 
follows: 
1. CoMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats) 
Members Alternates 
Belgium: MM. Bonnel MM. De Decker 
Dejardin Van der Elst 
Steverlynck Mrs. Herman-Michielsens 
France: MM. Duraffour MM. Baumel 
Galley Caro 
Mayoud Schleiter 
Menard Jung 
Pignion Spenale 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Ertl MM. Rumpf 
Gerstl HaufT 
Kittelmann Lenzer 
Lemmrich Handlos 
Scheer Horn 
Italy: MM. Be mini MM. Calice 
Cavaliere Giust 
Della Briotta Mondino 
Fosson Tripodi 
Pecchioli Amadei 
Luxembourg: Mr. Prussen Mr. Glesener 
Netherlands: MM. van den Bergh MM. Tummers 
Blaauw de Vries 
Scholten A arts 
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United Kingdom: 
Belgium: 
France: 
Fed. Rep. ofGermany: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
Members 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Cox 
Edwards 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Sir Dudley Smith 
Alternates 
MM. Wilkinson 
Morris 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Beith 
Lord Duncan-Sandys 
2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats) 
MM. Bogaerts MM. Van der Elst 
Lagneau Pecriaux 
Michel De Bondt 
MM. Berrier MM. Baumel 
Bertile Caro 
Lagorce Mayoud 
Prouvost Grussenmeyer 
Wilquin Joxe 
MM. Ahrens MM. Linde 
Muller K.ittelmann 
Reddemann BOhm 
Rumpf Ertl 
Vogt Mrs. Kelly 
MM. Conti Persini MM. Patriarca 
De Poi Benedikter 
Valiante Cavaliere 
Vecchietti N ... 
Zito Rubbi 
Mr. Thoss Mr. Berchem 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. de Vries 
MM. van der Sanden Scholten 
van der Werff Blaauw 
Sir Frederic Bennett Mrs. Knight 
Mr. Hardy Lord Hughes 
Lord McNair MM. Hill 
Lord Reay Atkinson 
Mr. Urwin Eastham 
ARST SITTING 
3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIAC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats) 
Belgium: Mr. Adriaensens MM. Biefnot 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas De Bondt 
France: MM. Barthe MM. Lagorce 
Fortier Bassinet 
Fourre Bertile 
Valleix Galley 
Fed. Rep. ofGermany: MM. Bohm MM. Muller 
Lenzer· Schwarz 
Schmidt Manfred Haase 
Spies von Bullesheim Stavenhagen 
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MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members Alternates 
Italy: MM. Amadei MM. Orione 
Antoni Martino 
Fiandrotti Della Briotta 
Forma Spitella 
Luxembourg: Mr. Prussen Mr. Thoss 
Netherlands: MM. A arts Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers 
Worrell Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
United Kingdom: Mr. Garrett Lord Northfield 
Sir Paul Hawkins Sir Russell Fairgrieve 
MM. McGuire MM. Brown 
Wilkinson Jessel 
4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats) 
Belgium: MM. Adriaensens MM. Steverlynck 
Biefnot Bogaerts 
France: MM. Delehedde MM. Freche 
Jag er Belin 
Jeambrun Rossinot 
Schleiter Oehler 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Haase MM. Enders 
Hartmann Lemmrich 
Schmitz Homhues 
Schulte Buchner 
Italy: MM. Martino MM. Cafiero 
Orione Ajello 
Petrilli Bonalumi 
Tripodi Pozzo 
Luxembourg: Mr. Hengel Mr. Margue 
Netherlands: MM. Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra 
de Vries Mr. van den Bergh 
United Kingdom: MM. Durant Sir Paul Hawkins 
Eastham Lord MeN air 
Lord Hughes MM. Fletcher 
Mr. Stainton Grieve 
5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats) 
Belgium: MM. Michel MM. Lagneau 
Pecriaux De Decker 
France: MM. Beix MM. Koehl 
Joxe Prouvost 
Senes Delehedde 
Vial-Massat Wilquin 
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Members Alternates 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Antretter MM. Buchner 
Linde Schmidt 
Spies von Bullesheim Jag er 
Unland Wulff 
Italy: MM. Giust MM. Spitella 
Mondino Fiandrotti 
Sterpa Romano 
N ... Patriarca 
Luxembourg: Mr. Glesener Mr. Margue 
Netherlands: MM. Eysink MM. van der Sanden 
van der Werff Stoffelen 
United Kingdom: MM. Eastham MM. Cox 
Edwards Morris 
Grieve Osborn 
Howell Jessel 
6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats) 
Belgium: Mr. Bonnel Mr. Dejardin 
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Mrs. Staels-Dompas 
France: MM. Mercier MM. Senes 
Poncelet Jeambrun 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Enders MM. Antretter 
Hackel Handlos 
Italy: MM. Agrimi MM. Forma 
Rubbi Zito 
Luxembourg: MM. Berchem MM. Prussen 
Glesener Thoss 
Netherlands: Mr. Stoffelen Mr. Eysink 
Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers 
United Kingdom: MM. Fletcher 
Page 
10. Address by Mr. M6llemann, 
Parliamentary Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Mollemann replied to ·questions put by 
MM. Holtz, Ahrens, Vogt, Jung and Schwarz. 
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Mr. Gourlay 
Mrs. Knight 
11. China and European security 
(Presentation of tUUl debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 945 and amendments) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Lord Reay, MM. Lagorce, Muller 
and Michel. 
The debate was adjourned. 
MINUTES 
12. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the 
following changes in the membership of com-
mittees proposed by the Delegation of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany: 
- Mr. Schulte as a titular member of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges in place of Mr. Linde; 
17 
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- Mr. Linde as a titular member of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration in place of Mr. Schulte. 
13. Date and time of the next sitting 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 7th 
June, at 9.30 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m. 
APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Bohm 
Enders 
MM. Adriaensens Gerstl 
Bogaerts Scheer (Haase) 
De Bondt (Bonnel) Hartmann 
Dejardin Lemmrich (Hornhues) 
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens Kittelmann 
Mr. Michel Linde 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas MUller 
Reddemann 
Stavenhagen (Rumpf) 
France Schulte 
Schwarz 
MM. Baumel Spies von Biillesheim 
Berrier Unland 
Caro Vogt 
lager (Jeambrun) 
Jung 
Lagorce 
Pignion Italy 
Galley (Poncelet) 
Menard (Schleiter) MM. Agrimi 
Fourre (Senes) Be mini 
Bassinet (Spenale) Spite/la (Bonalumi) 
Valleix Giust (Cavaliere) 
Vial-Massat De Poi 
Forma 
Fosson 
Federal Republic of Germany Conti Persini (Mondino) 
M artino (Pecchioli) 
MM. Ahrens Petrilli 
Antretter Valiante 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Duraffour 
Freche 
Mayoud 
Oehler 
Wilquin 
Italy 
MM. Antoni 
Della Briotta 
Mr. Foschi 
Mrs. Gherbez 
MM. Rubbi 
Tripodi 
Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
Mr. Scholten 
Luxembourg 
MM. Prussen (Berchem) 
Glesener (Margue) 
Thoss 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
Worrell (van den Bergh) 
Blaauw 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
(Mrs. van der Werf-
Terpstra) 
United Kingdom 
Lord MeN air (Beith) 
MM. Stainton (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Grieve 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Mulley 
Lord Reay 
Lord Northfield (Urwin) 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Cox 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Hill 
Jessel 
Mrs. Knight 
Mr. McGuire 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Page 
Sir Dudley Smith 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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SECOND SITTING 
Tuesday, 7th June 1983 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. China and European security (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 945 and amendments). 
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-
eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, Doe. 948). 
3. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presenta-
tion by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External 
Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 942). 
4. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-
eighth annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on 
the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 
948). 
5. Political activities of the WEU Council - reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 
944 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. China and European security 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee and vote 
on the draft recommendation, Doe. 945 and amendments) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. van der Sanden, Prussen, 
Bassinet and Scheer. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Caro, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by 
Mr. Vogt: 
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2. Leave out paragraph (vz) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation. 
Speakers: MM. Vogt, Muller, Caro and Vogt. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by 
Mr. Fourre and moved by Mr. Bassinet. 
1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
" and, in particular, no longer subject the 
latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the 
eastern countries ". 
Speaker: Mr. Caro. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by 
Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourre. 
4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
" and refrain from any position which might 
prevent the return of Taiwan to China;". 
The amendment was withdrawn. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by 
Mr. Vogt: 
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
MINUTES 
" Appeal to the People's Republic of China 
to stop the tests of atomic weapons and deli-
very vehicles, especially in the Pacific, in 
order to comply with the deep concerns of 
the Pacific peoples about such activities of 
the atomic powers, thereby setting a good 
example in the interest of the survival of 
mankind; ". 
Speakers: MM. Vogt, Scheer and Caro. 
The amendment was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended, draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 393) 1• 
4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Millister 
for External Relations, Chairman-iii-Of/ke of the Council, 
Doe. 942) 
The report of the Council to the Assembly 
was presented by Mr. Cheysson, French Minis-
ter for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council. 
Mr. Cheysson replied to questions put by 
MM. Dejardin, Lagorce, Blaauw, Vogt, Jager 
and Scheer. 
S. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
One candidate was proposed for the vacant 
post of Vice-President, namely: Mr. Blaauw. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
President by acclamation. 
Mr. Blaauw was elected Vice-President by 
acclamation. 
The President informed the Assembly that, 
according to age, the order of precedence of the 
Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. Pignion, Sir 
Frederic Bennett, MM. Bonnel, Berchem, 
Unland and Blaauw. 
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply 
to the twenty-eighth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 948) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by 
Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur. 
I. See page 23. 
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SECOND SITTING 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Bassinet. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
Mr. Pignion moved that the report be refer-
red back to committee. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the refe-
rence back to committee. 
The motion for reference back was agreed to 
and the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was referred back to 
the committee. 
7. Political activities ofthe WEU Council-
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee 
and 'Nite on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 944 and amendments) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Forma. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speaker. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft recommendation. 
Amendments (Nos. I and 2) were tabled by 
Mr. Lagorce and others: 
1. In paragraph ( vz) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out " the latest deci-
sions by NATO bodies in regard to defence 
plans " and insert " all the latest technological 
developments in this field ". 
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " the decisions taken by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee in 
December 1982 " and insert " all the latest 
technological developments in the armaments 
field". 
Speakers: MM. Lagorce and Ahrens. 
The amendments were agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
MINUTES 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 394) 1• 
8. Change in the membership of a committee 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules 
of Procedure the Assembly agreed to the 
following change in the membership of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges proposed by the Italian Delegation: 
l. See page 24. 
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- Mr. Valiante as a titular member to fill a 
vacant seat. 
9. Date and time of the next sitting 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m. 
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MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
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Tummers 
Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers 
(Mrs. van der Werf-
Terpstra) 
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Lord Hughes 
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Lord Reay 
Mr. Wilkinson (Sir Dudley 
Smith) 
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RECOMMENDATION 393 
on China and European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China 
is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace; 
(iz) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and 
that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important role in 
international relations; 
(iil) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social regimes the interests of 
Western Europe and of China converge in many fields; 
(iv) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and 
China is in their joint interests; 
(v) Considering that the People's Republic of China is now making proposals to European states 
and firms for co-operation of mutual interest; 
(vz) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, 
particularly for all aspects of defence and security, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
l. Ensure that the Western Europ.&an countries start regular consultations with the Government of 
the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the 
maintenance of peace in the world; 
2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's 
trade and economic co-operation with China; 
3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and co-
operation and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the 
eastern countries; 
4. Impress thi~ point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD; 
5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet 
Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe; 
6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay the foundations for lasting peace 
in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to 
facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 394 
on the political activities of the WEU Council-
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
SECOND SITTING 
(z) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as 
possible with the many aspects of European security; 
(iz) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the 
Council; 
(iiz) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active role in 
concerting European activities in areas within its competence; 
(iv) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council 
but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the 
desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to 
their security; 
(v) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the 
Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its 
reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC; 
(vi) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation 
implies that it take account of all the latest technological developments in this field, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for 
a concerted European approach; 
2. In that context instruct the SAC inter alia to complete its study without delay, with the addi-
tion of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the arma-
ments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly; 
3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of all 
the latest technological developments in. the armaments field. 
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Tuesday, 7th June 1983 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, Doe. 947 and amendments). 
2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. 
3. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Resumed debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and 
draft resolution, Doe. 947 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
2. Burden-sharing in the alliance 
(Presentation of the report of the Committee 
on Defem:e Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 947 and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by 
Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur. 
3. Address by General Rogers, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, addressed the Assembly. 
General Rogers replied to questions put by 
Mr. Blaauw, Lord Reay, MM. Vogt, Scheer, 
Pignion, Dejardin, Haase, Biefnot, de V ries, 
Spies von Biillesheim, Holtz and Wilkinson. 
4. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
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S. Burden-sharing in the alliance 
(Debate on the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 947 and amendments) 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, resu-
med the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Linde, Vogt, Tummers, 
Dejardin, Baumel, de V ries, Jager and Caro; 
(points of order): MM. Wilkinson and Stoffelen. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
Mr. Stoffelen moved that the report be refer-
red back to committee. 
Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Stoffelen (point of 
order), Wilkinson, van der Sanden (point of 
order) and Blaauw. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the refe-
rence back to committee. 
The motion for reference back was agreed to 
and the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was referred back to 
the committee. 
6. Date and time of the next sitting 
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 8th 
June, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m. 
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APPENDIX 
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Federal Republic of Germany Rubbi 
Tripodi 
MM. Muller Valiante 
Schwarz Vecchietti 
Netherlands 
MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) 
de Vries (van den Bergh) 
Blaauw 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Mrs. Baarve/d-Sch/aman 
(Mrs. van der Werf-
Terpstra) 
United Kingdom 
MM. Stainton (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Grieve 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Mulley 
Lord Reay 
Mr. Wilkinson (Sir Dudley 
Smith) 
Lord Northfield (Urwin) 
Netherlands 
Mr. Scholten 
United Kingdom 
MM. Beith 
Cox 
Sir Anthony Grant 
Mr. Hardy 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
MM. Hill 
Jessel 
Mrs. Knight 
Mr. McGuire 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Page 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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Wednesday, 8th June 1983 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. The law of the sea (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommenda-
tion, Doe. 946 and amendments). 
2. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly 
Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear 
weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for Euro-
pean security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Pre-
sentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 943). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. The law of the sea 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and vote 
of the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 946 and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was 
presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Fourre, Spies von Biilles-
heim, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers and Mr. Beix. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by 
Mr. Spies von Bullesheim: 
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1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, after " seabed mining 
regime " leave out " but " and insert " and ". 
Speaker: Mr. Spies von Biillesheim. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Fourre: 
3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out from " the policy 
split " to the end of the paragraph and insert 
" the individual and divergent positions which 
the member states of W estem European Union, 
the EEC and NATO have taken up as to 
whether the convention should be signed; ". 
Speakers: Mr. Fourre, Mrs. den Ouden-
Dekkers and Mr. Lenzer. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by 
Mr. Fourre: 
4. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add " more parti-
cularly in relation to the developing coun-
tries;". 
Speakers: MM. Fourre, Spies von Biillesheim 
and Lenzer. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by 
Mr. Fourre: 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " to adopt policies " and 
insert " to sign the convention on the law of the 
sea". 
MINUTES 
Speakers: MM. Fourre, Spies von Biillesheim 
and Lenzer. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim: 
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert a new text as 
follows: 
" 4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation 
with the United States with a view to estab-
lishing a universally-acceptable system of 
the rule of law for the world oceans. ". 
Speakers: MM. Spies von Biillesheim, Beix 
and Lenzer. 
The amendment was negatived. 
Following the agreement to Amendment 3 
tabled by Mr. Fourre, a consequential drafting 
amendment was moved by Mr. Lenzer in para-
graph ( v) of the preamble to the draft recom-
mendation to leave out " this split " and insert 
" these positions ". 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 395) 1• 
l. See page 30. 
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4. AMlysis and evaluation of the action taken 
on Assembly Recommendations 383 
on the problems of nuclear weapons 
in Europe and 388 on the problems 
for European security arising 
from pacifism and neutralism) 
( Prese•t•tio• of IIIUI thbate o• the report 
of the Committee for Reltltio•s with Ptzrli.me•ts, 
Doe. 943) 
The report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Dejar-
din, Rapporteur, and by Lord Reay in the 
absence of Mr. Page, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Vogt, Miiller and Enders. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, 
Chairman of the Committee, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly took note of the report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
5. Adjournment of the session 
The President adjourned the twenty-ninth 
ordinary session of the Assembly. 
The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m. 
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brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 395 
on the law of the sea 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea 
conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-
accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor 
in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industria-
lised countries and developing countries in the third world: 
(ii) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-
seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised 
Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials; 
(iii) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources ; 
(iv) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining regime and regretting the individual 
and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO 
have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed; 
(v) Considering that these positions may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world, 
more particularly in relation to the developing countries; 
(vi) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and 
the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of 
the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with 
the backing of international law, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate 
the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention ; 
2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the 
preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining 
regime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet 
bloc and many third world countries ; 
3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and 
industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions 
to problems relating to the seabed mining regime; 
4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its 
policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, 
consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation 
which cannot be enforced. 
30 
11 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 6th June 1983 
SUMMARY 
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Address by the Provisional President. 
4. Examination of credentials. 
5. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
7. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part 
of the session (Doe. 941). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mulley. 
9. Nomination of members to committees. 
10. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Replies by Mr. Mollemann to questions put by: 
Mr. Holtz, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Jung, 
Mr. Schwarz. 
11. China and European security (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 945 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro (Rapporteur), 
Lord Reay, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Miiller, Mr. Michel. 
12. Changes in the membership of committees. 
13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. lager, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of 
Procedure, I declare open the twenty-ninth 
ordinary session of the Assembly of Western 
European Union. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the substitutes attending this sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings1• 
3. Address by the Prorisional President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it is to seniority in years that I owe 
the privilege - which, you may well imagine, I 
l. See page 18. 
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was in no hurry to enjoy - of being allowed to 
address you for the second time as the doyen 
d'age. 
I have the opportunity today to look back in 
more serious vein than usual over my past and, 
through it, over the recent past of a Europe of 
which I have been able to witness - and, in 
some respects, indeed experience - both the 
destruction and the renaissance. 
The time perspective also enables me to 
appreciate how lucky we are to have been 
living at peace for nearly forty years: an entire 
generation is now reaching maturity without 
having experienced the horrors of world wars, 
even though families have been bereaved and 
peoples impoverished - as they still may be -
by murderous and devastating local conflicts. 
This peace, which I hope our children and 
grandchildren will long be able to enjoy, is not, 
however, a gift of nature. On the contrary, it 
is the result of an unremitting effort, an effort, 
which is all the more difficult for Europeans 
because, confined as they are within a restricted 
area, they still bear the marks of the dissensions 
which are the legacies of an incomparably rich 
history or of those generated by ideologies, and 
because they do not have sufficient resources to 
match up to the major military powers. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The President (continued) 
As a militant European, I have rejoiced at the 
successes of economic reconstruction but have 
also felt bitterness and disappointment at the 
setbacks and limitations of the political building 
of Europe: personally, I am still absolutely sure 
that without political union - and defence 
obviously forms part of this - Europe will be no 
more than the mere sum of its parts and 
nations without ever being able to constitute a 
single entity, in short, that Europe will remain 
incomplete. 
While the Council of Europe goes on 
patiently spinning its legal web and extending 
areas of agreement, the EEC is getting bogged 
down in a morass of national interests. 
Western European Union itself, the only 
European organisation empowered to deal with 
defence questions, seems to be doing little more 
than vegetate, even though, as all of us here are 
aware, this outward appearance of inactivity 
conceals much conscientious and fruitful work, 
especially within this Assembly. Our institu-
tion is awaiting the touch of the magic wand 
which will awaken it from its slumbers and give 
it the renewed impetus which it needs. 
This revitalisation of Western European 
Union has already been proposed more than 
once by France, in the person of Michel Jobert 
in 1973 and of Georges Lemoine in 1981, 
without, it must be admitted, their proposals 
having aroused sufficient interest to produce the 
electric shock required to revive this institu-
tion - that is, its Council and the two technical 
bodies which are subordinate to it. 
This reactivation of WEU seems to me to be 
called for by the international circumstances to 
which I shall refer briefly later. But it is clear 
that it cannot be based on the initiative of a 
single country; it can only be brought about 
through the joint determination of governments 
and through the efforts of all those who, espe-
cially within this Assembly, play a part in the 
work of this organisation. -
Western European Union, which in theory 
guarantees the joint security of the European 
countries, can in fact make a vital contribution 
to the security of Europe at a time when this 
appears to be a prey to increasingly serious 
doubts. 
For Europe, our second country, is now in 
danger. In the face of the Soviet threat, 
Europe is not only unsure of itself but also 
distrusts its American ally. In short, Europe, 
like the United States, is tempted to withdraw 
into isolation, even though an effort is made, in 
the statements issued at the end of summit meet-
ings such as that at Williamsburg, to dispel any 
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danger of misunderstanding within the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
We here are all aware that the growth in the 
power of the Soviet Union has changed the 
balance of forces and altered strategic thinking 
to the ultimate detriment of the security of 
Europe. Detente, desirable though it is, has 
from this point of view only served as a 
smoke-screen concealing the stepping-up of the 
Soviet armaments drive and, in particular, the 
stationing of SS-20s, as a result of which Soviet 
military superiority on the European continent 
- already considerable in conventional arms 
alone - is now crushing. This first-strike 
capacity which the Soviet Union now holds in 
relation to the NATO forces cannot be matched 
by the Europeans unless they deploy the Persh-
ing and cruise missiles as they decided to do in 
December 1979. This is merely a matter of 
applying the logic of the balance of forces, 
which experience has shown to be the best 
guarantee of peace. Deployment of these 
weapons in no way upsets the balance of strate-
gic forces since the range of the Pershing mis-
siles is not great enough to threaten an appreci-
able proportion of the Soviet Union's interconti-
nental missiles. 
In reality, as a consequence of this Soviet 
armament effort, the West - that is, first and 
foremost, our American ally, on whom our 
security fundamentally depends - no longer has 
an adequate safety margin. The narrowing of 
this margin has already led to the abandonment 
of the doctrine of massive reprisal; its virtual 
disappearance casts doubt on the possibility of 
maintaining the doctrine of flexible response; 
the position of potential inferiority in which the 
West is placed as a result of the inadequacy of 
its conventional forces means that the western 
countries now have to bear the responsibility 
for nuclear escalation and its suicidal conse-
quences. 
Such a situation can give rise to legitimate 
doubts as to the United States' real determina-
tion to defend Europe, that is, if necessary, to 
die for it. Personally I do not share this 
doubt, but I must admit that proposals such as 
those made in the journal Foreign Affairs by 
four of the most senior men formerly respon-
sible for United States defence policy are not 
calculated to reassure those of less sanguine 
disposition. The idea of a no-first-use commit-
ment, that is, an undertaking not to be the 
first to use the nuclear weapon, seems to me to 
be both illusory and a danger to Europe. 
Illusory because, even if there were re~ipro­
city, it is hard to see the value of such a 
commitment, which would obviously have the 
same final outcome as all those which were 
entered into between the two wars, in an effort 
to ward off the second world war. 
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This proposal is also dangerous, because it 
increases the risks of a conventional war, 
which, in Europe, would be scarcely less devas-
tating than a nuclear war and because, more 
fundamentally, it reduces the credibility of the 
American commitment, thus making a reality 
of the danger - a mortal danger for Europe - of 
breaking the link with the United States. 
Such a proposal is, moreover, all the more 
harmful because of its false attraction for all 
those who, in Europe, appalled by the arms 
race, take refuge in dreams of pacifism and 
neutralism. As history has shown us, the 
pacifist reflex, however noble the sentiments 
which inspire it, leads to war. 
In order to be better able to counter this paci-
fist temptation, let us try - as we have already 
done before in the course of our discussions -
to understand its causes. Let us remember in 
particular that, in addition to being a more or 
less rational reflex due to fear or a matter of 
principle, this is the simple reaction of people 
who are suddenly realising that having weapons 
may, in some cases, ·provoke aggression: this 
danger has always existed, but there was a 
tendency to forget it so long as the weapon 
remained in the holds of a submarine. Today 
nobody can ignore it any longer, now that mis-
siles which are so many priority targets for the 
enemy are liable to be stationed in the imme-
diate vicinity. Beyond the paradoxical aspect 
of such an attitude, which, taken to its logical 
conclusion, leads to basing security on complete 
and unilateral disarmament, there is an element 
of truth: possessing weapons is in fact dan-
gerous for anyone who does not appear to be 
determined to use them. 
This being so, it seems to me that one of the 
roles of the Assembly of WEU is to strengthen 
this will to defend ourselves, without which 
there can be no security for Europeans: the 
balance of forces is a genuine deterrent only if 
it is based on a sufficiently-firm collective 
determination. 
In the global poker game of East-West 
confrontation, psychological factors count just 
as much as objective realities such as technolo-
gical performance or economic dynamism. 
In this connection I should like to emphasise 
here that if the western countries were to 
embark too suddenly on rearmament at the 
expense of the whole balance of the economy, 
this effort would in fact fail to fulfil its purpose 
since, by undermining the morale of the nations 
concerned, it would weaken that very spirit of 
self-defence without which there can be no 
effective deterrence. 
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But collective determination to defend oursel-
ves can lead to united European defence only if 
it can be based on sound and dynamic institu-
tions. 
For Europe, the basis is, of course, the Atlan-
tic Alliance, because our security will always 
ultimately depend on the guarantee provided by 
America. But the institutions of WEU can 
play a worthwhile role if we are willing to 
regard it as the other pillar on which our joint 
determination to defend ourselves could rest, as 
the outward and visible expression of the ties of 
deep-rooted solidarity which unite the countries 
of Europe: legal ties resulting from the Brussels 
Treaty, which, in the event of aggression, far 
from leaving the allies free, as does the North 
Atlantic Treaty, to determine the nature of 
their support, on the contrary imposes on them 
the obligation to render military assistance; also 
the de facto solidarity between countries whose 
geographical position puts them in the front 
line in the defence of the West, and makes 
them into a battlefield right from the start of 
any world war. 
In these circumstances, it is WEU's task to 
serve as the place, par excellence, not only for 
a realisation of this solidarity, but also for 
"joint thinking about security problems " - to 
quote the words recently used by Mr. Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing - where thought might be 
given in particular to ways of dovetailing a stra-
tegy based on the alliance and a strategy based 
on national independence or European auto-
nomy. 
This antithesis between alliance and indepen-
dence is not easy to overcome even at national 
level, especially for a country like France which 
might have difficulty in reconciling its obliga-
tions within the Atlantic Alliance with the 
overriding requirement of independence on 
which the credibility of its policy of nuclear 
deterrence is based. 
Knowing the quality of the work of our 
Assembly, and the conscientiousness and expe-
rience of its members, I am certain that its 
resources are commensurate with its ambitions, 
provided that you believe that we should - to 
borrow the actual words used by Mr. Pierre 
Mauroy - " contemplate the prospect of a 
political entity possessing an autonomous 
defence capacity". 
The confidence which I am expressing here 
in the work of our Assembly is primarily 
esteem for its members; it is in that spirit that 
I should like to pay a tribute to the memory of 
the colleagues who left us before the opening of 
this session: Emile Bizet, member of the French 
Delegation to the Assembly between 1967 and 
1983; Louis Le Montagner, member of the 
French Delegation to the Assembly between 
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1980 and 1983; and Hermann Schmidt, 
member of the Delegation of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany to the Assembly between 1967 
and 1973 and from 1977 to 1983. 
I offer the condolences of the Assembly to 
the families of the deceased members and to 
their national delegations. 
I invite you to observe a minute's silence in 
their memory. 
(The Assembly stood in silence) 
All that remains for me to do, before presid-
ing over the voting, is to express the hope that 
our newly-elected future President will continue 
the good work and help to give the institutions 
of Western European Union their rightful place 
in this long-term undertaking of building 
Europe. (Applause) 
4. Examination of credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the examination of creden-
tials. 
The list of representatives and substitutes 
attending the twenty-ninth ordinary session of 
the Assembly of Western European Union has 
been published in Notice No. 1. 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on 25th April 1983 and are attested by 
a statement of ratification which . has been 
communicated to the President, with the excep-
tion of representatives and substitutes of the 
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Mr. Pecriaux, substitute in the Belgian 
Delegation, nominated since the session of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
It is now for the Assembly to confirm these 
credentials in accordance with Rule 6(2), and 
subject to ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly. They are in order under our rules, 
and there has been no objection. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, we may pro-
ceed to ratification without prior reference to a 
Credentials Committee. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
These credentials are therefore agreed, subject 
to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
I welcome our new colleagues to the Assem-
bly ofWEU. 
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S. Election of the President 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for the election of the 
President of the Assembly. 
I 
Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides 
that substitutes may not be elected to the 
Bureau of the Assembly. 
Furthermore, Rule I 0(2) and (1 0) states that 
no representative may stand as a candidate for 
the office of the President unless a proposal for 
his candidature has been sponsored in writing 
by three or more representatives. Representa-
tives who are members of a national govern-
ment may not be members of the Bureau. 
I have received two nominations, correctly 
submitted in the form prescribed by the Rules 
of Procedure. They are, in alphabetical order: 
Mr. Blaauw and Mr. De Poi. 
Voting will take place by secret ballot in 
accordance with Rule I 0. This states that, if 
after two ballots no candidate has obtained the 
votes of a number of representatives or substi-
tutes equal to more than half the number of 
representatives of the Assembly, that is, forty-
five or more, the candidate who on a third 
ballot receives the greatest number of votes is 
declared elected. If there is a tie, the candidate 
senior in age is elected. 
Under Rule 24, all representatives or substi-
tutes must sign the register of attendance. I 
request members who have not yet signed the 
register to do so without delay. 
Voting papers bearing the names of each 
candidate, together with an envelope, will be 
distributed. 
I will now draw by lot the names of the two 
tellers who will be responsible for counting the 
votes. 
Mr. Agrimi and Mr. Reddemann have been 
drawn. 
Each representative or substitute who has 
signed the register of attendance will be called 
to the rostrum in order to place in the urn the 
envelope containing the voting paper bearing 
the name of the chosen candidate. 
We shall now proceed to a roll-call. The 
roll-call will be taken in alphabetical order and 
I will now draw by lot the name of the member 
to be called first. 
The roll-call will begin with Mr. Pignion. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by secret ballot by roll-call was then 
taken) 
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Does anyone else wish to vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
I call upon Mr. Agrimi and Mr. Reddemann, 
the tellers, to withdraw into the office behind 
the rostrum in order to count the votes. 
The sitting will be suspended during the 
counting of the votes. It will be resumed in 
about twenty minutes. 
The sitting is suspended. 
(The sitting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.05 p.m.) 
The sitting is resumed. 
The result of the vote for the election of the 
President is as follows: 
Votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Blank or spoiled papers . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Effective votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Absolute majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
The votes were as follows: 
Mr. Blaauw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Mr. De Poi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Mr. De Poi having obtained the necessary 
majority, I proclaim him President of the Assem-
bly of Western European Union. (Applause) 
I congratulate him most warmly on your 
behalf and invite him to take the chair. 
(Mr. De Poi then took the Chair) 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I should like to begin by expressing 
my gratitude and by saying how much I appre-
ciate the confidence which the Assembly has 
shown in me by doing me the honour of 
making me its President. 
I can assure you that I shall devote all the 
enthusiasm of my European convictions to the 
service of the noble ideals which inspired the 
framing of the treaty which created WEU. 
I should also like to express my thanks to our 
doyen d'age, who has presided over the opening 
stages of our twenty-ninth session with an 
authority which he derives both from his great 
experience and from the wisdom reflected in his 
speech. 
I wish both to express my own feelings and to 
speak on your behalf by telling Mr. Mulley how 
much we have appreciated the cheerful autho-
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rity with which he has presided over our 
debates. Mr. Mulley was well acquainted with 
our Assembly, of which he had previously been 
a member twenty-five years ago. Before return-
ing to us he occupied the highest offices, espe-
cially that of Secretary of State for Defence, in 
his own country. To succeed him is a daunt-
ing task. I shall endeavour to be worthy of it. 
Lastly, I have to announce to you the depar-
ture of one of the most senior members of the 
Office of the Clerk, Miss Cohen, who has run 
the financial and administrative section most 
efficiently since the Assembly was formed. On 
your behalf I thank her most sincerely for her 
devoted service and extend to her our best 
wishes for the future. 
It is fourteen years since an Italian last 
mounted the steps of this rostrum as president 
of the only European assembly empowered to 
deal with matters of defence. I wish to say that 
I am proud that this honour has been bestowed 
upon me and shall endeavour to be deserving of 
it. 
Not that Italy has been absent from your 
debates. May I remind you that the two - if I 
may say so - most sharply-directed reports on 
the future of our institution since the masterly 
study on the subject made by Kai-Uwe von 
Hassel in 1980 have been, in chronological 
order, the report which I myself had the honour 
to devote to European union in December 1981 
and that of my colleague Vecchietti, who a year 
later emphasised the need for a more construc-
tive and effective relationship between the 
Assembly and the Council in order to conform 
to the spirit and aims of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, which set up our union. 
These Italian initiatives in the Assembly of 
WEU support the exemplary line taken by the 
French Government. 
The then French Secretary of State for Defence, 
Mr. Georges Lemoine, told us during the 
London symposium on co-operation in the field 
of armaments that the two-way transatlantic 
traffic must be preceded by an intra-European 
two-way traffic, that is, co-operation among 
member countries of WEU. 
The same applies to the North-South 
dialogue, which I consider should start within 
WEU and, before crossing the Mediterranean, 
be resumed on the European shores of the 
Mediterranean. We must not forget the mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance, such as Spain, 
Greece or Portugal, which are seeking a Euro-
pean identity as regards defence within the 
alliance. 
I am convinced that action to establish a 
European defence, forming the basis of that 
spirit of defence often spoken of in Paris, has 
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never been as necessary as it is today. I am 
convinced that France's ability to stand firm 
against the upsurge of pacifism and neutralism 
is due to the fact that it represents, within the 
Atlantic Alliance, a decision-making centre 
which appears credible to the younger genera-
tions of Frenchmen called upon to defend their 
country. I am, conversely, equally convinced 
that it is the absence of a credible intermediate 
decision-making link between the national 
centres and the strategic decision-making centre 
on the other side of the Atlantic - a link not 
perceived by the younger generations - that 
explains the smaller degree of resistance shown 
by certain member countries of WEU to the 
more or less externally inspired campaigns 
which call upon us to lower our guard. 
Under these circumstances it seems to me 
that in the transitional period in which we live 
it is around WEU and its bodies that a start 
should be made on strategic European consul-
tation with a view to co-operation on arma-
ments; for the modified Brussels Treaty, our 
treaty, is in fact the only reference for the Euro-
pean Community for defence matters and 
brings together the only countries in Western 
Europe which, up to the present, have felt it 
their duty to defend themselves, WEU's doors 
remaining open to any others which may feel 
the same sense of duty. 
There cannot be any deterrence without a 
consensus of the peoples, and this consensus 
calls for the progressive establishment of an 
autonomous European decision-making centre 
in all fields. Millions of unemployed do not 
make good soldiers, nor can uncommitted 
young people understand that our Europe, 
formerly an initiator, has become a mere object 
of politics. One does not fight for that kind of 
status and one does not feel protected by 
weapons which may not be fully under one's 
own control. 
Turning to those young Europeans who made 
up the bulk of the supporters of the pacifist 
movements in some countries, I should like to 
tell them first of all that, being thirty-seven 
years old, I belong to the generation which 
came of age in 1968, but I did not take part in 
the riots. 
I should also like to tell them that I share 
their aspirations for peace, freedom and 
development - privileges which we in Western 
Europe enjoy but are denied to millions of 
other young people in Eastern Europe and in 
other continents. 
What the younger generations must realise is 
that the peace, the freedom and the develop-
ment which we enjoy depend on delicate balan-
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ces, the credibility of which is threatened by 
pacifist campaigns, to the benefit of those very 
political regimes which deny these privileges to 
their young people. 
That is why it saddens me to see thousands of 
young people setting off in good faith along the 
road to the dead end of pacifism and neutra-
lism, rather than choosing the course which 
other young people, including myself, have 
chosen: that of playing a part in the great Euro-
pean adventure whose purpose is to help to 
bring the possibility of peace, freedom and 
development to those who, all over the world, 
are denied them. 
The multiple polarity now emerging in the 
world offers Europe, and hence my generation, 
a great opportunity of participating in the deci-
sive choices for the security of today, on which 
tomorrow's peace depends. 
Instead of losing themselves in the blind 
alley of pacifism and neutralism, young people 
must ensure that Europe is present and that its 
measure is put over in the worldwide negotia-
tions which are starting both in the East-West 
context and within the North-South dialogue. 
Let there be no mistake - I am of course in 
favour of the deployment of Euromissiles in 
Europe in view of the glaring imbalance of 
forces between the NATO countries and those 
of the Warsaw Pact. But I am afraid that, for 
the immediate future, assertion of Europe's 
identity as regards defence will be the price 
which will have to be paid in order to ensure 
that these Euromissiles are accepted without 
too much public opposition in our countries. 
In other words, it is only by building, around 
WEU, a European pillar of the alliance such as 
was called for by President Kennedy as far back 
as 1962 that the credibility of the defence of 
our European peninsula can be restored. 
That is why I think it necessary to preserve at 
the very least the achievements of WEU and to 
hold them in reserve in Europe against any 
untimely attempt to curtail its resources in 
terms of staff and funds, modest though these 
are - as if the hundred and fifty-seven officials 
of WEU and its austere budget were the cause 
of the serious economic and financial crisis 
which we are experiencing. 
Why are we not as aware of our European 
potential as the Chinese, whose invitation to us 
last April to send them a delegation of our 
Political Committee is the best recognition of 
the defence role of Europe and of our WEU. 
I am, to be sure, the last to deny the Euro-
pean Community and its parliament, elected by 
universal suffrage, a right to take cognisance of 
security problems. The simple fact is that, in 
view of the urgency of the decisions to be 
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taken, I believe that - once again at least for a 
transitional period, however long it may prove 
to be -we ought to make full use of Western 
European Union in order to stimulate the Euro-
pean reaction which seems to me to be a matter 
of life and death in order to counter the 
undermining of our societies now taking place 
daily before our eyes, in a very difficult 
economic and social context. 
There were ideas of postponing this half-
session, as attendance at our Assembly was 
reduced - but not to such a great extent, as far 
as I can see - because of parliamentary elec-
tions in the United Kingdom and Italy. I was 
not in favour of doing so, because we should 
have missed the opportunity of affirming our 
unique role in the field of defence on the eve of 
a historic meeting of the North Atlantic Coun-
cil due to be held in Paris for the first time 
since France's withdrawal from NA TO's inte-
grated command structure in 1966. 
Despite orders of the day which do not per-
haps cover all current matters of concern, I 
hope that there will emerge from this half-
session a clear message expressing the determi-
nation of Europeans to defend themselves, with 
the indispensable assistance of our American 
allies, but gradually assuming our rightful 
responsibilities in order to re-establish the 
confidence of our peoples, without which all 
our efforts will be in vain. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I will conclude by 
expressing a hope: that in 1984, the year of the 
thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of Wes-
tern European Union, this event will be 
commemorated by our Assembly in an impres-
sive manner, with each political committee 
called upon to make a review, which must of 
necessity be brief, of the achievements of these 
thirty years, but with the main emphasis 
on the future. 
Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for your 
attention and I now call upon you to proceed 
to the business of the session. (Applause) 
7. Election of Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for the election of 
Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
Rule 7(2) lays down that substitutes may not 
be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. 
Under Rule 10, no representative may stand 
as a candidate for the offices of President or 
Vice-President unless a proposal for his candi-
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dature has been sponsored in writing by three 
or more representatives, and representatives 
who are members of governments are not eli-
gible for nomination for the Bureau. 
Five nominations have been properly made 
in the form prescribed by the rules. 
These are, in alphabetical order: Sir Frederic 
Bennett, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. 
Pignion, Mr. Unland. 
The last seat will be filled later. 
If there are no objections, I propose that the 
election of the Vice-Presidents be by acclama-
tion. 
Is there any objection? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore declare Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Mr. Berchem, Mr. Bonnet, Mr. Pignion and 
Mr. Unland duly elected to be Vice-Presidents 
and congratulate them. 
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for 
the first part of the session 
(Doe. 941) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the adoption of the draft 
order of business for the first part of the 
twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly, 
Document 941. 
The Assembly will note that Mr. Fiandrotti's 
report on the harmonisation of research in civil 
and military high technology fields - reply to 
the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
has been withdrawn from the order of busi-
ness at the request of the Committee on Scienti-
fic, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
which has not yet completed its work on it. 
The draft order of business has been distri-
buted. 
Are there any objections? ... 
Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom). - First, 
Mr. President, I thank you warmly for the kind 
remarks that you made about my privilege of 
being your President for the past three years. I 
also want to say how much I appreciate how 
your remarks were received by our colleagues 
in the Assembly and the tremendous co-
operation that I had from members and staff of 
the Assembly during my period in office. 
Secondly, I want to be the first person to 
congratulate you, Mr. President, on your elec-
tion and to wish you well. I hope that you 
will have a most successful period as President 
of our Assembly. As you said, it is an impor-
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tant post and this is an important Assembly. I 
am sure that you will do all that you can to 
maintain its position. 
As you well know, Mr. President, I speak on 
the draft order of business because, as a result 
of the election problems in your country and 
mine, we have had to curtail our arrange-
ments. The matter was raised at the Presidential 
Committee and several people - I have in 
mind particularly my conservative colleague, 
Mr. Wilkinson, who is coming out just one day 
before voting especially to present his report -
hope that you will do your very best to keep to 
the timetable. That is particularly important 
when people are coming especially to present 
reports or to participate in debates in the diffi-
cult circumstances in which we all find oursel-
ves on this occasion. As I would not be Presi-
dent, I could not give such a guarantee. I 
know that you will do your best, but I 
undertook to raise that point on behalf of 
Mr. Wilkinson and the Presidential Committee. 
I hope that, if it is possible, we shall keep to the 
times in the draft order before us. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Mulley, 
you can imagine how much your congratula-
tions mean to me and how greatly I appreciate 
your good wishes. I assure you that I shall 
heed your remarks, bearing in mind particularly 
that the course of this part-session is somewhat 
unusual because of the forthcoming elections. 
I shall endeavour to meet the requirements of 
the members of the Bureau. 
Are there any objections to Document 941? ... 
The draft order of business is adopted. 
9. Nomination of members to committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the nomination of members 
to committees. 
The candidates for the Assembly's five 
permanent committees and the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments have been published 
in an Annex to Notice No. 1, which has been 
distributed. 
In accordance with Rule 39(6) and Rule 
42 his of the Rules of Procedure, these 
nominations are submitted to the Assembly. 
Is there any objection to these nominations? ... 
The nominations to the committees are 
therefore agreed to. 
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10. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. 
Mollemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
I apologise to the members of the Assembly 
and to Mr. Mollemann for the fact that our 
proceedings are behind schedule. 
I thank Mr. Mollemann in advance for his 
willingness to answer questions put to him. I 
propose to the Assembly that Mr. Mollemann 
should take the floor immediately and that we 
should then hear Mr. Caro's report. 
I call Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all I 
should like to thank you for your sympathy at 
your session last December, when I had to 
cancel my visit to the WEU Assembly at short 
notice because of an accident. Since then I 
have been eager to resume the dialogue with 
you at the earliest possible date, and I am glad 
that this is possible today. 
Mr. President, you have just been elected 
President of this Assembly. Allow me to 
convey to you my government's and my own 
congratulations on your election to this distin-
guished post. At the same time we wish to 
thank your departing predecessor, Mr. Mulley. 
I am confident that under your presidency, too, 
the good relations between the Council and the 
Assembly will be further strengthened and 
intensified; my government will contribute to 
this endeavour. 
A good relationship of trust between the 
Council and the Assembly is important, not 
least because the Assembly is still the only 
European parliamentary body dealing with 
defence issues. My government therefore 
follows the Assembly's debates and recommen-
dations with particular interest and great 
attention. 
Of course, this also applies to the Assembly's 
discussions on the adaptation of Western Euro-
pean Union to the changes that have occurred 
since its foundation in the real political situa-
tion on our continent. Here the Council and 
the Assembly have the joint task of undertaking 
sensibly and realistically the adjustments 
needed to ensure that Western European Union 
remains a viable and functioning body in the 
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1980s. The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany notes with satisfaction 
that initiatives pointing the way ahead have 
been launched by the Assembly, including 
Recommendation 380, adopted in June 1982. 
The Federal Government welcomes and thanks 
the Assembly for the trust it has shown 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
central goal of German foreign policy is 
actively to safeguard peace. This means ensur-
ing a defence capability on the basis of the 
western alliance and German participation in 
the shaping of East-West relations. 
As a divided nation at the interface between 
East and West, the Federal Republic of 
Germany has constructed its defence policy on 
the solid foundations of western solidarity. 
Proceeding from this stable base, it continues to 
seek, within the CSCE context, a dialogue with 
Eastern Europe on political, economic and 
humanitarian issues. This western solidarity is 
likewise the basis of the Federal Republic's 
efforts on behalf of disarmament and arms 
control. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
guarantees our security, which is the vital 
condition for our active policy of peace and at 
the same time the alliance creates the general 
framework of German political, economic and 
social stability. 
In close proximity to this session of the WEU 
Assembly in terms of both time and place, the 
foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance 
will meet here in Paris on 9th and 1Oth June 
1983. Let me take this opportunity to describe 
the unique historical role played by the 
alliance, which has now been safeguarding 
peace in Europe for more than three decades. 
Unlike the Warsaw Pact, this alliance is not a 
military bloc forcibly imposed on others and 
under authoritarian control. It is a community 
of free peoples, founded on shared convictions. 
On the basis of common values and security 
interests in the face of the undiminished threat 
posed by the Soviet Union, the democratic 
states of Europe and North America united in 
the alliance constitute a community with a 
common destiny, whose vitality and determina-
tion to defend itself are unbroken. Develop-
ments in Europe since the establishment of the 
North Atlantic Alliance have shown that it is, 
as stated in its charter, an association for 
purposes of defence alone, without any expan-
sionary goals. None of the major, dangerous 
European crises of the last few decades was 
provoked by the West. Even when it enjoyed 
nuclear superiority, the principles of modera-
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tion and renunciation of force came first with 
the alliance. This was reaffirmed in Bonn a 
year ago by the heads of state and government 
of the alliance. They stated clearly and 
without reservation that none of the alliance's 
weapons will ever be used in the future either, 
except in response to an attack. 
The security afforded by the alliance has not 
simply fallen into our laps. It demands efforts 
from all member countries which would be 
hard to bear if they were not made in a spirit of 
partnership and fair burden-sharing. We are 
grateful to the United States for finding the 
strength, despite economic difficulties, to 
respond to the Soviet arms build-up with out-
standing defence efforts. We Europeans, too, 
are committed to shouldering our share of 
responsibility for our collective security. We 
have never neglected this principle in the past 
and have taken Europe's growing economic 
strength into account. 
Of the alliance's joint defence expenditure, 
44 % is now borne by Europe against no more 
than 25% in 1971. The rise in the German 
share has been well above the average of the 
other non-American allies. The federal armed 
forces are the cornerstone of the alliance's 
defence capability at the dividing line between 
East and West in Central Europe. Their contri-
bution to the alliance's potential in Central 
Europe accounts for 50 % of the land forces, 
50 % of the land-based air defence, 30 % of the 
combat aircraft, 70 % of the naval forces in the 
Baltic and 100 % of the airborne naval forces in 
the Baltic. 
Besides the 490,000 soldiers of the federal 
armed forces, there are approximately 
350,000 allied troops stationed in the territory 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, whom we 
support in the common interest, for instance by 
providing buildings and land. 
This density of troops brings home to the 
people of the Federal Republic of Germany 
that they live at a highly sensitive point in the 
tense East-West political constellation. For us 
the active pursuit of a peace policy is therefore 
- as Chancellor Kohl said in his policy state-
ment on 4th May 1983 - both a political neces-
sity and a moral obligation. 
The Federal Government is wholly commit-
ted to the Atlantic Alliance's basic political 
concept, founded on firmness and a readiness 
for dialogue, a concept whose validity will be 
reaffirmed at the forthcoming meeting of 
NATO foreign ministers. This concept also 
underlies NA TO's twofold decision, pursuant to 
which American intermediate-range missiles 
will be deployed in Europe from late 1983 
onwards unless a concrete negotiated settlement 
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has by then rendered such deployment super-
fluous. I am certain that the NATO foreign 
ministers will reaffirm their commitment to 
both parts of the decision and thus demonstrate 
once more the alliance's unity and predictability. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we 
note with concern that there are still no solu-
tions in sight to the problems that have impo-
sed serious strains on East-West relations in 
recent years. The Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan continues, with more than half a 
million victims to date, and there has been no 
discernible easing of the Soviet arms build-up, 
which greatly exceeds that country's legitimate 
security interests. The change of leadership in 
Moscow has not resulted in any shift in Soviet 
foreign policy. In Poland, the release of the 
internees and the suspension of martial law 
have not yet led to the national consensus that 
the Polish leaders had hoped for. Despite the 
serious strains on East-West relations and the 
existing ideological and political differences, the 
Federal Government subscribes to a policy 
aimed at reducing tensions, creating trust and 
reconciling opposing interests. 
However, a policy geared to the development 
of constructive and stable relations between 
East and West and to genuine detente can only 
be successful in the long run if it is based on 
reciprocity and if the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact, especially the Soviet Union, contribute to 
it by exercising restraint and displaying respon-
sibility in international relations. East-West 
relations have always been marked by a 
mixture of confrontation, competition and co-
operation. This is not likely to change in the 
foreseeable future, but the opportunities for 
reconciliation, progress and co-operation must 
be perceived and utilised. 
Consequently, the Federal Government 
regards the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe as a model for shaping 
East-West relations in the interests of peace. 
The Helsinki final act enunciates what is attain-
able by means of agreements between East and 
West in terms of political relations, human 
rights, contacts between people, exchange of 
information, security matters and economic and 
cultural co-operation. The final act does not 
expect any more of a participating state than it 
has undertaken by signing the act. Some 
things have been achieved since 1975, but 
much remains to be done. This process must 
therefore be kept alive and reinforced, and we 
must continue patiently to encourage and 
demand contacts between people and the 
exchange of information and ideas. The Fede-
ral Government therefore attaches the utmost 
importance to an early, successful conclusion of 
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the Madrid meeting with a substantive and 
balanced final document. Even at the current 
stage of negotiations the draft document would 
open up opportunities for progress and impro-
vements for people in Europe and would enable 
a conference on disarmament in Europe to be 
convened. The moderate revisions to the 
document suggested by the West do not ask the 
impossible from any participating country. 
Having declared its readiness to accept the neu-
tral compromise proposal, the Soviet Union 
cannot refuse to agree on a few revisions. The 
final document may not live up to everybody's 
expectations, but failure in Madrid would 
neither benefit the people, nor promote the 
achievement of human rights, nor advance the 
efforts on behalf of security and arms control. 
We need a positive outcome to the Madrid 
CSCE follow-up meeting as an important part 
of the political framework for our peace policy 
and work for disarmament and arms control. 
In the elections on 6th March Chancellor 
Kohl received a vote of confidence supporting 
the consistent continuation of these endeavours. 
The Federal Government is determined to 
do its utmost in accordance with this mandate 
to help bring about balanced and verifiable 
arms reductions. This political aim is espe-
cially crucial to us because it would take 
account of the anxieties and concern of large 
sections of our population over the horrors of 
nuclear war. 
A realistic peace policy calls for disarmament 
in East and West alike. Unilateral disarma-
ment, as demanded by some representatives of 
the peace movement in our country and other 
allied countries, does not foster greater security, 
but, on the contrary, insecurity. Concerned as 
we are for peace, we must not be guided by 
fear, but must take sensible decisions to 
preserve peace. This includes being prepared 
to defend ourselves together with our partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance, as well as working 
unceasingly for peaceful reconciliation between 
East and West, and especially for balanced arms 
reductions. However, the path of agreed 
mutual arms reductions calls for patience and 
perseverance. But one thing is certain: prior 
concessions and unilateral disarmament merely 
invite coercion and blackmail. This does not 
make peace any safer. 
The alliance has submitted arms control 
proposals to the East that embrace all areas of 
the military balance of forces and aim at 
concrete results. Our citizens undoubtedly 
place their hopes above all in early results at 
the Geneva INF talks. On 29th March the 
alliance submitted a proposal for an interim 
agreement, designed to secure parity of the 
Soviet and American potentials at the lowest 
level acceptable to the Soviet Union. 
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Since then, Mr. Andropov has announced in 
Moscow that the Soviet Union is willing to 
accept warheads as the criterion for calculating 
the ratio of forces. This is undoubtedly an 
advance, but a point of criticism is that the 
Soviet Union persists in its demand that British 
and French systems be counted, which is unac-
ceptable to the Western European allies. The 
opportunities for progress afforded by this 
change in the Soviet Union's position must now 
be examined at the negotiating table. The 
western proposal for an interim agreement has 
provided the negotiators with a flexible frame-
work for exploring the possibilities. 
Despite the importance and topicality of INF, 
we must not neglect arms control in the 
conventional sphere. We must continue our 
efforts to come to grips with the problem of the 
Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional wea-
pons, not only by means of defence policy, but 
also through arms control. This is why we 
shall continue to seek a solution through 
MBFR and why the Federal Government 
attaches so much importance to a conference 
on disarmament in Europe, which now offers 
an opportunity to achieve an attempt at arms 
control in negotiations covering the whole of 
Europe as far as the Urals. 
The Federal Government also attaches parti-
cular importance to the work of the Geneva 
Committee on Disarmament, which is the only 
forum for negotiations on disarmament and 
arms control on a global scale. It urges that all 
of the talks in the Committee on Disarmament 
be stepped up. Mr. Genscher underlined this 
emphatically once more in his statement to the 
committee on 3rd February 1983 at the start of 
this year's session. 
The negotiations on a worldwide, compre-
hensive and dependably verifiable ban on all 
chemical weapons are a matter of top priority 
for us. In the course of time these negotiations 
have led to agreement in some areas and to 
some initial convergence on the key question of 
a reasonable and reliable verification regime, 
which must include systematic on-site inspec-
tions. To help resolve this very question, the 
Federal Government has made constructive 
contributions in the form of proposals sub-
mitted in March and September 1982 and 
presented a model for a comprehensive verifica-
tion regime. The Federal Government believes 
that an agreement banning all chemical· wea-
pons is attainable and will continue to exploit 
every opportunity of influencing these difficult 
talks in a constructive manner and of actively 
expediting them. Here in particular we put 
our trust in the support of our western 
allies. 
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Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in a 
year of such decisive political importance 
worldwide as this one, we place even greater 
reliance on these many and varied political and 
security activities on behalf of maintaining 
peace. The Federal Government is firmly 
convinced that these activities can succeed 
through the joint efforts of the allies. The 
western alliance owes its strength and cohesion 
to the fact that it is a voluntary association, 
based on a wide range of shared ideals and poli-
tical values. If this community of values of the 
free democratic countries of Europe and North 
America is to survive, a permanent dialogue is 
needed. The Federal Republic of Germany 
concurs with you, Ladies and Gentlemen, in 
the view that the WEU Assembly can and will 
make an important contribution to this dialo-
gue in the future, as it has in the past. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
Mr. Mollemann for his address and for his good 
wishes for the future of the Assembly. 
I would now ask him to be so kind as to 
answer questions from the members of the 
Assembly. 
I call Mr. Holtz. 
Mr. HOL TZ (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I should like to 
ask the Secretary of State about the Federal 
Government's position on a WEU protocol in 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture certain types of wea-
pon and means of mass destruction, such as 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons. This 
protocol states, however, that it will refrain 
from doing so in its national territory. Does 
this undertaking by the Federal Republic 
of Germany mean that it may manufacture or 
co-operate in the manufacture of such weapons 
outside its own territory? 
You referred to the commun!ty of free peo-
ples when describing the alliance. I regard this 
not only as a statement of fact but, where Tur-
key is concerned, for instance, as an exhorta-
tion. How does the alliance, how do the other 
countries intend to use their influence so that 
the Turkish people can make free and demo-
cratic decisions once again? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - During the Franco-German 
consultations in October of last year the two 
sides agreed that their discussions should be 
extended to include security and defence mat-
ters. It would surely not be presumptuous 
to ask the Secretary of State to provide this 
Assembly, which he too considers to be the 
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only parliamentary body permitted to discuss 
European defence and disarmament questions, 
with some details of the content of these 
consultations. 
A second question I should like to ask is this: 
the Secretary of State is familiar with the 
proposals and suggestions various French 
ministers have propounded here, all amounting 
to a call for a more active WEU Council and 
Assembly. I would be interested to hear what 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Fede-
ral Government think of these proposals and 
what your own views are. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The Secretary of State said that 
the result of the elections on 6th March 1983 
was also a vote in favour of balanced and veri-
fiable arms reductions. Is he not perhaps going 
too far in supporting the NATO arms build-up, 
and perhaps even regarding the elections of 6th 
March 1983 as a majority vote in favour of this 
concept? That is my first question. 
Second, does the Secretary of State share my 
view that the " arm to disarm " formula has 
failed where disarmament is concerned? Does 
he not also agree that disarmament on this basis 
has never made any progress and that it would 
be foolhardy to try this formula again now, at 
so dangerous a time, when a further increase in 
nuclear stockpiles might lead to annihilation? 
My third question is this: you say that the 
strength of the western system is that it is a 
voluntary association. Now that the Sinus 
study has revealed that some 60 % of the popu-
lation of the Federal Republic of Germany are 
opposed to the deployment of these medium-
range weapons in their country, would you not 
agree that there is no question of any voluntary 
acceptance of these next steps in the arms 
build-up? 
Fourth, you did not explain why the Soviet 
Government's desire to include French and 
British missiles, in a balance of warheads, for 
example, is unacceptable. I should like to 
know why you think this is unacceptable and 
how the Federal Government would argue the 
case if, as a result of independent armament, 
Czechoslovakia, for instance, had missiles of 
its own, as France and the United Kingdom 
have. Would the Federal Government not 
take it for granted that such missiles should 
be included in a numerical comparison? 
Finally, since you have said that as a result 
of the elections on 6th March 1983 the 
Federal Government is interested in balanced 
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and verifiable arms reductions, I should like 
to hear from you whether it could not also 
take steps in favour of establishing a genuine 
disarmament agency, a genuine European 
disarmament committee, possibly under the 
auspices of WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Jung. 
-Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
Minister, I should like to congratulate you on 
the effort made by the Government of the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany to promote European 
development and for everything that you said to 
us a few moments ago. 
But I consider that it would be equally 
interesting to hear an analysis from you of the 
military potential of East Germany, because we 
are all very much aware that, in the present 
situation, there are certain problems; and you 
are the man best placed to talk about these. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Mollemann. 
Mr. M6LLEMANN (Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to 
begin by answering Mr. Holtz's two questions. 
The undertaking to which he referred extends 
not only to our own territory but also to the 
types of weapon which have been mentioned 
here. We have undertaken not to manufacture 
A, B and C weapons, and we do not do so, any-
where. The Federal Government intends to 
abide by this position. As to the situation in 
Turkey, the Federal Government joins with its 
partners in the Council of Europe, I believe, 
and in Western European Union and NATO, 
in advocating that the timetable laid down by 
the Turkish military government for the rein-
troduction of democracy should be observed so 
that democratic principles and human rights 
may soon be fully restored in Turkey. This is 
after all one of the criteria which must be met 
by every member of the alliance. 
The controversy in our parliament in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and probably 
among parliamentarians in the other countries 
too, concerns the best way of influencing the 
Turkish military government in this respect. 
We are convinced that we should use our 
contacts, honour the commitments we have 
entered into and continue to co-operate on this 
basis while calling on the Turkish Government 
to observe the timetable it has adopted, in pre-
ference to suspending these contacts or disregar-
ding our commitments. We are relying on our 
assessment of the situation in Turkey and the 
course of historical developments. 
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Secondly, I should like to address Mr. Ahrens 
and answer his two questions. Franco-German 
co-operation in defence policy has only recently 
begun in earnest: the consultations in fact fulfil 
the Elysee agreement in an area to which it had 
not previously been applied. In view of the 
special role played by France in the alliance, it 
is natural that co-ordination, information and 
consultation between two neighbours, who 
moreover have a particularly prominent part to 
play in national military defence, should be 
stepped up in this way. 
In a speech he made some time ago the 
French President explained what is not inclu-
ded in this co-operation. It does not extend to 
nuclear weapons or a nuclear strategy, nor does 
it imply the formation of a kind of alliance 
within the alliance. What it does concern is 
the practical co-ordination of all matters and 
plans relating to national defence so that 
neither the structure of the two countries' 
armed forces nor their training, equipment and 
weaponry develop along conflicting or parallel 
lines, but can be brought into rational harmony 
with each other. 
The second question concerned the proposals 
that have been made here and elsewhere for the 
future planning of WEU's work. You referred 
to the French proposals, and there are others. 
We feel that all these proposals should be 
very carefully analysed, taking two questions in 
particular as the criterion. 
Is it possible that there is a duplication of 
effort here, that work is being taken on which is 
already being done efficiently elsewhere? For 
example, in some of the proposals made by 
Mr. Hintermann, for whom I have the greatest 
respect, I see a danger of duplication of very 
important work that is already being done 
elsewhere. I feel that at a time when we all 
have enough to do and when all good people, 
simply because they are good, are working to 
capacity, we should beware of burdening them 
with work that involves a repetition of some-
thing that has already been done. 
Nor do I think we should create the impres-
sion that there is something like rivalry between 
this and other organisations. On the contrary, 
its work must be complementary to the others'. 
To Mr. Vogt I would say that election results 
can, of course, be interpreted in different ways, 
depending on how they affect us personally and 
on the criteria we apply. This is particularly 
fascinating in an international body. 
It is surely indisputable that the present 
Federal Government won a clear majority on 
6th March 1983. I believe it made its position 
on the NATO twofold decision which we are 
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now discussing very clear to the public before 
the elections. It must be assumed that the 
public voted as they did because of rather than 
despite this position. 
Your second question concerned the " arm 
to disarm " formula. There would indeed be 
little point in using it in this way. As far as I 
can remember, I did not mention the phrase in 
my statement just now. The very essence of 
the twofold decision consists in attempting to 
reach agreement on disarmament before 
arming, in other words, to involve the other 
side in the extent of our own armament. This 
is a co-operative approach which did not exist 
until the twofold decision was taken. I would 
have been very pleased if the Soviet Union had 
proposed to the western alliance that it would 
make its deployment of SS-20 systems depen-
dent on prior arms control negotiations, rather 
than confronting us with their deployment as a 
fait accompli. The Federal Government and, I 
believe, the western alliance will maintain this 
other approach, namely the attempt to proceed 
on a co-operative basis. One thing is clear, 
however: where imbalances have arisen as a 
result of pre-emptive armament and where they 
cannot be eliminated through negotiations, we 
must restore the balance with defence efforts of 
our own. In this respect, the western alliance 
is pursuing the goal not of parity of numbers, as 
the twofold decision makes perfectly clear, but 
of parity of options. 
In your third question you referred to my 
contention that one of the strengths of the west-
em alliance is that it is a voluntary associa-
tion. I fail to see how your counter-argument 
refutes this argument, but I will nevertheless 
take up your question. 
You said that a survey had shown 60 % of 
the citizens of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many were opposed to the deployment of 
American land-based, medium-range missiles in 
their country. Like most of the members here, 
I expect, I am familiar from my work with a 
great number of very sound public opinion 
polls on alliance policy and the various aspects 
of defence policy, and I know that the findings 
vary very substantially. I do not therefore 
think it is wise to pick out just one such poll 
and one set of answers. The Federal Govern-
ment has sufficient evidence to show that, if it 
advocates both elements of the twofold decision 
with equal credibility, it will continue to enjoy 
the support of the majority of the population. 
Not the least important factor in this will 
be whether all the parties represented in the 
parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany 
which have hitherto backed both elements of 
the twofold decision, and particularly the pro-
genitors of this decision, will stand by their off-
spring. 
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You have asked me why British and French 
warheads cannot be included in the INF talks 
in Geneva as the Soviet Union has demanded. 
I said that the western alliance considered 
this demand unacceptable because it would 
mean including these warheads twice. As you 
know, the ceiling fixed at the SALT talks provi-
ded for the de facto inclusion of the French and 
British systems in the western weapons count, 
although this was not explicitly stated. 
Of course, one might object that SALT 11 has 
not been ratified. But I believe we are all satis-
fied for SALT 11 to be treated by both sides as 
if it had been ratified and that the two sides 
mutually confirm this. Over and above this, 
however - and someone else ought to be 
advancing this argument: it is not really up to 
me - a statement by President Mitterrand 
before the German Bundestag and various 
remarks by Mrs. Thatcher have made it clear 
that there are other factors preventing the 
French and British Governments from agreeing 
to the inclusion of their systems in the count. 
I have stated the objective reasons, which are 
of paramount importance to us. 
I do not think - and I now refer to your last 
question - that there is any shortage of interna-
tional bodies or forums to deal with disarma-
ment. It is my impression that the West's 
disarmament proposals have created so wide a 
range of possible arenas for action that it is now 
a question of finding the political will actually 
to make reductions as a step towards practical 
and verifiable agreements. The West is ready 
to do this. 
I now come to Mr. Jung's question. It is 
difficult to do justice to your request for infor-
mation on the development of the Warsaw 
Pact's military potential in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, but there have undeniably been 
unwelcome changes which have further upset 
the balance or tipped it against the West in two 
areas: conventionally equipped land forces, and 
air forces. There has been a further shift in the 
Warsaw Pact's favour in both these areas. 
Mr. President, I shall conclude by reverting 
to one of Mr. Vogt's questions, which I over-
looked just now. He asked me somewhat 
rhetorically how we would react if Czechoslo-
vakia, for example, should hit on the idea of 
going it alone nationally, as it were, and pro-
ducing and deploying nuclear systems. I 
believe we are all quite clear that the realities of 
the situation make this question extremely rhe-
torical. He was comparing the situation in 
Czechoslovakia with the situation in France. I 
feel that objectively the position of these two 
countries in relation to their own system of 
alliance is so different that no further comment 
is needed. (Applause) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The Secretary of State's last 
remark prompts me to put a supplementary 
question. In an assembly such as this it should 
be permissible to use what might be termed 
logical aids, as I have done with the hypothe-
tical case of missiles being deployed in Cze-
choslovakia. I feel we should agree on that. 
I should like to extend the question some-
what. Do you not think that if the negotia-
tions in Geneva do fail and SS-20s continue to 
be deployed without restriction and if NATO 
similarly proceeds to the deployment of Per-
shing 11 and cruise missiles, the attempt to 
arrive at negotiations by means of a postpone-
ment, in other words, to involve the other side 
in the agreed extent of armament, must be 
considered just as much of a failure as other 
disarmament formulas? Are you not also 
concerned that, as I have heard, the Soviet 
Union might move its medium-range missiles, 
hitherto confined to its own territory, closer to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, to Western 
Europe, thus enabling it, with its SS-20s, to 
match the shorter early-warning period which 
NATO's Pershing lis would allow? Would you 
not then agree that the effect of the arms build-
up already under way in NATO - to the extent 
that preparatory construction work is going 
ahead in Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany - might well be 
the opposite of what the advocates of this 
concept hope to achieve and substantially 
increase the danger of a nuclear war, especially 
one caused by mistake? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Schwarz. 
Mr. SCHW ARZ (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - I should like to ask the 
Secretary of State if he took account of last 
week's events in Turkey in his answer, in which 
he said that the generals would keep to the 
timetable and that he would do everything he 
could to help. A party founded under recently 
irttroduced Turkish legislation has been banned 
and sixteen politicians have been sent into 
exile. Does he agree that it is more important 
for democratic freedoms to be restored in 
Turkey than for the timetable to be observed, 
and therefore for the elections on 6th Novem-
ber to be free and democratic as we understand 
these terms rather than a mere sham? Does he 
also agree that the Federal Government must 
make a great effort to obtain the release of the 
sixteen politicians who have been arrested, if 
Turkey's relations with the Council of Europe 
and with the Federal Republic of Germany are 
to remain as cordial as they have been in the 
past? 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call· 
Mr. Mollemann. 
Mr. MOLLEMANN (Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - I shall 
begin with Mr. Vogt's questions. It would, of 
course, be regrettable for everyone concerned if 
the negotiations being conducted in Geneva on 
the basis of the twofold decision failed to pro-
duce agreement to the zero option on both sides 
or at least an interim solution. The decision 
the alliance has taken would then leave it with 
no other alternative than to compensate for the 
imbalance that has since developed, by 
deploying its own land-based, medium-range 
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles. 
However, having assessed the progress of the 
negotiations so far, my impression is that such 
pessimism is at present of a very hypothetical 
nature, to say the least. I should like, Mr. Pre-
sident, to give you three brief examples in 
support of this statement. 
First, the Soviet Union began by rejecting 
negotiations on the twofold decision in any 
form and in fact demanded its withdrawal or at 
least its suspension. 
Second, it refused to negotiate on warheads. 
All it would discuss was missiles, launcher 
systems. For obvious reasons, that was out of 
the question, since the Soviet launcher systems 
carry three warheads, while the Pershing 11, if it 
is now deployed, will carry only one. 
Third, the Soviet Union repeatedly said at 
the beginning of the talks that it could not 
make substantial concessions because there was 
virtual parity in this area. Mr. Andropov's 
recent speech, however, clearly indicates that 
the Soviet Union is prepared to accept a greater 
reduction in its missiles. In other words, it 
admits to an imbalance of forces. It would be 
altogether too blatant if it did not, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, since it is quite literally phenome-
nal that a power like the Soviet Union should 
have managed to conduct a positively gigantic 
propaganda campaign since 13th December 
1979 against the possible deployment of west-
ern systems from December 1983 onwards, 
while itself deploying a fresh SS-20 launcher 
every week. This is known colloquially in my 
country as the " Stop thief" method. The 
unfortunate thing is that some people still fall 
for it. 
You also said that in this situation the Soviet 
Union might move its SS-20s forward. The 
mobility of these systems allows them to be 
moved backwards and forwards, which explains 
why not only Japan but also the ASEAN coun-
tries have now become worried. 
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I feel, however, that you have misunderstood 
the statements made by the Soviet leaders last 
week. They referred not to the movement of 
existing systems but to the deployment of addi-
tional systems in Warsaw Pact countries to the 
west of the Soviet Union, which would indeed 
increase the discrepancy in the balance of 
power. 
Lastly, the deployment of one hundred and 
eight Pershing 11 systems can in no way be 
seriously related to the first strike concept. A 
system which cannot even reach Moscow, 
which flies just two thousand kilometres and so 
cannot reach the main control centres in the 
Soviet sphere of influence, which corresponds 
to just 10% of the Soviet Union's strategic 
nuclear potential - to describe this as a first-
strike capability is, objectively speaking, com-
pletely without justification. The philosophy 
formulated by Helmut Schmidt and Hans-
Dietrich Genscher was to secure, in this area 
too, deterrence not on the basis of numerical 
equality but of efficiency in terms of parity of 
options. 
To conclude, I turn to Mr. Schwarz. I fully 
agree that last week's events did not come up to 
our expectations - on the contrary - and that 
the assurances given to the West did refer not 
only to a period of time but also to matters of 
substance. Of course, as champions of the idea 
of freedom, we parliamentarians must support 
our counterparts in Turkey - and most of them 
are former colleagues - and appeal for their 
release. The Federal Government and the 
other countries of the western alliance would do 
well to bring their influence to bear in every 
way they can. However, I have the impres-
sion, Mr. Schwarz, that this will be the more 
convincingly and effectively achieved, the 
clearer we make it to Turkey that, if these 
requirements are satisfied, it will retain its place 
in our alliance, because we want to go on co-
operating with Turkey as a partner. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Secre-
tary of State, we have probably taken up too 
much of your time. Thank you again for 
giving such precise answers to the questions put 
to you. I, and my colleagues, hope that we 
shall have the pleasure of receiving you again 
in this Assembly in order to continue a fruitful 
exchange of views. 
Owing to the particularly heavy work-load 
for this part-session, I propose to the Assembly 
that, in accordance with Rule 33 'of the Rules 
of Procedure, speeches in all the debates, except 
those of committee chairmen and rapporteurs, 
be kept to five minutes. 
I would remind you that, under the same 
rule, the Assembly must vote on this proposal 
without debate. 
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Please understand the rather special situation 
in which this session is taking place. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The proposal is agreed to. 
11. China and European security 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 945 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee on China and European security 
and vote on the draft recommendation, Docu-
ment 945 and amendments. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, I, in turn, should like to congratulate 
you on your election. I am happy to see you 
presiding over our discussions and our work in 
the spirit which you described, which, I hope, 
found favour with all our colleagues. 
The report which I have the honour to 
present on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee was prepared after a visit by this 
committee to the People's Republic of China. 
The Rapporteur's first duty, which I find par-
ticularly pleasant, is to express our warmest 
thanks to the Chinese authorities, who invited 
the committee, gave it the best possible recep-
tion, even arranging for it to have a talk with 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, for an 
hour and a half, and provided it with all the 
information it asked for. 
I should like to extend a special greeting to 
the representatives of the Chinese Embassy who 
are attending this debate. I also wish to thank 
my colleagues on the General Affairs Commit-
tee, especially our Chairman, Sir Frederic Ben-
nett, who is unable to be present today, and our 
secretariat. 
I ought to explain, by a few words of intro-
duction, why China is the subject of study by 
Western European Union. 
I was able to observe, during the joint meet-
ings between the Assembly and the Council in 
Brussels only just over a fortnight ago, that the 
representatives of the governments of our seven 
countries considered, as we do, that relations 
between Europe and China are not merely an 
economic matter but also lie within the area of 
foreign policy and joint security. 
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I therefore welcome this recognition by both 
the Council and the Assembly that China is 
now an essential factor for equilibrium and 
peace in the world. 
An institution which is responsible for the 
security of Western Europe can no longer 
ignore the fact - any more than the People's 
Republic of China did when it invited a 
committee of our Assembly to pay a visit - that 
Western European Union is the only European 
organisation with competence with regard to 
security. This is indeed what Mr. Tindemans, 
Chairman-in-Office of both the Council of 
Western European Union and the EEC Coun-
cil, made clear when he addressed us in order 
to present the point of view of the Seven and 
the Ten on their relations with the People's 
Republic of China on the very day when the 
Council had just been discussing this question. 
This being so, a report taking stock of the 
questions which China poses for Western 
Europe from the point of view of its security 
could not be restricted to the purely military 
sphere. It could not even devote a great deal 
of space to it. 
China has its defence policy, its strategy, 
geared to its requirements and above all to its 
resources, which are immense in terms of space, 
time and numbers of people but limited in 
terms of the factors relating to modem techno-
logy. We have our policy, which reflects what 
we are. The convergences are restricted to the 
overriding importance to us both of main-
taining a peace which can only be based on a 
worldwide balance of forces. 
Neither Europe nor China can be happy to 
see a shifting of Soviet intercontinental missiles 
from East to West; but the important thing for 
us is to assess to what extent China is now and 
will remain for the foreseeable future a partner 
we can trust. 
That is why a large section of this report is 
devoted to China's economic and political 
development since the disappearance of 
Mao Zedong in 1976 and especially during the 
last two years, because it was not until then 
that the trends which were emerging became 
established, took clearer shape and gained 
ground in many fields. 
There is no point in my repeating now what 
is in the report before you, and I should there-
fore like to confine myself to mentioning briefly 
a few points which do not appear in the report 
but which to my mind confirm and reinforce 
the ideas outlined in it. 
It should be said straight away that it appea-
red to us that China, after a long period of ideo-
logical intoxication when its leaders seem to 
have thought that everything was possible, had 
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reverted to a rational, moderate and above all 
realistic view of things. Recognising that their 
country was still, despite obvious progress, an 
underdeveloped country, China's present lea-
ders set themselves the task of lifting their 
country out of this state and of creating, by way 
of plans which have been repeatedly modified 
since 1976, the basic conditions for a genuine 
economic advance. This entailed recourse to 
private enterprise, which had been missing from 
China for decades, and the restoration of certain 
freedoms, which were primarily but not exclu-
sively economic. Those of us who had visited 
China previously were impressed by the extent 
to which it had advanced in this direction. 
Since the drafting of the report which I have 
the honour to present to you, certain further 
events, which in my opinion merely co~firm 
the conclusions reached by the General Affairs 
Committee, have taken place. While the most 
important of these is President Mitterrand's 
visit to China, there is also the adoption of 
common positions on China by the European 
ministers who met at Gymnich early in May, as 
Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for 
External Relations, in his capacity as President-
in-Office of the European Political Co-opera-
tion Council, informed the members of our 
Assembly at the meeting in Brussels on 17th 
May. Mention should also be made, however, 
of Mr. Tindeman's visit to the United States 
and of the American Government's relaxation 
of the Cocom ban on the export of certain 
products to China. As a result, several of the 
recommendations which the General Affairs 
Committee is asking you to approve already 
correspond to the joint policy of the member 
countries of WEU, and your Rapporteur can 
only welcome this. 
Thus, the principle of regular political 
consultation between the Ten and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China, men-
tioned to the committee by the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Zhao Ziyang, was adopted by the Ten at 
the Gymnich meeting, and the Ten also appear 
to have decided to explore, within the Euro-
pean Economic Community, ways and means 
of increasing economic co-operation with the 
People's Republic of China. 
Furthermore, Mr. Tindemans openly admit-
ted that in his opinion and that of his European 
partners it was not right to apply to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China the restrictions which 
are imposed on the export to the Soviet Union 
of products which could have a military 
use. It is fortunate that the United States has 
since agreed to an appreciable easing of these 
restrictions in the case of China, but Western 
Europe can and must demand and obtain more 
than this. There are no grounds for regarding 
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the People's Republic of China as a potential 
enemy, because, as far back as twenty-three 
years ago, it severed most of its links with the 
Soviet Union and now considers, as we do, that 
the Soviet Union's formidable military power is 
at present the main threat which it faces. 
With regard to President Mitterrand's visit, 
while it probably helped to promote greater 
economic co-operation between France and 
China, its main result was a substantial rappro-
chement of views on the only political problem 
about which there was still a major difference 
of opinion between Europe and China : that of 
Cambodia. True, none of our countries was 
prepared to recognise as a fait accompli either 
the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam or the 
regime which the latter has set up there. But 
they all felt the greatest loathing for the pre-
vious regime, the Khmer Rouge whose bloody 
tyranny is a matter of common knowledge. 
The argument that the Khmer Rouge is the 
most powerful element in the resistance to the 
Phnom Penh regime cannot be allowed to make 
us forget the recent past. But if China now has 
as its objective the establishment in Cambodia 
of an independent, democratic state based on 
self-determination for the Cambodians and wil-
ling to associate itself with the other countries 
of South-East Asia, there are no longer any 
divergences between China and Western 
Europe. 
For in fact China's other main objectives, 
namely the recovery of the parts of the Chinese 
territory which were taken from it by the one-
sided treaties of the 19th century, do not clash 
either with Europe's interests or with the prin-
ciples which it upholds - whether it be Hong 
Kong, where the United Kingdom intends to 
defend the interests of both the local population 
and the international community, but not the 
treaties of the 19th century, or Taiwan, which 
all our countries have recognised as forming 
part of the territory of China but whose rever-
sion to China depends primarily on domestic 
developments both in Taiwan and in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. The present move-
ment towards greater freedom in China war-
rants the hope that the day will soon come 
when it will be possible for the proposals which 
it recently made to the Taipei regime for a 
status giving a large measure of autonomy to be 
considered by a government which itself also 
claims to be Chinese. A recent contact with 
representatives of Taiwan convinced your Rap-
porteur that the gulf separating the two political 
entities claiming to represent China is not in 
fact as wide as it might seem. 
The West should at least be careful to avoid 
encouraging a certain intransigence on the part 
of the Taipei authorities stemming, in parti-
cular, from the supplying of sophisticated arma-
ments which the People's. Republic of China 
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lacks. The consistently peaceful policy pur-
sued by the People's Republic of China in 
recent years should warrant reconsideration of 
the desirability of these deliveries. This is an 
argument which Western Europe probably 
ought to press more strongly in dealing with the 
United States, whose true interests are no diffe-
rent from ours on this subject. 
In the absence of the Chairman of the com-
mittee, I ought to give you some idea of the 
course of its deliberations. The first point to 
note is that the report which I am presenting 
was adopted unanimously - in other words that, 
basically, it reflects general agreement on the 
analyses and conclusions which it puts forward. 
This does not mean, however, that there was 
complete identity of views among all the mem-
bers of the committee, or even among those 
who had visited China. Some of them felt that 
the report was not sufficiently critical of the 
domestic situation in China, especially as 
regards respect for freedom and human rights, 
and this caused the Rapporteur to make certain 
changes to his explanatory memorandum and 
calls for comment here. 
The first point is that the subject of our study 
was neither Chinese society nor Chinese poli-
tical life, but what China represents for Euro-
pean security. This is not the Council of 
Europe, and China's domestic situation 
concerns us only from the point of view of its 
possible repercussions on China's relations with 
the rest of the world. 
The second point is that the committee's visit 
to China did not allow it to extend its investi-
gations to this area. There could be no ques-
tion of dealing in the same way with matters for 
which the Rapporteur possessed direct infor-
mation and those about which the only infor-
mation he has is indirect, unverifiable and often 
contradictory. I have therefore adhered, on 
certain points such as that of greater freedom 
for national minorities or for what have come 
to be called " democratic parties ", to official 
documents provided by the People's Republic 
of China, without going into the matter further. 
But the third, and probably the most impor-
tant, reason is that I felt it to be unjust and 
unprofitable to make judgments on these sub-
jects by reference to absolute values, which 
would in fact be the standards of our western 
societies, which mean so much to us. I 
thought it much fairer and much more in 
keeping with a sound assessment of realities to 
note current developments rather than attempt 
to define China's precise position. While it is 
true that many freedoms are still lacking, the 
fact remains that the evolution which began 
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seven years ago and has speeded up to a 
remarkable extent during the last two years is 
in the direction of a very considerable increase 
in all kinds of freedoms, and not just the econo-
mic freedoms on which my report mainly 
concentrates. That, to my mind, is the most 
significant aspect. 
I would add that many restrictions of freedom 
and violations of what we regard as inalienable 
human rights are not primarily due to the poli-
tical system but are attributable to the state of a 
society which has remained rural and archaic in 
many respects. Only through the transforma-
tion of this society, and through the economic 
transformation of the country, can any real, 
permanent progress towards greater freedom be 
made. It therefore seems to me important for 
us to examine how China has set about the task 
of remedying its present state of underdevelop-
ment, while continuing to denounce the viola-
tions of the rights of the individual which have 
taken place in the past and are probably occur-
ring today. Because I am convinced that these 
violations are incompatible with China's most 
legitimate national aspirations, as territorial 
unification can only take place peacefully if 
acceptable and credible guarantees can be offe-
red to all Chinese without exception. 
In reply to another objection expressed to the 
committee I should also emphasise that the fact 
that neither Western Europe nor China is parti-
cipating in the Geneva negotiations on the limi-
tation of nuclear armaments does not mean that 
international equilibrium can be a matter of 
indifference to either of them. While the 
Chinese are very ready to denounce the " dual 
hegemony", they are perfectly capable of dis-
tinguishing between a threat and an error of 
diplomacy. On the European side it would be 
completely wrong to regard the threat repre-
sented by the Soviet armies, tanks and missiles 
as being on the same plane as any objections, 
however justified, we might have to this or that 
aspect of American policy. 
At least the fact that we remain allies of the 
United States does not prevent us- far from it 
- from urging upon it what we consider to be 
fair and reasonable, as Mr. Tindemans has just 
done, not without success, with regard to his 
country's trade with the People's Republic of 
China. The purpose of this report is in no way 
to set a European, pro-Chinese policy against 
an American policy which is less so, but to urge 
Western Europe to persuade the United States 
to recognise interests which are common to the 
West as a whole. The prospects of an open-
ing-up of China to the international commu-
nity, which our diagnosis suggests are sound 
and probably lasting, do not, however, justify 
any attempt on our part to make China into a 
new market just for ourselves. On the con-
trary, they impel us to lay great emphasis on 
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the areas of convergence between China and 
Europe with a view to strengthening internatio-
nal peace, developing co-operation and trade 
and organising an international community 
embracing the whole of the world. 
The purpose of the report which I am 
presenting to you today is to contribute to this 
work, which, by its very nature, is in accord-
ance with WEU's terms of reference. Taking 
its place among reports on European union, the 
activities of WEU, the relations between Eur-
ope and the United States and, indeed, on paci-
fism and neutralism, it will contribute, if you 
approve its recommendations, to defining Eur-
ope's position in a world which is seeking to 
achieve and organise a peace based on the eli-
mination of underdevelopment, on economic 
and social progress and on free trade as well as 
on the balance of forces and the limitation of 
armaments. 
Europe and China for mutual security- that 
is a task worthy of WEU. The time at our 
disposal is probably short. Let us make sure 
that we seize the opportunity squarely for the 
sake of our peoples, our youth and peace. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Caro, for your very full and clear 
report. I consider it most important, after the 
visit to China by our Assembly's General 
Affairs Committee, for us to be given such a 
concise summary in the presence of the distin-
guished guests whom I can see in the gallery, 
and to whom I offer our respectful greetings. 
The names of eight speakers are down for the 
general debate. I would remind you that 
speaking time is limited to five minutes. I 
shall insist on this, because we are already 
behind schedule. 
I call Lord Reay. 
Lord REA Y (United Kingdom). - Before my 
allotted time begins, let me be the first of the 
European Democratic Group to congratulate 
you, Mr. President, on your electoral victory 
this afternoon. Having followed your leader-
ship in China during the visit of the sub-
committee after it had left Beijing, I have no 
doubt that you will become a popular and 
dynamic President of this Assembly and that 
you will bring much credit to its reputation. 
I associate myself with Mr. Caro's remarks of 
appreciation to the Chinese authorities for the 
manner in which they received us. They did 
so with great courtesy. They received us at a 
high governmental and administrative level and 
with the determination that we should fully 
learn their political position in the world, as 
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well as their economic aspirations and achie-
vements. At the same time, they were deter-
mined that we should enjoy some of the glories, 
both natural and man-made, of that great coun-
try. On every account it was a journey of 
quite exceptional and absorbing interest, as I 
am sure everyone who took part will agree. 
By every account China has made consider-
able economic progress in the seven short 
years since the cultural revolution ended. 
Although I had not visited China before, I was 
surprised among other things by the number of 
cars in the streets and the amount of construc-
tion, particularly of apartment blocks, that had 
taken place. China is now free from the 
destructive conflict of the ten-year-long cultural 
revolution and is able to organise and concen-
trate its immense energies on the long-term task 
of turning itself into a great economic power. I 
have no doubt that in twenty-five years' time 
China's role in the world's balance of power 
will look very different. 
The second striking phenomenon of China 
today is that for the first time in its history it is 
systematically setting out to get to know, and 
have a contact with, the rest of the world. 
There are various explanations for that which I 
shall not go into, but the deepest is that China 
is preparing a pattern of greater involvement in 
world affairs that is more appropriate to a 
country that sees itself as a great power of the 
future. 
The third phenomenon is that, as China hur-
ries to modernise itself internally and to deve-
lop constructive partnerships internationally, 
ideology will plainly not be allowed to become 
an obstacle to economic progress. Private 
ownership and private economic activity are 
given considerably greater encouragement than 
before. If anyone wishes to obtain the full fla-
vour of that pragmatism, he should read the 
1982 constitution - a most interesting docu-
ment- particularly Article 13. 
The West should welcome and respond to 
this opening out of China. We should do busi-
ness with China. I am certain that China is 
ready to do business on attractive terms with 
western companies. We should also have regu-
lar exchanges of views at political level, above 
all on strategic matters, and, to the extent that 
we have a common interest, we should main-
tain common policies. 
China makes three major complaints against 
present Soviet policy - the continuing occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, which we tend to forget is 
a neighbour of China ; Soviet support for the 
regional hegemony of Vietnam over Cambodia ; 
and the massive presence of Russian troops 
along China's borders. We should continue to 
call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
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Afghanistan and refuse to recognise the puppet 
regime in Cambodia. We should also seek to 
remove possible sources of conflict between our 
countries and China. In this respect I am plea-
sed by the inclusion in the recommendation of 
a recognition of the need for a negotiated solu-
tion for Hong Kong. I find it hard to believe 
that the two powers concerned, in friendly rela-
tions with each other, will not be able to 
resolve this problem satisfactorily. Plainly, a 
solution is desirable sooner rather than later. 
We should avoid any actions that are likely 
to delay or obstruct a peaceful Chinese solution 
to the Taiwan problem. There remains the 
problem ... 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Will you 
please wind up your speech, Lord Reay ? 
Lord REAY (United Kingdom). - I am just 
about to conclude, Mr. President. 
I am sure that you will take account of the 
fact that as the first member called in the 
debate, I find it difficult to adjust and to halve 
the length of my speech, particularly when dis-
cussing such a delicate question. We can do 
little more than seek to influence and steady the 
policy of the United States by our example 
along the general lines that I have mentioned as 
being desirable for western interests. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Lord Reay, for your warm words on behalf 
of your group. I am grateful to you for them 
and for your support. 
I call Mr. Lagorce. 
Mr. LAGORCE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, China is in 
no way a threat to international security. 
But that country's position and development 
are and will remain crucial factors for world 
peace. It is therefore in the interests of Eur-
ope, China and overall balance that stable and 
trusting relations be established between West-
ern Europe and China. But the subject 
prompts me to make a few remarks, none of 
which, of course, in any way detracts from Mr. 
Caro's excellent report. 
The first concerns the fact that, with the 
sources at present available to us, China's 
medium-term development makes much of our 
information and many of the deductions which 
we draw from it more intuitive, it seems to me, 
than reasoned and, above all, more concerned 
with today than forward-looking. 
My second remark concerns the need to put 
the very comprehensive picture of the present 
situation painted by Mr. Caro in its chronolo-
gical perspective. On first consideration, it 
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looks as if China will need peace until at 
least the year 2000. With this prospect it is 
therefore important that Europe should endea-
vour, fairly and without exerting pressure on it, 
to establish with China links such as will enable 
it to continue along this road and adhere to this 
course, which is of vital importance to 
everyone. 
This aim prompts my third observation, 
concerning the need for Western Europe to 
establish extensive, balanced economic relations 
with China as quickly as possible. The domi-
nant economic position of Japan, the emer-
gence as world market competitors, during the 
last few decades, of certain nations - of which 
Korea is a significant but not isolated example 
- are indications, indeed lessons, which must be 
taken into account. 
Experience in fact shows nowadays that eco-
nomic co-operation often means the creation, 
for the more distant future, of a definite danger 
of competition. Competition created by the 
establishment of economic links between 
Europe and China, so rightly recommended by 
Mr. Caro, is no exception to the general rule. 
But this is a calculated risk which Western 
Europe must take. The absence of Western 
Europe from China's economic development 
during the last part of the century would, in my 
opinion, be irreparable. For China has abiding 
features and constituent elements which neither 
its leaders nor the international community can 
afford, now or in the future, to disregard. 
China is a communist state and a developing 
and temporarily unaligned country. 
The fact that China will one day be transfor-
med from a developing country into an indus-
trialised country will inevitably shift the econo-
mic axis of the world. This will influence, 
among other things, strength relationship and 
North-South political positions. China already 
has an influence and interests in Asia, espe-
cially the South-East part of that continent. 
Two by no means absurd hypotheses can be 
envisaged. The first is that of a Sino Japanese 
economic association. What effect would this 
coalition have on the world economy and on 
Europe's standard of living? The second 
hypothesis, even more dangerous, is that of a 
change in Sino-Soviet relations. What would 
happen to the world if, tomorrow, Russia, with 
its allies, were to form an alliance with an eco-
nomically developed China ? 
Especially as there are still two major 
unknown factors in the Chinese situation. One 
concerns the present and foreseeable attitude 
and internal influence of its army. What is 
it ? What is it thinking? Whom, if the situa-
tion calls for it, will it obey ? Will it be the 
great imponderable or, more in line with 
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tradition, will it follow the example of the 
warlords or of the Latin American, pronuncia-
mientos ? There is not, I believe, at present 
anything certain enabling an objective and pre-
cise answer to be given to this question. 
The second question concerns the real hol-
ders, at present and in the immediate future, of 
political power within the Chinese Communist 
Party. Is the present team - the successor of 
many others since the long march - solidly 
based or is it merely a transient phenome-
non ? Who knows? From the passage of 
time we can deduce one - albeit by no means 
decisive - fact. The next two decades will see 
the gradual arrival on the scene, at successive 
levels of the government hierarchy, of those 
who have been schooled in Moscow. 
These considerations raise - without solving -
the not unimportant question of the holding 
and use of power in China. There can thus be 
no absolute certainty in the present state of 
western and eastern society. But I nevertheless 
still think, as the great writer Albert Camus 
might say, that " there is nothing to prevent us 
from hoping that these two societies, if they do 
not destroy themselves in a general suicide, will 
fertilise each other and enable something new 
to be created ". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I will call 
two more speakers - Mr. Miiller and Mr. 
Michel - so that we can close the sitting at 
6.15 p.m. 
I call Mr. Miiller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by 
thanking the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, very much 
for his report. I see it as a documentary 
record. As a member of the delegation, I had 
the same experiences and took notes on the 
same discussions as our Rapporteur, and from 
my notes I can see how accurately Mr. Caro 
has brought everything together in this report. 
It will stand as a permanent and valuable 
documentary record. 
When we comment on China, we must not 
forget that Europe once had a very peculiar 
relationship with this country and that the phi-
losophical sentiments that have emerged here at 
times still haunt the minds of Europeans to 
some extent. I have only to remind you that 
the phrase the "Yellow Peril", was once ban-
died about even in the political debate in 
Europe, and you will know what I am talking 
about. So the General Affairs Committee's 
visit to China has helped to correct certain 
ideas that may have lingered in the minds of 
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Europeans. That was what made this visit so 
valuable. 
I should like to comment very briefly on 
three problems. 
Firstly, I feel that more interest should be 
taken in economic co-operation. As we were 
able to see for ourselves, this enormous country 
has to import technical know-how. One of 
China's trading partners that is not a super-
power, not one of the hegemonic powers to 
which constant reference was made in China, 
happens to be Western Europe. This might 
prove useful. 
In the same context, I believe it is also 
important to consider co-operation between 
China and the industrialised countries of West-
em Europe in the third world. I raised this 
question myself in a discussion with the Prime 
Minister, and he gave a very affirmative 
response. This is a point we should bear in 
mind for the long term. 
As regards China's foreign policy, I will sim-
ply say on the subject of Cambodia that I was 
very impressed to hear on all sides that the 
Chinese are obviously allowing Cambodia to 
follow an independent course. They know, as 
they often told us, that the key lies with the 
Soviet Union, without whose help Vietnam 
could not pursue its present policy towards 
Cambodia. 
This brings me to my third point, the rela-
tionship between China and the Soviet 
Union. It became increasingly clear to me at 
informal meetings as well as in the official dis-
cussions that the Chinese know that the Soviet 
Union is the only colonial power left in the 
world, large areas of Asia having been conque-
red under the Tsars. Reference was made to 
the unfair treaties concluded at that time. 
China feels itself particularly badly affected, 
and although I know that China does not 
intend to use force to solve this problem, the 
Chinese will never forget and will always regard 
this as an encroachment on their sovereignty. 
The question of Afghanistan also arises here, 
the Soviet attack on Afghanistan being seen by 
the Chinese as a direct threat to China's sove-
reignty since it has a common frontier with 
Afghanistan. We were repeatedly told that we 
in the West must remember that the policy pur-
sued by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is 
merely a first step towards the Middle East and 
may be followed by others. 
To conclude, I am pleased to see that para-
graph 135 of Mr. Caro's report refers to China's 
opinion on the reunification of Germany. It 
seems to me very important - and we are very 
grateful for the Chinese attitude - that they 
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refer to the indivisibility of Germany and 
approach the problem in this way. 
Let us be under no illusions: China is without 
doubt an extremely important factor in Eur-
ope's security. Even a passive participant in 
world politics influences the balance of power. 
But we should forget any ideas of its pos-
sibly becoming an ally if, for example, we 
should be threatened by the Soviet Union. 
I will conclude by quoting Mao Zedong: 
" Distant water will not put out a nearby 
fire ". This applies to us too, if we try to 
include China in our calculations in relation to 
our own security. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Michel. 
Mr. MICHEL (Belgium) (Translation). -Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first 
of all like to add my congratulations to those 
of the previous speakers to our President and to 
the Rapporteur for his objective and lucid sur-
vey. 
I think it can be said that the General Affairs 
Committee's visit to the People's Republic of 
China was a success. It follows on from a pre-
vious report produced by Sir Frederic Bennett 
and it was very necessary. 
It was a success both internally, that is, from 
the standpoint of security and European 
defence, and externally, that is, as a step taken 
on behalf of Western Europe as a whole. The 
Chinese with whom we talked were in fact very 
well aware that the WEU delegation was speak-
ing on behalf of Western Europe, but within 
its own special field. 
I will make four points. First, the People's 
Republic of China appeared to us, in all its 
uniqueness, to be a world apart whose external 
relations are dictated by its internal economic 
situation and its age-old traditions. China's 
foreign policy can only be understood through a 
knowledge of this background. 
Second point: this country is in the throes of 
economic, social and demographic change. 
Taking a realistic attitude, the Chinese authori-
ties understand that they must direct their 
economy towards intensive agricultural deve-
lopment and promotion of the essential capital 
goods industries. Rigid theoretical principles 
have been abandoned in favour of concrete, 
useful projects. If we wish to extend our 
economic relations with this great country, we 
must bear in mind these fundamental decisions 
taken by the Chinese authorities. 
Third point: there is a broad measure of 
agreement, indeed a similarity of views, bet-
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ween the People's Republic of China and West-
ern Europe about most international political 
problems. Whether it be concerning the prob-
lem of South-East Asia, namely Cambodia, or 
those of the northern frontier of Afghan-
istan, the Middle East or, above all, with 
regard to missiles, we find a remarkable degree 
of agreement. The People's Republic of 
China's determination to oppose any kind of 
hegemony is in line with the attitude of West-
ern Europe, which is ardently pursuing peace-
ful aims. From this angle, too, our attitudes 
should continue to move closer together in the 
future. 
Fourth point: contacts between Western 
Europe and the People's Republic of China 
should be intensified and extended, because 
they are a condition of world peace and the 
balance of forces, even though the military 
strength and political influence of the People's 
Republic of China are at present relatively 
slight and limited. 
I think that we should decide here and now 
to extend our relations and develop our 
contacts with each other in order to contribute 
in future to a peace which we both desire. 
Further action is necessary at an early stage in 
order to take stock of the situation and promote 
our mutual progress towards peace. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As inten-
ded, we shall now adjourn the debate until 
tomorrow morning. 
12. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Dele-
gation of the Federal Republic of Germany pro-
poses the following changes in committees. 
They are now submitted for the ratification of 
the Assembly in accordance with Rule 39 (6): 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges: Mr. Schulte as titular member in place of 
Mr. Linde ; Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration: Mr. Linde as titular mem-
ber in place of Mr. Schulte. 
Is there any opposition ? ... 
These nominations are agreed to. 
13. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 7th June, at 9.30 
a. m. with the following orders of the day: 
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1. China and European security (Resumed 
debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 945 and amend-
ments). 
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty- reply 
to the twenty-eighth annual report of the 
Council (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, Document 948). 
3. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Coun-
cil (Presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French 
Minister for External Relations, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council, Document 
942). 
4. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply 
to the twenty-eighth annual report of the 
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Council (Resumed debate on the report of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 948). 
5. Political activities of the WEU Council -
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Commit-
tee and vote on the draft recomendation, 
Document 944 and amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak ? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.) 
SECOND SITTING 
Tuesday, 7th June 1983 
SuMMARY 
1. Adoption of the minutes. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. China and European security (Resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee and voti on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 945 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. ·Prus-
sen, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Caro (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Vogt, Mr. MUller, Mr. Caro, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Bassinet, 
Mr. Caro, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Scheer, Mr. 
Caro. 
4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presen-
tation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External 
Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 942). 
Replies by Mr. Cheysson to questions put by: Mr. Dejar-
din, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Jiiger, Mr. 
Scheer. 
5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly. 
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-
eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Defonce Ques-
tions and Armaments, Doe. 948). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Prussen (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Dejardin, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Prussen (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Pignion, Mr. Prussen. 
7. Political activities of the WEU Council - reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doe. 944 
and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Forma, Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur), Mr. Lagorce, 
Mr. Ahrens. 
8. Change in the membership of a committee. 
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous sit-
ting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the substitutes attending this sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings1• 
I. See page 22. 
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3. China and European security 
(Resumed debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee 
and 11ote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 945 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on 
China and European security and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 945 and 
amendments. 
In the resumed debate, Mr. van der Sanden 
has the floor. 
May I remind speakers that they are limited 
to five minutes. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I should like to start by 
expressing my thanks for the great amount of 
work done by the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, in 
producing this report, both in the preparatory 
period in France and also during our stay in 
China itself. I think that he has been extre-
mely successful in portraying the relationship 
between the economic and the politico-military 
problems which we encountered in China. 
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These issues are not merely related, they are 
interdependent. I wish to make the point that ' 
the Chinese authorities missed virtually no ' 
opportunity of emphasising this relationship 
and interdependence to us. In particular they 
drew attention to the changes in Chinese policy 
after the cultural revolution, which were also 
mentioned by yesterday's speakers. 
In the first place more emphasis is now being 
placed on agriculture and on agrarian activities 
aimed at feeding the thousand million mouths 
in mainland China. In the second place, there 
is the change from heavy to light industry and 
the shelving of the ambitious plans for China's 
military apparatus in favour of programmes of 
a markedly less ambitious character. 
In the light of the situation we found in 
China I consider these changes to be fully justi-
fied. In the few minutes of this brief statement 
I do not wish to go into details. We must, 
however, appreciate that China feels itself 
threatened on three sides: along the northern 
frontier, which is very extensive and where a 
million Russian troops are stationed ; on the 
western frontier, which has witnessed the 
unjustifiable military intervention of the 
Russians in Afghanistan, and, finally on the 
southern frontier, where a regime supported by 
Moscow has invaded Cambodia from Vietnam 
and virtually occupied the country. 
There is naturally a direct connection 
between my initial remarks, which are also 
expressed in the report and which relate to the 
change in China's approach to internal issues, 
and the relationships which this Assembly, and 
in particular the General Affairs Committee, 
has had to examine, i.e. the relationships 
between European security and the position in 
which China currently finds itself. 
It is clear that the present Chinese Govern-
ment needs to do its best, short of an all-out 
effort, in the interests of world peace for at least 
the next twenty years. This outlook was made 
very clear: China needs to modernise its indus-
try, to reverse the appalling consequences of the 
cultural revolution and to ensure that the stan-
dard of living within its vast territory is once 
more considerably improved. 
Mr. President, in view of this situation we 
must be quite clear in our own minds - and this 
is the main point which I wish to emphasise to 
the Assembly today- that we have to deal with 
the position as we find it in China at the pre-
sent time, with a certain policy and line of 
conduct pursued by today's Chinese leaders. 
How delicate the situation can be we know 
from the last three months, when the Foreign 
Minister, following his visit to Moscow and his 
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utterances there, quite quickly vanished from 
the political scene in China. 
If I say that, in the present circumstances, I 
can fully endorse the line taken in the report 
and if I add that I recognise the interests of 
Western Europe and China with regard to their 
security and the threat posed to both by the 
Soviet Union, that does not mean, if I may 
speak quite plainly, that, as regards our inde-
pendence and freedom and the security of the 
established liberties of our western democratic 
community in the broadest sense, we should in 
any way depend on any support from China. 
We remain dependent primarily on co-opera-
tion in Western European Union and NATO 
and therefore on collaboration with the United 
States of America. 
This is the main point which I wish to 
emphasise today in order to ensure that we do 
not deviate from the fundamental policy which 
we have chosen in the West, but are fully aware 
of the possibilities which exist in China for 
achieving the goals which the present Chinese 
Government has set itself and which may lead 
to changes in the policy and military posture of 
the Chinese Government. 
I would like to conclude this brief statement 
by once more expressing my thanks for all the 
work done by the Rapporteur. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Prussen. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. 
Caro's report on China and European security 
is a most valuable document, which cannot be 
discussed as fully as it demands in five min-
utes. I shall therefore confine my remarks to 
the problem of Taiwan, as earlier speakers have 
already made important comments on the prob-
lems as a whole. 
Just as it was ridiculous to ignore the. 
People's Republic of China politically for many 
years, it is now equally absurd to ignore Tai-
wan with its population of eighteen million, 
huddled on an island four hundred kilometres 
long and eighty-five kilometres wide ; they are 
dissidents and refugees from a communist 
regime, whose sole ambition is to live in peace, 
to be free to decide their own fate, to have the 
right to hold and express whatever political and 
religious views they like, in short to enjoy all 
human rights as we understand them and as 
they are not respected in the People's Republic 
of China. 
The governments of the free world have 
nothing to be proud of in their behaviour 
towards Taiwan. Overnight, they abandoned 
nationalist China, their long-standing friend, 
and established diplomatic relations with its 
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hostile brothers who had become a more 
powerful force in the interval and seem likely 
to become a more interesting economic pros-
pect in the immediate or more distant future. 
I am sorry to have to say that the govern-
ments of the free world use a different yard-
stick when it comes to the application of 
human rights to Taiwan. 
On the one hand, we sympathise with the 
dissidents in the communist countries and 
deplore the fate of the victims of communist 
oppression in Poland and of the Afghan 
refugees and rebels, but, on the other, we 
deliberately ignore the presence in Taiwan of 
eighteen million dissidents, opposed to a 
communist regime, who have been able to flee 
to that island. It would be wrong, therefore, 
to underestimate the strategic importance of 
Taiwan, the sole reliable anti-communist 
bastion in that part of the world, which 
is unquestionably a prey to communist 
infiltration. 
It is very satisfying to note that, despite the 
absence of diplomatic relations with nationalist 
China, friendly, cultural and economic approa-
ches involving the countries of Western Europe 
are increasing in frequency, either unknown to, 
or with the tacit consent of the various govern-
ments. The breaking of diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan has thus been circumvented by 
large numbers of cultural and economic mis-
sions, which are proof of great friendship and 
sympathy for this brave, hardworking people. 
Please do not misunderstand me, however. 
While I am speaking up for Taiwan, I 
am enough of a realist not to underestimate the 
political importance of the People's Republic of 
China and the need for our countries to have 
good relations with it. I have had the opportu-
nity to visit the People's Republic of China. I 
was not won over to its political ideology but I 
did fall under the spell of the beauty of that 
vast country, of the welcoming charm of its 
people, of its open-handed hospitality and of its 
age-old culture. 
It would be foolish to deny the social and 
economic progress which that vast country has 
achieved over the last few years. 
Mr. Caro's report identifies very accurately 
the present difference between the Russian and 
Chinese communist systems, with China 
moving gradually towards a more liberal regime 
pursuing a peace policy and preferring at the 
moment to invest rather in the economy than 
in armaments. These are points which should 
decide us to continue our efforts to extend rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China in 
order to help it to solve its economic prob-
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lems, particularly after its disappointments 
with the Soviet Union. Collaboration between 
the countries of Western Europe and the 
People's Republic of China is bound to give 
added impetus to the process of liberalisation, 
provided the present policy keeps up the effort 
and is not reversed as happened at the time of 
the cultural revolution. Everything will 
depend on the succession of the present leaders. 
We should agree with Mr. Caro that any 
study of the realities of the Chinese situation 
which does no more than record the ideological 
obstacles liable to set continental China against 
Western Europe would be inadequate and 
pointless. This kind of study and this sort of 
policy are not even applied to the East 
European countries. Why apply a different 
policy to continental China, always provided 
we remain cautious and vigilant ? 
The situation is not made any simpler by the 
attitudes of the two antagonists both claiming to 
represent the whole of China. Bqth_l!Sr{!~_on 
the need for peaceful reunification. But Taipei 
has not yielded to the temptation of Be~ijing's 
most recent proposals as reported by Mr. Caro. 
For Taipei, reunification will only become a 
possibility if liberalisation becomes a reality, 
Marxist-Leninist theories are abandoned, poli-
tical freedoms and humans rights are restored 
and policy is again inspired by the three great 
principles of Sun Y at Sen, based on natio-
nalism, democracy and the common weal, 
which were the fundamental principles of the 
1911 republic. 
In conclusion, I should again like to stress the 
need for political and economic relations with 
the People's Republic of China and the need 
for technical co-operation of the kind urged by 
the countries of Western Europe in the spirit of 
the North-South dialogue. 
At the same time, I should also like to 
awaken both the public and governments to the 
very special political situation of Taiwan, in 
the hope that our relations will become less 
restricted or even normal, out of respect for 
human rights which we are always preaching, 
leaving the two opposing parties to solve their 
problems in the Chinese fashion, with a great 
deal of patience and finesse. 
I hope that the People's Republic of China 
will adopt a slightly more flexible attitude 
towards those who do not wish to abandon 
their friends in Taiwan overnight, towards the 
Western European organisations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Prus-
sen you are overrunning your time. I must ask 
you to conclude. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- By seeking to establish friendly, cultural and 
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economic links with their Chinese friends in 
Taiwan, these countries will be making a 
genuine and sincere move towards Taiwan, 
with a view to peaceful reunification. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should 
first like to thank the Rapporteur for his excel-
lent report which gives the whole of our 
Assembly a complete and detailed picture of 
China, its situation and its importance in the 
world. 
I also wish to endorse the conclusions of the 
report concerning the need for the western 
countries to develop their relations with China 
and to support its efforts to maintain world 
peace. 
In this context, I welcome the opportunity 
which recently fell to France to set the example 
by way of the visit paid to China by the Presi-
dent of the Republic, Fran~ois Mitterrand; I 
also welcome the prospects for better economic 
and cultural collaboration which emerged from 
his stay there. Here, I would remind you that 
France was the first western country to establish 
diplomatic relations with China by recognis-
ing it as long ago as 1964. 
These meetings culminated in the conclusion 
of an agreement on the principle of French par-
ticipation in the construction of a power station 
in Guangzhou province and in preliminary 
talks on achieving a second power station in 
Kiangsu province. The Chinese also showed 
great interest in offers to co-operate on railway 
and airport equipment. 
In line with this report France appears 
clearly as a European power anxious to have 
close economic and cultural relations with the 
People's Republic of China and it is to be 
hoped that the same may be true for all the 
western countries. France also has long-stand-
ing relations with all the South-East Asian 
countries. 
The improvement of economic relations 
between the Western European countries and 
the People's Republic of China is of the greatest 
importance now that some observers suggest 
that Sino-Soviet trade is being re-established. 
While there may be signs of a detente in 
Sino-Soviet relations, the exact extent of this 
resumption of contacts has to be measured in 
the light of the war in Cambodia which sees the 
two countries on opposite sides. 
The obscurity surrounding the progress of 
political and economic relations between the 
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People's Republic of China and the USSR is 
such that the western countries must keep a 
very close watch and must take account of it in 
their relations with the two countries. 
Our colleague's report also stresses the need 
to support the People's Republic of China in its 
efforts to maintain world peace. I cannot but 
endorse this conclusion which is in accord with 
the spirit of independence at the heart of 
France's foreign policy and its determination to 
maintain world peace effectively. 
I would, however, like to express one small 
doubt regarding the possible development of 
China's foreign and defence policies. Mr. 
Caro's report is perhaps a little over-optimistic 
in saying that the recent reform of institutions 
together with China's domestic economic situa-
tion will probably help to keep that country on 
the path towards world peace. I believe that 
we can take a positive view of China's present 
rearmament as being a contribution to its deter-
rent policy. At the same time, the western 
countries must be on the watch for any diver-
sion of use for the benefit of a third bloc. 
At risk of repeating myself, I must insist on 
the need for the fullest possible development of 
trade relations between Europe and China. 
Indeed, economic co-operation has always been 
a very good- guide to two countries' views of 
international relations as a whole. Its develop-
ment opens the way to useful compromises on 
many bilateral and other questions. 
Before concluding, I must refer to the 
problem of Taiwan. As I have already said, 
France was the first western country to recog-
nise the existence of the People's Republic of 
China. We can, therefore, only deplore the 
ambiguous attitude of certain countries, and of 
the United States in particular, to the question 
of Taiwan. The WEU countries should adopt 
a united approach in this matter. I have in 
fact tabled an amendment on this point, which 
Mr. Fourre has also signed. This amendment 
is wholly in line with the logic of the arguments 
developed in Mr. Caro's report. I am, more-
over, surprised that there is no reference to 
Taiwan in the operative text of the recommen-
dation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - In our view, or rather in the 
view of the German Social Democrats in the 
Socialist Group, the Caro report is altogether 
remarkable and I would like to make a number 
of points relating to future prospects. There 
are some important elements here which call 
for comment. The first point relates to the 
convergence of Chinese and Western European 
interests. 
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If the main criterion of China's foreign policy 
is the dismantling of the existing hegemony -
and that means chiefly the hegemony of the two 
atomic superpowers - then it follows in effect 
that anything we can do in Europe to reduce 
tension and overcome the polarisation which 
separates both the two atomic superpowers and 
the eastern and western blocs with their ideolo-
gical differences automatically coincides with 
the Chinese aim of overcoming the existing 
hegemony. 
Building on a variety of experiences, part of 
the Chinese foreign policy naturally consists in 
establishing a kind of equidistant posture - a 
position which we ourselves cannot adopt. 
However, since about the time of NA TO's 1967 
Harmel report we have seen the important part 
which can be played by a European policy of 
detente, which is also in complete accord with 
Chinese ambitions. It follows that there are no 
fundamental contradictions in this area, even if 
for a long time the Chinese failed to under-
stand, as they are now perhaps beginning to do, 
the European policy of reducing tension. It is 
therefore all the more important that we should 
not now abandon the political concept of 
detente. 
A second point: in an address a few days ago 
the former Federal German Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, drew attention to the importance for 
the future of adding to the two fundamental 
principles of NATO policy developed since the 
end of the sixties, security and .detente, a third 
· element in the shape of support for the econo-
mic development of the third world. This also 
fundamentally accords with Chinese foreign 
policy, as in its own eyes China is basically a 
developing country with its own highly indivi-
dual pattern of development. This third 
element must increasingly become a prominent 
part of our policy. However, support for the 
third world must not impair its freedom as a 
bloc if third world policy is not to become 
involved in the East-West conflict. Here is an 
important area where there is an identity of 
interests, provided that European policy is 
developed along the lines which I have just 
described. 
There "is a third point I should like to 
comment on. 
There is one aspect of Chinese foreign policy 
which, in my estimation, will be reviewed over 
. the next few years. I refer here to the extent to 
which China will take part in international 
negotiations to end the arms race. The Chi-
nese position hitherto has been that prelimi-
nary steps should first be taken by the two 
atomic superpowers. That is to say, there 
should first be a considerable reduction in the 
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level of nuclear armaments before China would 
be ready to take part in such negotiations. It is 
of the greatest importance for the peaceful poli-
tical development of the world that at some 
point a situation should be created in which 
China can participate in negotiations of this 
kind. This will largely depend on progress 
being made in nuclear disarmament. 
I conclude with the comment that we have a 
major, dynamic role to play here. Present 
prospects hold no great promise of substantial 
progress. Indeed, all present here have much 
ground to make up. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The gen-
eral debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - May I 
first thank all my colleagues who have taken 
part in the debate on the report which I presen-
ted on behalf of the General Affairs Commit-
tee. Whatever shades of opinion they have 
expressed, I wish to thank them for supporting 
the conclusions submitted to the Assembly. I 
should now like to take up a few of their 
points. 
I detected in Lord Reay's remarks one of the 
points which I feel are of particular concern to 
us. While backing to the full the free world's 
fundamental ideas on defence and the pursuit of 
our ideals, particularly as regards security 
and human rights, we in Western Europe are 
entitled to take our own line and to speak up 
for ourselves. The European identity is a fact 
and it is for us to ensure that it survives. So 
far as China is concerned, insistence on this fact 
was unquestionably the most important point, 
regardless of shades of view. This was appa-
rent from the questions asked, even though 
some of them have still not been answered in 
full. 
Like Mr. Lagorce, I am waiting, I am 
worried, I have doubts concerning a political 
and economic element which has not yet emer-
ged but is just below the horizon - what might 
be called the China-Japan pairing. 
In all the commercial and export conquests 
of the Asian genius, the pairing of China and 
Japan is a fact which cannot be ignored. Like 
us, Mr. President - as you saw for yourself 
during our three-week visit, which was inade-
quate and far too short for such a continent -
you were struck by the kind of admiration for 
western technology, especially American tech-
nology, and by the almost universal presence of 
Japanese machinery. 
Since we in Western Europe have managed to 
combine our economies and our efforts in a 
single market might not this solution be adop-
ted tomorrow in Asia? Europe has a major 
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role to play in this. I warmly welcome 
Mr. Lagorce's remarks on this point. 
In reply to Mr. Miiller who, like other spea-
kers, referred to relations between China and 
the USSR, I would say that the problem 
remains as it was. But is not a kind of tension 
between China and the Soviet Union to be 
regarded almost as abnormal? They are neigh-
bours, linked by communist ideology. Signs of 
a formula for understanding or rapprochement 
may well be expected. But the terms for 
rapprochement have been totally rejected by 
the Chinese leaders. In broad terms, they have 
agreed to an " attempt at normalisation " - and 
here I am quoting the exact terms. 
A new phase has therefore opened and will 
no doubt continue through diplomatic moves 
and the influence of the great powers. Europe 
is interested in the problems of Sino-Soviet 
relations, including the threat to Chinese secu-
rity posed by the encirclement referred to by all 
our speakers. 
Mr. Michel mentioned the words used by the 
Prime Minister of the People's Republic of 
China on the multiplication of contacts. As I 
said in my introductory remarks, I recognise -
as I am happy to do in reply to a Belgian 
colleague - the great importance of Mr. Tinde-
mans's visit to China, which cleared the way for 
our work. The decision taken by the Ten- of 
which we were informed in Brussels - that each 
country succeeding to the chair of the European 
Council will establish contact with the Chinese 
Government both to improve relations and to 
try to identify areas of agreement is fully in line 
with the committee's recommendations and 
with the requests of the Chinese themselves. 
Close relations must be maintained in order 
to understand each other and to act together. I 
am therefore very glad that this point was 
raised by Mr. Michel and other speakers. 
I agree entirely with the substance of Mr. van 
der Sanden's remarks. Our credibility with the 
Chinese, whom we heard, understood and want 
to help, depends essentially on the correctness 
of the behaviour of us Europeans. We have 
not become spokesmen for the People's 
Republic of China. The Chinese are big 
enough to speak for their own ideas and 
policies. We speak for the people of Europe 
wl!o firmly believe that in the new world order 
now taking shape, Europe has a major role to 
play. We shall only be credible to our Chinese 
friends if we are accepted as men and women 
who keep their promises, are true to our way of 
life and are determined to preserve the civilisa-
tion which has been the glory of Europe 
through all adversities. 
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That is why we must not compromise on our 
diplomatic undertakings, our belief in human 
rights and our instinctive denunciation of any 
violation of those rights. It is for this that the 
Chinese respect us and will continue to do so 
and it is also the reason why we may perhaps 
play an effective role. 
My friend, Mr. Prussen, showed his usual 
courage in his moderate and well-argued speech 
on the problem of Taiwan which was also men-
tioned by Mr. Bassinet. Mr. Prussen, you are 
well aware that the committee gave consi-
derable thought to the problem and decided 
unanimously to adopt a very cautious 
approach. 
Mr. Bassinet said a few moments ago, with 
particular reference to the United States, that 
ambiguous positions must be avoided. Ambi-
guous, if you like. I assume he was referring to 
the delivery of arms to Taiwan. At the same 
time, it must be recognised that the change in 
the diplomatic order within the world commu-
nity, particularly as regards Chinese represen-
tation in the United Nations, is the result of the 
policy adopted by the United States Govern-
ment after President Nixon's visit. 
For the European countries, the recognition 
or non-recognition of Taiwan or of the People's 
Republic of China was a political decision 
taken more as a matter of principle and perhaps 
even as a matter of commercial interest. But 
its effect on the equilibrium of world peace 
was immeasurably less than a decision such as 
that taken by the United States of America. I 
cannot agree therefore that the American posi-
tion is ambiguous. As the Chinese themselves 
say, it is correct that the United States makes 
mistakes liable to jeopardise further progress 
towards the reunification of Chinese terri-
tory. It is up to us Europeans to help in 
getting it under way but in so doing we must 
respect to the full the friendship and solidarity 
which bind us to the United States. 
On the fundamental issue of the difference of 
regime and of respect for human rights, which 
Mr. Prussen raised, may I be allowed to quote 
- I sometimes have good sources; I will, there-
fore quote my own words which I used in my 
introductory speech and which meet his point 
in full. I am referring to violations of personal 
rights. I said yesterday that, in my view, such 
violations are incompatible with China's most 
legitimate national aspirations, because there 
can be no peaceful reunification of territory 
unless acceptable and credible safeguards can be 
offered to all Chinese. I repeat these words 
deliberately, because they are the heart of our 
thinking on the problem. 
If some among you, Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, have heard reports of the 
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debates now taking place in the National Peo-
ple's Congress in Beijing, they will have noted 
that new proposals have just been tabled for the 
reunification of China with Taiwan, which go 
beyond the confidential information given to 
the committee and repeated on various occa-
sions, more particularly in diplomatic negotia-
tions, indicating that the problem is under 
consideration. 
I am dealing with this point now so that I do 
not have to come back to it when the amend-
ments are discussed and so that Mr. Bassinet 
will appreciate that the absence of a paragraph 
on Taiwan from our report is not an oversight. 
The members of the General Affairs Commit-
tee are responsible enough to weigh the terms 
of their proposals which we discussed at length. 
This is a difficult problem - we must be willing 
to recognise the facts - and its solution depends 
basically on previous and future relations bet-
ween China and Taipei. 
Should we have tabled a motion on this 
point? You yourself, Mr. Bassinet, have 
acknowledged that this is the basic line taken in 
the report. It is not in opposition to what you 
ask and what your amendment urges. We 
thought however that, in this matter, it was best 
to rely on the wisdom of those concerned. We 
are all aware of the fundamental decision taken 
by the United States of America, based essen-
tially on the issue of security, of the bastion, to 
use Mr. Prussen's word, and of course on the 
issue of human rights. We also know however 
that there has been a tremendous change in the 
People's Republic of China and that since Deng 
Xiaoping took over the leadership, the question 
is being pursued with determination and with 
wholly oriental wisdom. 
Let us, therefore, leave the wise men now at 
the head of the People's Republic of China to 
handle the matter, while expressing the hope, 
set out in clear terms in the explanatory memo-
randum to the report, that this will be achieved 
with due respect for freedoms and reserving the 
right to come back to the question if by chance 
it is not resolved as we would wish. 
I shall now reply to Mr. Scheer concerning 
the third world. It is true that the third world 
forms part of the triptych to which he referred 
and that it is of special interest to the People's 
Republic of China as it is to us. 
I must however observe that here again - and 
you have not argued to the contrary - there is 
convergence and a European interest. In fact, 
while it is the ambition of the People's Repub-
lic of China to become in future a great coun-
try, capable of spreading its culture and impos-
ing - at least as we hope - its wish for peace in 
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that part of the world, we also know that the 
People's Republic of China looks upon itself as 
part of the third world and will continue to do 
so. 
However, China's economic needs are so 
great and its financial resources so limited and 
carefully husbanded - we know that the 
Chinese currency is not convertible and that the 
scope for Chinese trade is restricted by shortage 
of foreign currencies - that the amount of 
financial aid which the People's Republic of 
China can give to the third world countries, in 
Asia alone, is immeasurably less than the 
Chinese themselves would wish in order to 
fulfil their ambition to win the leadership of the 
Asian third world. 
While determined to remain loyal to the 
third world, China is equally determined to 
advance to the level of the dialogue between the 
great powers. 
This is where Europe has a part to play 
because its policy is exactly the same in the last 
analysis; its wish to help the third world has 
run into economic difficulties. In the concert 
of nations, we can undoubtedly succeed in the 
enterprise urged by the committee by adding 
what brings us together and by seeking to 
resolve the differences which still separate us, 
particularly as regards our philosophies. 
Finally, Mr. President, I do not think I am 
giving a purely personal impression because we 
have frequently exchanged views on the subject, 
when I say that things are moving so fast and 
everything is changing so swiftly, and moreover 
the need for rapprochement and security is so 
great that China is making a_ colossal effort. 
Our time is certainly limited; China will not 
really need Europe for ever. 
Europe has only a short time to succeed in its 
mission. We must act promptly. We must 
call on the governments to act. Speaking for 
the committee, I shall allow myself to be opti-
mistic and I wish to thank the members of the 
Council for the favourable reception which they 
gave in Brussels to the essential elements of the 
proposals in our report. 
In view of my comments I hope, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the Assembly can agree to adopt the 
report which I had the honour to present. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Caro, for your replies to speakers and 
for your excellent report. 
We will now consider the amendments to the 
draft recommendation. 
Four amendments have been tabled. They 
will be taken in the order in which they refer to 
the text. They are Amendment 2 tabled by 
Mr. Vogt, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourre, 
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Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Bassinet and 
Mr. Fourre and Amendment 3 tabled by 
Mr. Vogt. 
Amendment 2 is worded as follows: 
2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation. 
I call Mr. Vogt in support of his amendment. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it is a source of some astonishment 
to me that a draft recommendation concerned 
with the relations between Western Europe and 
the People's Republic of China should have 
been used to confirm yet again our special rela-
tionship to the United States. 
Mr. Caro has just been talking again about 
European identity, and I find it somewhat inap-
propriate that this European indentity should 
be asserted by underlining the special relation-
ship, or, as we might say, the special depen-
dence, which links Europe to the United 
States. To be brief, I feel that this particular 
reference is objectionable, especially in a 
context which lays stress on sovereign and 
autonomous relations with another, very 
powerful, nation. 
I therefore suggest that this paragraph be 
deleted from the text, although this proposed 
amendment may sound somewhat terse and 
unreasoned. 
So much for one proposed amendment. I do 
not know if this is the time for me to add my 
reasons for the second proposed amendment. 
Perhaps I might return to that later. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, may I say that I reject the 
amendment proposed by Mr. Vogt. I believe 
that our purpose is not to incorporate in the 
report any kind of wishful fantasies or expect-
ations but to portray things as they really 
are. The real situation is as depicted by our 
Rapporteur, Mr. Caro. The fact is - as was 
indeed constantly reiterated in the discussions 
at which I was present in China - that the 
countries of Western European Union belong to 
a military alliance, to NATO, and that this 
alliance- as has also been stated in the last day 
or two in this Assembly - rests, in Kennedy's 
words, on the twin pillars of the European and 
the American contribution. To deny or 
attempt to eliminate this fact is to blind oneself 
to reality. But we are practical politicians, and 
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it is therefore our wish that the text of 
Mr. Caro's report should be allowed to stand. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is 
the committee's view? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - The 
committee is in full agreement with Mr. Miil-
ler, whom I wish to thank. This amendment 
would certainly be very unwelcome to our 
Chinese friends: in order to speak for a policy 
which we seem to share with the Chinese 
authorities, it is not necessary to gloss over 
anyone or anything which is absolutely funda-
mental for the existence of our western 
community. 
I read in a newspaper this morning an 
extract, with commentary, from a statement 
made yesterday by the Chinese Prime Minister 
to the People's Congress in Beijing. Referring 
to Sino-American differences, Mr. Zhao Ziyang 
said: " Let us stop doing anything which may 
prejudice Sino-American relations". 
I believe that the Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union will find it difficult to accept our 
colleague's arguments which, even though they 
are based on what I am sure is sincere convic-
tion, I cannot endorse. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I must nevertheless point out 
that the obligations of the Western European 
NATO countries towards the United States of 
America are already familiar enough. I see no 
reason why they should be specially mentioned 
again in a document of this kind. I also 
consider it unwise to make such a reference as, 
from the standpoint of another power, which is 
after all always alluded to between the lines, it 
might well create a fear of encirclement and so 
introduce an element of instability into the 
world political situation in which we find 
ourselves. There is, Mr. MUller, another kind 
of reality, which is concerned to avoid the con-
stant reawakening of anxieties which might 
trigger a fear of encirclement or even a panic 
reaction on the part of the Soviet Union. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I must ask 
you to conclude. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I will conclude at once by 
summing up. I do not regard it as an expres-
sion of reality but rather as a grotesque 
demonstration of the dependence of the Euro-
peans on the United States of America that this 
should be stressed in a document concerned 
with the relations between Western Europe and 
China. 
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Amendment 2 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2 is negatived. 
I call Mr. Bassinet to speak in support of 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourre, worded as 
follows: 
1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
"and, in particular, no longer subject the 
latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the 
eastern countries ". 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). -As 
both speakers and the Rapporteur have wel-
comed the growth of trade relations between 
China and the Western European countries, 
adoption of this amendment would seem to be 
automatic. 
I would remind the Assembly that in the 
report which I presented at the last session, I 
argued that the Cocom rules needea to be 
re-examined. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the committee's view? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - The 
existing third paragraph of the draft recommen-
dation more or less covers the point argued by 
Mr. Bassinet. The amendment therefore sim-
ply supplements the text and is in line with 
the committee's thinking. The committee can 
accept it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourre to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourre have tabled 
Amendment 4 worded as follows: 
4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add: 
" and refrain from any position which might 
prevent the return of Taiwan to China;". 
I call Mr. Bassinet to speak in support of the 
amendment. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - As 
the Rapporteur has informed us that the 
General Affairs Committee was unanimous on 
this point, I withdraw the amendment. 
I still insist, however, on using the word 
" ambiguity " with reference to United States 
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policy. China did of course join the United 
Nations after being recognised by President 
Nixon, but there have since been much more 
complex developments. 
I withdraw the amendment therefore but 
regret doing so because it was justified by the 
report itself. 
I do not believe that the authority of an 
assembly is enhanced by saying things which 
are not supported by the facts. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
amendment is withdrawn. 
I call Mr. Vogt to move Amendment 3: 
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
" Appeal to the People's Republic of China 
to stop the tests of atomic weapons and 
delivery vehicles, especially. in the Pacific, in 
order to comply with the deep concerns of 
the Pacific peoples about such activities of 
the atomic powers, thereby setting a good 
example in the interest of the survival of 
mankind; ". 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I have noted with some satisfac-
tion that a very wise recommendation is being 
put forward here to the effect that, if the Soviet 
Union can be induced to withdraw the SS-20s 
as a potential threat to Western Europe, such a 
step should not, of course, operate to the disad-
vantage of another region. On the other hand, 
the position is that the People's Republic of 
China has itself become a disquieting factor. 
This is particularly apparent in the fact that, 
like other atomic powers, the People's Republic 
of China has chosen the Pacific as a testing 
ground for its missiles. The People's Republic 
of China is using the Pacific as a testing ground 
for atomic weapons and is thereby acting very 
much against the vital interests of the inhabi-
tants of the surrounding areas. 
Where a resolution of this kind contains a 
recommendation to another atomic power -
and I welcome the recommendation addressed 
to the Soviet Union - then I think reference 
should also be made to the fact that China too, 
as an atomic power, should make an initial 
concession. In particular, China should desist 
from disturbing this Pacific region - one third 
of the earth's surface, after all - with its atomic 
weapon and missile tests. I will expand on this 
a little further by adding that is intolerable for 
the countries of the Pacific that the basis of 
their food supplies - especially the fish catch 
yielded by the sea - should be harmed by the 
destructive effects of atomic tests. The 
position is exactly the same as if one were to 
test nuclear missiles in the large wheat-growing 
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areas of the United States of America, accepting 
the concomitant atomic pollution, or as if one 
were to test atomic weapons in China's rice 
fields with the consequent nuclear contamin-
ation of nutritional resources and foods. 
It may be said that an organisation- Western 
European Union - which includes a country 
like France - I shall shortly conclude what I 
have to say, but in this context one must be 
allowed to state the argument, Mr. President -
which is also causing disquiet in the countries 
surrounding the Pacific by its atomic tests, lacks 
credibility when it makes such recommen-
dations to another atomic power. In my 
opinion it would be a dereliction of duty quite 
equal to that of our parents with regard to the 
Nazi crimes if we were to remain silent while 
the weapons of world war three are being tested 
and in response to atomic tests whose conse-
quences are fully equivalent to medical experi-
ments on living organisms. 
In this connection, I should like to remind 
you that when gunpowder was invented, it was 
not the Chinese but the Europeans who used it 
as the foundation for a policy of destruction. 
In the present situation it would be highly 
appropriate if the Europeans, faced with the 
unleashing of nuclear fission, were to develop a 
common policy, in collaboration with China, 
say, to free us from this scourge of humanity. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, the problem rai-
sed by this amendment has been aired in the 
second part of Mr. Vogt's remarks. The prob-
lem arises from the fact that, while on the one 
hand an appeal is being directed towards the 
People's Republic of China - an appeal which I 
consider to be proper, timely and necessary -
on the other hand those for whom we are 
speaking here have perhaps in the past not been 
absolutely wholehearted - to put it mildly - in 
the seriousness of their endeavours to arrive at 
a real test-ban agreement - and I refer here not 
just to one of the European partners. It is a 
disgrace that no progress in this direction has 
been made anywhere in the world since the 
partial test-ban agreement of 1963. 
The fact remains that we can scarcely make 
an appeal to China on a matter to which we 
ourselves give too little attention and which is 
not pursued with the necessary dedication. As 
a new delegate I do not know if what I have to 
say is in order, but I suggest we adopt this 
amendment in a modified form. The import 
of this minor modification could be that, in an 
endeavour to achieve a comprehensive test-ban 
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treaty, we are also appealing to the People's 
Republic of China. The endeavour referred to 
is that of the Geneva Committee on Disarma-
ment, which has before it a joint proposal -
tabled by the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy and a number of other European partners 
- directed towards a comprehensive test-ban 
treaty. This would serve the purpose of creat-
ing a measure of credibility, which would 
further our cause. I therefore propose that the 
amendment be adopted in the following modi-
fied form: " In the endeavour to achieve a 
comprehensive test-ban treaty we also appeal 
to ... " after which the text could stand. 
I take it that it is ,now for you to decide, 
Mr. President, whether you will allow this 
change. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I under-
stand, Mr. Scheer, but it is impossible at this 
stage of the procedure to amend an amend-
ment. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I believe that the 
Rules of Procedure allow the person tabling the 
amendment to accept this proposal for a change 
in the wording of the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- No further 
speakers can be taken at this stage in the 
proceedings. 
What is the committee's view? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation).- Mr. Pre-
sident, this amendment, tabled by Mr. Vogt, 
raises a fundamental issue going far beyond the 
r~port which I have presented. 
I agree with Mr. Scheer. We cannot say 
anything to you on this subject for the commit-
tee, because it was not on the agenda for our 
talks with the people we met in China. Nor 
did we discuss it in committee. We could of 
course go into it if we so wished, but I am 
speaking now for the committee only. 
Furthermore, this paragraph reminds me 
strangely of the debate we held not so long ago 
on pacifism and neutralism. I simply wonder 
who is served by this paragraph. To whom is 
such an appeal directed? Seeing that both 
Western Europe and the People's Republic of 
China are faced by the same problem of insecu-
rity - created by the only enemy of peace and 
security, recognised as such by both East and 
West - I mean the Soviet Union and I am 
repeating the actual words of the Chinese lea-
ders - is it possible to ask any country seeking 
to restore its security to abandon military 
nuclear energy at the end of the 20th centtury? 
This is my problem. But it is not the 
problem which concerns you, Mr. Vogt, 
because you were honest enough to speak of 
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France. I wonder, in the final analysis, 
whether your amendment may not be aimed 
more at my country than at China. 
Furthermore, the debate must be seen in a 
wider context where everyone can express his 
views. The effort now being made by the 
People's Republic of China in the field of 
nuclear defence is following the same course as 
in the western countries. Have we a single 
yardstick for the whole world or are we simply 
willing to accept what is happening in Europe? 
Because, ultimately, we are very happy to 
shelter behind the American shield and I would 
like to know in what kind of situation certain 
European nations which are still free today 
would now find themselves if we had not had 
that shield at the end of the second world 
war. We might not perhaps have been here to 
discuss the question. 
Secondly, in dealing with the People's 
Republic of China this is not the right point in 
the debate to launch an appeal of this kind. 
This being so, even though there has been no 
discussion in committee, I oppose the amend-
ment in the name of the committee and in line 
with its work. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, the matter 
concerns a point of procedure which you 
should not disregard. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Vogt, 
I cannot allow the author of an amendment to 
speak several times. 
I put Amendment 3 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
We now vote on the amended draft recom-
mendation as a whole. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The amended draft recommendation is adop-
ted•. 
4. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
(Preaentation by Mr. Cluysson, 
French Miniater for External Relations, 
Chairnum-in-OJ]iee of t/u Council, Doe. 941) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation by Mr. 
Cheysson, French Minister for External Rela-
l. See page 23. 
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tions and Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil, of the twenty-eighth annual report of the 
Council to the Assembly, Document 942. 
I wish to welcome Mr. Cheysson and to 
apologise to him for a few minutes delay in 
starting the debate. I am sure that Mr. 
Cheysson, who knows our Assembly well and is 
moreover greatly appreciated by members, will 
understand that our procedures have to be 
observed. 
I now invite Mr. Cheysson to address the 
Assembly. 
Mr. CHEYSSON (French Minister for Exter-
nal Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil) (Translation). - May I begin, Mr. President, 
by congratulating you on behalf of the French 
Delegation and the French Government on 
your election yesterday. It is a source of great 
satisfaction to us, and may I say, speaking for 
my colleagues, to the Council also to have at 
the head of this Assembly such a convinced 
European as yourself and a man so well versed 
in the problems debated here and brought to 
the attention of our peoples through the 
Assembly. 
I was particularly interested by the analysis 
which you made yesterday of the reasons why 
our countries' defence effort is perhaps better 
understood here than elsewhere. I cannot say 
too strongly how much we agree with your 
analysis, which serves only to confirm what we 
already know of your clear-sightedness on the 
subject. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am 
delighted to be here. I previously had occasion 
to address you very briefly last spring. I am 
happy to be able to do so again this year, but 
this time in my dual capacity as Chairman-in-
Office and as representative of the French 
Government. 
In accordance with the usual practice, I will 
first, as Chairman-in-Office, present the Coun-
cil's twenty-eighth annual report. I will deal 
in turn with relations between the Council and 
the Assembly, the activities of the Council and 
its subsidiary bodies and, lastly, but not with 
much pleasure, budgetary questions. 
The WEU Assembly occupies a unique posi-
tion. Your Assembly is the only European 
parliamentary body empowered by treaty to 
debate defence questions. 
The Council greatly appreciates the conscien-
tious and serious manner in which the Assem-
bly discharges its duties, the importance of 
which has no need to be stressed in present 
circumstances. The Council welcomes the 
reports presented by your parliamentary com-
mittees. It is pleased to note that in response 
to the appeal from Mr. Lemoine, then Secretary 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Cheysson (continued) 
of State at the French Ministry of Defence, the 
Assembly has made a detailed study of the 
question of nuclear weapons in Europe, of secu-
rity problems and of the possibility of maintain-
ing the balance of forces in Europe by pacifism 
and neutralism. 
In 1982, the Council made every effort to 
assist the Assembly to fulfil its role effectively 
by maintaining a meaningful dialogue on 
matters covered by the modified Brussels 
Treaty, including questions dealt with by the 
governments of WEU member states in other 
international bodies. As evidence of this, I 
would mention: the earlier communication of 
a detailed report on the activities of the Council 
and its subsidiary bodies in 1982; the replies of 
substance given to Assembly recommendations; 
the informal contacts held after the ministerial 
meetings in London on 19th May 1982 and in 
Brussels on 17th May last, with the Presidential 
Committee, the General Affairs Committee and 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments; the attendance, encouraged by the 
Council, of ministers, and particularly of 
defence ministers at Assembly sessions; the 
authorisation given to the international secre-
tariat of the SAC to collaborate on technical 
matters with the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions in the 
study on the problem of harmonisation of 
research in civil and military high technology 
fields. 
May I be allowed to express a wish: in view 
of the number and solid content of the reports 
drawn up by committees, the Council would 
like to receive them as long as possible before 
each session. It considers this essential for a 
more fruitful dialogue. 
On the subject of its own activities and those 
of its subordinate bodies, the Council reaffir-
med in its report the importance attached by 
the member countries of WEU - the only 
exclusively European organisation empowered 
by treaty to deal with defence matters - as I 
said earlier - ·and the determination of those 
countries to honour their commitments under 
the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
more particularly the commitment to legitimate 
collective defence under Article V. 
The Council conscientiously ensured that the 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
its protocols were applied and avoided, as 
required by the treaty, duplication of its work 
with that in which the member states of WEU 
participate elsewhere. 
At political level, the ministers, meeting in 
London on 19th May 1982 and in Brussels on 
17th May this year, discussed East-West rela-
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tions, with due attention to the problems 
created by pacifism and neutralism. They also 
considered the work of the CSCE, and the 
situation in Afghanistan and in Poland. They 
exchanged views on the situation in the Medi-
terranean area, with which Europe obviously 
has ties of solidarity which must be maintained. 
In military matters, the Council was careful 
to ensure that the provisions of the treaty and 
its protocols concerning control of the levels of 
forces and armaments of member states were 
implemented. It examined the suggestions 
made by the Assembly in Recommendation 380 
regarding Annexes Ill and IV to Protocol 
No. Ill, in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in Articles 11 and V respectively. 
Regarding the implementation of Annex IV, it 
requested a technical opinion from the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments ; this opinion is 
confidential and is at present under consider-
ation by governments. 
The Agency for the Control of Armaments, 
whose duties are defined in Protocol No. IV, 
performed those duties efficiently in the sectors 
subject to control. It should be stressed that it 
did so at low cost. 
The Standing Armaments Committee up-
dated the classified version of the first part of its 
economic study of the armaments sector of 
industry in member countries. It continued its 
exchanges of information and its work on a 
glossary of operational research terms. 
At their meeting in London last year, minis-
ters discussed the work of the SAC. Since that 
meeting, a new head of the international secre-
tariat of the SAC, Mr. Hintermann, has been 
appointed. He brought to his duties an imagi-
native and practical turn of mind, which we 
warmly welcome. He submitted a number of 
proposals, mainly for fresh studies by the SAC 
which might provide governments with the 
information required to enable member coun-
tries to progress with "the standardisation, 
production and procurement of armaments " -
to quote the terms of the Council decision 
setting up the SAC. 
At their meeting in Brussels on 17th May 
last, the ministers welcomed these proposals 
with interest and referred them to the perma-
nent representatives for further study and final 
disposal. 
Lastly, to conclude this first part of my 
speech, in 1982, as in the previous year, the 
Council was compelled by the financial situa-
tion in member countries, to apply a strict bud-
get policy. It nevertheless intends that all the 
WEU bodies shall continue to work smoothly 
together in furtherance of the aims of the 
treaty. It is determined to provide all of these 
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bodies with the necessary funds to discharge 
their duties in a fully effective manner. 
Mr. President, I have been greatly interested 
by the reports prepared by Assembly commit-
tees in reply to the Council's annual report. 
The Council will give due attention to the 
recommendations you will be forwarding at the 
end of your debates. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall 
now continue, not as Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council but, in accordance with normal prac-
tice, as French Minister for External Relations. 
Voices are sometimes heard querying the 
value of WEU and seeming to suggest that our 
organisation has outlived its use. This is no 
doubt true in some respects which will have to 
be discussed in due course. It will then be 
time to concentrate on the basic direction to be 
taken for the future. For the moment, how-
ever, I note and again repeat that WEU is the 
only European organisation empowered to deal 
with defence matters, where the elected repre-
sentatives of our peoples can discuss problems 
affecting the security of Europe. This is the 
clear justification of the organisation's exist-
ence. Any attack on it would be contrary to 
our unyielding determination that opinions, 
followed by due reflection and finally decision, 
must be combined in all matters affecting the 
security of every man and woman in our coun-
tries. If your Assembly did not exist it would 
have to be created. 
What do we see around us ? Our nations are 
asking questions about conditions for the secu-
rity of our continent and they must know the 
factors on which that security depends. It 
would be both absurd and dangerous to under-
estimate the anxiety which is felt. The ques-
tioning must be understood. Above all, the 
reasons for decisions and policies must be 
explained to our peoples after their views have 
been heard when those decisions and policies 
are being prepared. Ladies and Gentlemen, this 
is what you WEU parliamentarians have to do. 
Nuclear weapons are arousing fears and even 
worse. Yet, we in France believe absolutely 
that the deterrent so created has made war in 
Europe unthinkable for more than thirty years 
and is continuing to do so. Fears must not 
lead unwittingly to abdication, thus helping to 
revive the threat. This is the danger today, 
because - and this we cannot repeat too often -
any weakening on our part would embolden 
potential enemies who are unaware of, or do 
not recognise, the fears of their peoples. 
To take only today's burning question, the 
need to modernise the American nuclear poten-
tial in Europe, it is quite apparent that the 
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tremendous propaganda battle now in progress 
is aimed at increasing the imbalance which the 
Soviet Union has established in the European 
theatre in respect of nuclear weapons targeted 
on nearby countries but incapable of reaching 
the distant areas of the alliance. Can anyone 
reasonably doubt that the source of the present 
imbalance is to be found in this over-arma-
ment ? This imbalance must be corrected. 
And of course, France, like all its allies, is 
most anxious that this should be achieved at 
the lowest possible level and by negotia-
tion. All eyes are now on Geneva. 
Again, the INF negotiations must be conduc-
ted on a sound basis. Here, it is unfortunately 
the case that one of the two partners sometimes 
tries to divert the discussions from their true 
purpose. Is this an attempt at greater con-
cealment of the real issues ? The spotlight is 
thus turned on to the forces of the other coun-
tries, France and the United Kingdom; but 
these have never been intended as a counter to 
medium-range weapons but, in the strategy of 
the weak against the strong, as a means of 
deterring any enemy from using the whole of its 
arsenal or even of threatening to do so. In face 
of the vast capabilities of the superpowers, these 
forces are, as everyone knows, the guarantee 
and condition of the independence of their 
possessors. France's nuclear forces are there-
fore not negotiable. That is out of the ques-
tion. 
The true stake in the negotiations lies else-
where. How could our continental NATO 
allies be prepared to live under a threat which 
does not reach their powerful allies across the 
Atlantic and for which there is at present no 
counter of the same nature ? How could they 
agree to being denied the right of cover by the 
deterrent of their ally from across the Atlan-
tic? How could they allow the Soviet Union 
such, what might be called, a mathematical 
right to superiority ? 
There are other negotiations to which, as you 
know, my country attaches importance. I am 
referring to those which should take place at a 
conference on European disarmament when, as 
we hope, the Madrid Conference finally suc-
ceeds in agreeing terms of reference enabling it 
to be convened even before the end of 1983, let 
us hope. The European neutral and non-
aligned countries have put forward proposals 
for a final compromise which, with a few 
improvements, should enable agreement to be 
reached. Any agreement in Madrid will cover 
both the mandate of the conference on 
European disarmament and a document by 
which human rights and contacts between 
persons will be given their proper place in the 
CSCE procedures. 
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The CSCE is the only forum where the East-
West dialogue, the internal European dialogue, 
is at present continuing as a global exer-
cise. The final act of Helsinki, which is some-
times harshly criticised, insists on the fact that 
the problems of security and co-operation in 
Europe cannot be limited to the military 
dimension or to the confrontation of two blocs. 
We still share this approach to European 
realities which takes account of human aspira-
tions and the permanence of nations, beyond 
the inertia of political systems and the weight of 
bureaucracies. This is the only approach 
which can ultimately heal the wounds which 
are tearing our continent apart. 
Armaments control cannot be restricted to 
narrow, limited geographical areas. There is 
one clear fact which the importance of the pre-
sent nuclear debate in Europe must not be 
allowed to obscure; the unbalanced stockpil-
ing of conventional weapons on European soil 
has been and still is one of the main sources of 
tension and danger on the continent. It is that 
stockpiling which, as we know, has brought 
about and still requires the presence of large 
numbers of nuclear weapons. It is therefore 
vital that we should direct all our efforts to this, 
seeking to bring armaments down to lower and 
more stable levels. 
In the present circumstances, the French 
Government will - and I wish to state this in 
the clearest terms to this Assembly - maintain 
its defence policy in accordance with the doc-
trine laid down and proclaimed since General 
de Gaulle, as is demonstrated by the military 
programme now being debated in parliament. 
France will not lower its guard. Its defence 
is the guarantee of its security and therefore of 
its independence. The funds will be provided, 
therefore, despite the present state of the 
economy. 
The prime consideration for us is to maintain 
the credibility of our nuclear deterrent; no one 
should have any doubts on that score. And, as 
I have said, this deterrent is designed to counter 
all the resources of the potential enemy. In 
this way we ensure, and will continue to 
ensure, the protection of our national territory 
and of our vital interests. 
The French Government, standing foursquare 
with its allies in the defence of Europe, in 
accordance with the treaties by which we are 
linked to them, is determined that our country 
shall be able to play its part. The programme 
law therefore provides for some reorganisation 
of our conventional forces, whose firepower and 
mobility will be enhanced, in order to increase 
the power and speed of our intervention, if at 
any time we have to take a political decision to 
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intervene in complete independence and at our 
sole discretion. 
Lastly, you know that France is planning to 
improve its capacity to intervene in other 
theatres, in order to fulfil its undertakings, to 
come to the assistance of friendly countries who 
ask for help - I quote the case of Lebanon - to 
protect its nationals. We have therefore deci-
ded to reinforce our capacity for external 
action, and this again will involve heavy but 
essential demands on the budget. 
In the context of our plans for our conven-
tional forces, may I make one remark concern-
ing the so-called " Rogers doctrine " which 
lays the emphasis on conventional armaments. 
France has several times stated its view on 
this subject, notably in November last through 
my friend the Minister of Defence. I will sim-
ply add that the excellent idea that conven-
tional forces must be strengthened must not 
give the false impression - which General 
Rogers clearly does not share - that at the pre-
sent stage the deterrent can be sought in non-
nuclear forces. Nor should the impression be 
allowed to gain credence outside the alliance 
that the countries belonging to· the integrated 
military structure - which do not include 
France - have lost confidence in the American 
nuclear deterrent. This is an area where 
doubts easily arise and this is dangerous. 
I shall conclude by speaking of the work of 
your Assembly. I have already said that 
France greatly values your responsibility in the 
matter of security. Our interest is proved by 
the speeches of my predecessors, including what 
I said myself last year. We expect a great deal 
of you and I agree and reaffirm that you should 
have the necessary resources. 
In my view, the "revitalisation" of the 
Assembly - to use an incorrect word which 
seems to have gained general currency - is to be 
achieved in two ways. As several speakers 
have said, the Assembly should be able to study 
all the problems affecting the security of our 
countries and to debate them in all their com-
plexity. It is a vast field. Your committee 
reports show that the guidelines have been 
clearly set. Work must continue with the same 
determination and wish to know. The Assem-
bly is one of the three bodies set up under the 
treaty. Relations between the Assembly, the 
Council and the Agency, forming the "triad" 
to which I add the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, should be more flexible, more direct 
and fuller in content. The international secre-
tariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
should continue to help you as it has done for a 
number of years; it could profit from being 
expanded. In the same line of thought, you 
could be briefed on some of the work of the 
SAC. I am convinced that the dialogue 
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already started is valuable and that both the 
Assembly and the SAC can benefit from it. 
On the subject of the Standing Armaments 
Committee, you are aware that the head of its 
international secretariat has put forward a num-
ber of proposals. We feel that they are a move 
in the right direction and that they are in line 
with the thinking of our countries. They have 
been referred to the permanent representatives 
for consideration. I hope that priorities will be 
identified and that the first studies will quickly 
be under way. 
These comments on the work of WEU may 
seem modest. They are nevertheless such as to 
help in strengthening the organisation's role. 
The present situation, Mr. President, calls for 
the fullest efforts from us. Europe must take 
an active part in the strategic debate. Its deter-
mination to defend itself must first be expressed 
in Europe. It is for Europe to play the full 
role cast for it by history. In this Assembly, 
the European dimension of security is clear for 
all to see. WEU was the first collective secu-
rity organisation set up immediately after the 
world war. It must remain the living and 
renewed expression of our solidarity. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Thank you, 
Mr. Minister, both for your very kind remarks 
addressed to me personally and for what you 
said regarding the strengthening of our organi-
sation, which naturally implies the streng-
thening of our Assembly. 
I should also like to thank you in advance for 
the replies you will be giving to any questions 
which members of the Assembly may now wish 
to put to you. 
I call Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. Minister, as you said, our Assembly has in 
the recent past heard repeated statements from 
the present French Government declaring its 
wish to strengthen WEU. The Italian Govern-
ment has taken exactly the same line, and this 
position was not repudiated by the previous 
Chairman of the Council of WEU, Mr. Tinde-
mans. 
Furthermore, I seem to remember that you 
stated in the French National Assembly that 
WEU should be strengthened through the par-
liamentary Assembly and that its executive, the 
Council, had little future. 
Are you not afraid that, since the Paris 
Agreements of 1954 and the Council's subse-
quent decision preferring that political consul-
tations concerning Europe should take place in 
the wider European framework of the Ten, we 
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are moving towards a real break up of our 
organisation and its transformation into a mere 
debating society ? 
Should not any abandonment by the WEU 
authorities of their powers in respect of arms 
limitation and control be regarded as likely to, 
hasten this regrettable development ? 
Lastly, would you clarify your statement to 
the French National Assembly, which appears 
to refer to the Council's marked political 
lethargy in the matter of building the European 
pillar of western defence ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Lagorce. 
Mr. LAGORCE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
Minister, as always your statement was extre-
mely full and complete. 
May I nevertheless ask one question or at 
least ask you for clarification : what role does 
the French Government see for armaments 
control between the member countries of an 
alliance ? Does it consider that it is solely a 
matter of past history or that updating of the 
lists of weapons subject to control by the WEU 
Agency would be of advantage for the future of 
Europe? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Blaauw. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands).- The Paris air 
show has just ended. I was there and I noticed 
that it is becoming more and more a weapons 
show. The minister who opened the debate 
talked about standardisation. The air show 
revealed much competition, particularly in 
weapons. Most governments subsidise such 
weapons to produce them competitively. Per-
haps we should consider the matter more and 
use the SAC to study the possibility of increas-
ing standardisation. The Assembly always 
calls for greater standardisation but today there 
is less standardisation. Perhaps we can change 
that. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Minister, in your capacity as 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council you 
referred to the existence of an extensive 
propaganda campaign and said, if I understood 
you aright, that the peace movement was one of 
the results of this propaganda campaign. Can 
you conceive of the possibility of independent 
grounds for disquiet, quite unconnected with 
any propaganda campaigns which might be 
waged by the superpowers concerned, which 
might induce people to speak out against any 
further deployment of nuclear weapons in 
Europe? 
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The second part of my question is this : is it 
conceivable that the very violent rejection of 
the efforts of the peace movement in the Euro-
pean NATO countries by the French Govern-
ment might be connected with the fact that in 
its overall nuclear defence concept the French 
Government regards the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany as a kind of forward 
battleground for its own defence ? May I add 
that, if this is indeed the case, it is quite 
unacceptable to us, as we see all these weapons 
from the standpoint of the "end-user", the 
future victims, whether the weapons concerned 
are the Pluto I and 2, the Hades, the SS-20, the 
Pershing 11, cruise missiles or the so-called 
" tactical " nuclear weapons located in the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Jager. 
Mr. J.AGER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation).- Minister, may I preface my two 
brief questions by thanking you most warmly 
for your address, which was distinguished by its 
clarity. 
Minister, my first question is whether the 
French Government's refusal, which you have 
just confirmed, to allow its nuclear forces to be 
included in the Geneva disarmament talks is to 
some extent influenced by the complete dispa-
rity of the demands made by the Soviet 
Government in calling for the inclusion of both 
the French and the corresponding British forces, 
which comprise chiefly seaborne nuclear wea-
pons, whereas the Soviet Union itself has not 
the slightest intention of including its own 
extensive seaborne medium-range missiles in 
the disarmament talks, but only its land-based 
weaponry. It would interest me to know whe-
ther this is an important factor in the French 
Government's decision. 
Secondly, I should like to know what you 
think of the Soviet Government's attitude to the 
disarmament talks which you have described in 
such detail. How do you assess the action of 
former General Secretary Brezhnev in declaring 
on his own initiative in spring 1981 that the 
Soviet Union would henceforth unilaterally 
refrain from any further deployment of 
medium-range missiles directed against Western 
Europe ? At the time, western observers coun-
ted approximately two hundred and twenty to 
two hundred and fifty systems in place. Today, 
two years after Mr. Brezhnev's promises, obser-
vers estimate that the number of systems 
has increased by about one hundred. How 
does your government view the fact that the 
Soviet Government clearly did not even dream 
of keeping its promise to refrain unilaterally 
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from installing further medium-range missile 
systems aimed at Europe ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Minister, I should like to refer 
to the French attitude towards the negotiations 
on medium-range weapons which you have 
already mentioned today and ask again why the 
potential of our French friends should not be 
taken into account, or alternatively, on what 
conditions it should be included - " inclusion " 
being interpreted in a very broad sense ? 
I make this point firstly because the NATO 
twofold decision was concerned with European 
nuclear arms control - an issue not covered by 
SALT 11; secondly because, as you yourself 
pointed out, the French systems naturally assist 
the western deterrent and are therefore to some 
extent part of the overall spectrum; thirdly 
because the earlier, SALT I and MBFR nego-
tiations made some provision for the inclusion 
of these systems; and, fourthly, because the 
success of the negotiations may very largely 
depend on their inclusion. I refer here essen-
tially to serious proposals which have been 
made on this subject in the West over the last 
two years. 
I would remind you that there is talk of 
considering at the START negotiations whether 
this matter might be brought into conjunction 
with the INF talks. In the INF negotiations we 
are faced with the problem of discussing three 
artificially separated topics: (a) medium-range 
weapons only, (b) land-based, medium-range 
missiles only and (c) these issues considered 
possibly only in the Soviet-American con-
text. This makes the negotiations very much 
more difficult, particularly since it was origin-
ally envisaged in 1979 that the matter should 
be dealt with in a round of SALT Ill talks, not 
in a separate round of negotiations. 
Now I come to the question : bearing these 
points in mind and interpreting the idea of 
inclusion very broadly, on what terms could 
you conceive of the French systems being inclu-
ded ? Let me add that I quite understand the 
French attitude in rejecting discussion of their 
systems at negotiations to which they are not 
party. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Scheer, please ask your question. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Please forgive the lengthy intro-
duction. 
My question is: could you in certain cir-
cumstances visualise direct participation by 
France in these negotiations - an idea hardly 
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discussed at all so far - in that such a step 
might open up a new path leading to a solution 
with implications extending beyond the INF 
negotiations ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. CHEYSSON (French Minister for Exter-
nal Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil) (Translation). - The relevance and interest 
of the various questions are in themselves suffi-
cient proof of the value of these meetings. 
It is true that we have several times - I my-
self have had the honour in the French Natio-
nal Assembly - stated the position of the 
French Government, which is that we consider 
WEU to be indispensable for the discussion and 
formulation of decisions which link Europeans 
in the matter of security. This also enables 
them to state their views better in other forums 
where security problems are discussed, either 
from the purely political standpoint in an orga-
nisation which has no powers in the matter and 
which we do not want to have any powers, that 
is the European Community, or in an organi-
sation with specific operational competence in 
defence matters - the Atlantic Alliance, within 
a limited geographical area I would remind you 
- but with no right to interfere in anything 
other than defence matters. 
WEU can cover a very wide range of subjects 
- as you showed this morning by debating 
China - in general political debates between 
Europeans. WEU is therefore ·indispensable. 
It is so because of the institutions it has set 
up, as I said in my address. Here, I would 
recall that the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments has responsibilities which are of impor-
tance to us as the guarantee that the under-
takings entered into by certain countries 
concerning the non-manufacture of some arma-
ments and the control of levels and equipment 
are fulfilled. 
WEU and its permanent institutions, respon-
sible to the Council, have the resources for pro-
moting standardisation and for studying a whole 
series of common problems regarding arma-
ments, but, in our view, WEU is primarily 
essential - and this is the fourth time I have 
said this today - because your Assembly is the 
only forum where the elected representatives of 
our peoples can debate all aspects of defence 
and security. 
Never before has it been so important and so 
essential that our peoples should be involved in 
thinking on the subject, and that action be 
taken to throw open the debate which has too 
long been kept from public view, chiefly for 
technical but justified reasons that have led 
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governments to take decisions, adopt policies 
and enter into undertakings. This debate must 
take place. It can take place in the street and 
our government certainly has no wish to place 
obstacles in the way of public demonstrations, 
so that our country and neighbouring countries 
can display their desire for peace and security, 
that is their capacity for defence. This is the 
crux of the present debate. 
Will peace be ensured by pacifism? Who 
dares say it will? Peace means first of all that 
war is impossible, that war is rendered so 
unthinkable that it cannot even be mentioned. 
The prime objective - as I have no hesitation 
in repeating here yet again, Ladies and Gentle-
men - is to deter any country from thinking 
in terms of war or in terms of threats. At the 
moment and for, I hope, a long time ahead, I 
hasten to say, there is a credible deterrent. 
Horribly credible I agree but credible. That is 
why we believe that at present - I repeat this 
without fear of criticism from those who will 
find me provocative - nuclear weapons are 
weapons for peace, because they render war 
unthinkable and absurd. Will this always be 
so? I do not know, but so long as these 
weapons are a perfect deterrent we should be 
failing our peoples if we did not stress the fact. 
Let us think hard of the responsibility we 
would have to bear if we encouraged the threat 
by lowering our guard - and I am not even 
saying if we encouraged a war. I am sure that 
the generation of leaders who experienced the 
second world war cannot countenance the idea 
of a war for an instant. I am utterly convinced 
that leaders throughout the world want peace, 
but I do not want them to have the means to 
mount a threat. What I do not want to 
happen is that, if changes take place in one or 
other country, men who have fewer memories 
of the second world war should be tempted to 
brandish the threatening weapon. The balance 
of forces is the precondition of peace. This 
balance should be at the lowest possible level 
and where a deterrent is possible it would be a 
serious matter not to have it. 
Believing that nuclear weapons render war 
unthinkable, France insists on having its own. 
France is the sole judge and the sole master 
on this issue. The President of the Republic 
and no one else has the authority to use it, 
could threaten to use it, could use it as an argu-
ment and no one in the world will take this 
right away from us. 
We have no intention of joining a system 
where we would have to ask any country in the 
world to tell us the minimum level at which we 
think we should keep our nuclear weapons so 
that we, a weak people, may have credibility in 
face of the strongest. 
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As I said in my address, French nuclear wea-
pons are not intended for the protection of all 
the countries of the alliance, of the continent of 
Europe. These countries are now threatened 
by a new incredibly accurate rapid-strike wea-
pon. At the moment they have nothing on 
their soil to counter this new weapon. The 
only response lies in escalation to the ultimate 
strategic weapon which is American. And 
such escalation is regarded as less likely now 
that nuclear forces have become unbalanced in 
the European theatre. 
We believe that there is a balance at world 
level. The experts will tell us that it is more 
or less steady and that there may be doubts as 
regards particular kinds of weapons. I am 
speaking in political terms and I accept that 
there is a world balance; as the Russians 
themselves have recognised it has existed for 
several years now. But if the theatres are taken 
separately, there is no longer a balance in 
Europe and it is in this imbalance that lies the 
danger which will have to be dealt with. 
These are the sort of problems which the public 
must be made to understand, which must be 
debated and on which our peoples must show 
and demonstrate their true capacity and deter-
mination to defend themselves. 
In our democracies, the most important sub-
jects are naturally debated most publicly 
through our elected representatives, who can 
give more time to thought on the problems and 
to the scrutiny of reports and can be more fully 
informed of the reasons and of the arguments 
for and against which can lead to conclusions. 
This is the unique role of your Assembly. I 
do not mean by this that the other WEU insti-
tutions should disappear. Certainly not. The 
structure created by the modified Brussels 
Treaty should remain intact. What value 
would some people attach to the commitments 
entered into under the treaty if all or part of it 
were put on ice or dismantled? Our determi-
nation must be made quite clear at a time of 
great trouble and anxiety. This is our best 
protection. 
At this time, the fact that you, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, are elected representatives, is of 
vital importance. The Assembly is the real 
focus of our interest in WEU. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Cheysson. I am certain that your 
remarks concerning the defence of your country 
and its commitment to our organisation have 
been noted by everyone present. Once again, 
thank you, Mr. Minister. 
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S. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly was invited yesterday to appoint its 
six Vice-Presidents. One vacancy reserved for 
the Netherlands was not filled. 
I have received the nomination of 
Mr. Blaauw, which is in order. I welcome this 
nomination. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose to 
proceed to this election by acclamation. 
Are there any objections? ... 
I therefore nominate Mr. Blaauw a Vice-
President of the Assembly and I wish him 
success in his duties. 
I would remind the Assembly that under the 
terms of Rule 1 0(7) of the Rules of Procedure, 
the Vice-Presidents take precedence in order of 
age. The order of precedence of the Vice-
Presidents is as follows: Mr. Pignion, Sir Fre-
deric Bennett, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Berchem, 
Mr. Unland and Mr. Blaauw. 
I should also like to offer a few words of wel-
come to a former President of this Assembly, 
Mr. Ka'i-Uwe von Hassel, who is present 
today. I extend the warmest welcome to him, 
both personally and on behalf of the Assem-
bly. (Applause) 
Mr. von Hassel, we have not forgotten your 
example as a great president of this Assembly 
or your efforts to create a more unified and 
safer Europe. Thank you for attending. 
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply 
to the twenty-eighth annual report 
of the Council 
(Present•tio11 of •nd de/Hue 011 the report of 
the Committee 011 Defenee Qustioll8 Gnd 
Amuune11ts, Doe. 948) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Document 
948. 
I call Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur of the com-
mittee. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin 
by thanking everyone who helped with the 
preparation of this report and in particular the 
Chairman and members of the Committee on 
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Defence Questions and Armaments, and the 
tireless secretary of our committee. 
Mr. President, as in preyious years the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
received the following chapters of the Council's 
annual report from the Presidential Committee: 
relations between the Council and the Assem-
bly, as regards defence questions; activities of 
the Council, part B, defence questions; 
Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
The committee's report which I have the 
honour to present follows the main lines of last 
year's report which was largely approved by the 
Council and ministers. Their words of appro-
val are partly quoted in Section I of the expla-
natory memorandum, entitled " Relations bet-
ween the Council and the Assembly ", while 
as recently as yesterday Mr. Mollemann 
expressed his approval of Recommendation 380. 
The committee's report deals principally with 
the present defence activities of the Council, 
but not defence questions in the wider sense 
which some people would like the Council to 
take up; the question of the competence of the 
WEU Council and of the other Atlantic and 
European institutions in the matter of defence 
is discussed in the committee's other report on 
burden-sharing in the alliance, which my col-
league, Mr. Wilkinson, will present this after-
noon. The committee did not want the 
Assembly to have to hold the same debate 
twice. 
What are the present activities of the Council 
in the field of defence and armaments? 
May I remind you that, disregarding any 
question which a member state may wish to 
raise - because the governments no longer raise 
wider defence questions in WEU - the Council 
considers that it has four fields of a~tivity: the 
level of forces of member states, the stationing 
of certain United Kingdom forces on the main-
land of Europe, the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments and the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
The main theme of the committee's report is 
that, while the basic commitment to mutual 
defence written into the Brussels Treaty has 
exactly the same validity today as when the 
treaty was signed, Western European Union 
should on the other hand be adapted as far as 
possible to the needs of the eighties. Mean-
while, the Assembly's reports and debates and 
its exchanges with the Council ensure the conti-
nuing validity ofthe treaty. 
As regards the level of forces of member 
states, it is often forgotten that Protocol No. 11 
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to the Brussels Treaty sets upper limits for 
those forces which may only be exceeded by 
unanimous decision of either the WEU Council 
or the North Atlantic Council according to the 
category of forces involved. The Council of 
WEU still applies the prescribed procedure, but 
modified for French forces stationed in Ger-
many, a category of forces which does not 
appear to have been allowed for in the 
1954, 1956 and 1957 texts which govern the 
question. Today, it is no doubt superfluous to 
set upper limits for our own forces, but the 
treaty makes no provision for modifying the 
relevant commitments. The committee finds 
that in 1982 the Council duly applied the 
procedure prescribed by the texts in force. 
In the case of United Kingdom forces statio-
ned in Germany, Article VI of Protocol No. 11 
sets minimum levels which can be varied by the 
Council and are at present fifty-five thousand 
men plus a tactical air force. After repeated 
requests from the Assembly, the Council and 
the United Kingdom Government agreed that 
current figures for these forces should be inclu-
ded in the annual report. The committee finds 
that the United Kingdom fulfilled its under-
taking in this respect in 1982. But as the 
committee's report notes in paragraph 2.6 of 
the explanatory memorandum, the planned 
reorganisation of the British Army of the Rhine 
over the period 1983 to April 1984 seems to 
involve a net reduction of about two thousand 
men. The committee hopes to have an assur-
ance that in future years the figure of fifty-five 
thousand British troops stationed in Germany 
and placed under the command of SACEUR 
will at all times be respected by the United 
Kingdom. 
The publication by the United Kingdom of 
the real level of its forces in Germany is a 
voluntary act on the part of the United King-
dom Government. It has no such obligation 
under the treaty. The committee considers, 
and a proposal is included in paragraph 6(a) of 
the draft recommendation, that the value of the 
Council's annual report would be enhanced if 
all the WEU countries agreed to include in 
future annual reports a statement of the levels 
of forces which they make available to NATO 
and ofthe French forces in Germany. 
As regards the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments and the controls stipulated in Pro-
tocols Nos. Ill and IV to the Brussels Treaty, 
the committee recognises the value of the work 
done by the Agency but considers at the same 
time that the controls imposed by the treaty 
serve no further purpose and should be reduced 
to a minimum. Fortunately, the situation is 
not the same as for the ceilings imposed by the 
treaty for the forces of member states and the 
treaty itself allows certain changes to the 
controls. Consequently, in paragraph 1 of the 
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draft recommendation the committee repeats 
the whole of the proposal made last year for 
cancellation of the two remaining sections 
dealing with the conventional weapons which 
Germany has undertaken not to manufacture 
on its territory. Last year the Council "recei-
ved with great interest and are considering the 
Assembly's recommendation to cancel para-
graphs IV and VI ". 
Paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
refers to the list of member states' armaments 
subject to quantitative controls on the mainland 
of Europe. In reply to the recommendation 
sent by the Assembly last year for a reduction 
of that list, the Council said that it " was consi-
dering the technical, military and political 
aspects of this problem ". This year, therefore, 
the Assembly proposes that the Council should 
submit to the Assembly the results of its consi-
deration and should take into consideration the 
possibility of deleting the list concerned, except 
for atomic, biological and chemical weapons. 
At its joint meeting with the Council, three 
weeks ago, I was very pleased to be able to hear 
General Rambaldi, Director of the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments, who with the 
permission of the Council was able to speak for 
the first time to explain the work of the 
Agency. The committee's report proposes that 
advantage be taken of all constructive aspects of 
that work. In paragraph 6(b) therefore we ask 
that the valuable information collected by the 
Agency on the production and procurement of 
armaments in member countries be included in 
future reports of the Council as they were in 
reports prior to 1982. 
In paragraph 3 we further propose closer co-
operation between the Agency and the United 
States agency. Such co-operation was organ-
ised on a number of previous occasions. At a 
time when the activities of the United States 
agency are unfortunately being whittled down 
by the American administration, the committee 
considers that the WEU Agency should extend 
its studies of the principles of control, verifi-
cation and exports of armaments in co-opera-
tion with the United States agency, and should 
make its findings available to the alliance as a 
whole. 
Lastly, Mr. President, the committee wel-
comes the fact that the international secretariat 
of the Standing Armaments Committee of 
WEU is now helping with the preparation of 
certain committee reports but asks that such 
assistance be extended to collection of the 
necessary information, which does not seem to 
be the case at the moment. The committee 
also proposes that the study of the European 
armaments industry, started by the committee 
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some years ago, be extended to include a study 
of the status of the two-way street and an analy-
sis of the factors which would help to increase 
the proportion of European equipment in the 
armed forces of all allied countries. 
Mr. President, these are the proposals of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and I hope that the Assembly will 
endorse them by agreeing to the araft recom-
mendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -I 
wish to comment on two points in the twenty-
eighth annual report of the Council of WEU 
and Mr. Prussen 's reply to that report. These 
are: the renewed request to the Council to can-
cel the ban on manufacture by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the quantitative 
limitation for other member states, in the case 
of the conventional weapons listed in Annex Ill 
- paragraphs IV and VI - and Annex IV of 
Protocol No. Ill; and the study of the arma-
ments sector of industry in the member 
countries of WEU, carried out by the SAC, and 
Mr. Prussen's proposal that this study be exten-
ded to include " the status of the two-way street 
and an analysis of the factors which would help 
to increase the proportion of European equip-
ment in the armed forces of all allied coun-
tries ". 
The straightforward cancellation of the prohi-
bitions and limits relating to the conventional 
armaments of the member states of WEU have 
consequences which are not very clear to see 
for a possible, subsequent speeding up of the 
arms race. One thing is certain however: the 
initiators of such straightforward cancellation 
would bear a heavy share of responsibility if the 
race were in fact speeded up. 
This is, however, only a first assessment. 
Equally, it may be argued objectively that while 
it is certainly possible that total freedom for the 
member states of WEU in the case of conven-
tional armaments might well speed up the arms 
race, it is equally undeniable that the imposi-
tion of limits on those states alone prevents 
them from exerting any major active impact on 
the progress of world disarmament. How can 
one negotiate without a bargaining counter? 
At present, however, it may be doubted whe-
ther the European members of NATO are able 
or willing to play such a role, because of their 
position as vassals of the United States. This 
was demonstrated yet again recently at Wil-
liamsburg in the unexpected declaration on 
security. Can anyone stand up against the 
dollar these days? 
l 
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In 1954, the Paris Agreements gave WEU 
powers in four directions: economic, social and 
cultural, political and legitimate collective 
defence. Since then, our organisation has 
steadily been dismantled. WEU has at no time 
exercised its economic powers, except when the 
dialogue between the Six and the United King-
dom from 1963 to 1970 was linked with that 
subject. A very proper concern to avoid dupli-
cation resulted in WEU standing down in 
favour of European organisations very actively 
concerned with economic questions such as the 
OECD, the EEC and EFT A. 
The same concern to avoid duplication led to 
the relinquishment of social and cultural activi-
ties to the Council of Europe. Again, the 
Council of WEU thought it better that political 
consultations affecting the whole of Europe 
should take place in a wider context, namely 
ten-power Europe. In this area, WEU has 
become a debating organisation, operating 
mainly in our Assembly which deals with 
important political subjects; but it is now only 
a debating organisation. 
It is in the defence field that WEU still has 
practical, tangible substance in everyday 
affairs. Admittedly, exclusive authority for the 
operational control of forces, defenc~ planning 
and other related matters was transferred to 
NATO as long ago as 1950. But WEU still 
has a real, specific role to play because of the 
arms limitations and controls for which it has 
powers under the Paris Agreements, quite apart 
of course from the vital Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, providing for automatic 
military assistance between the seven members 
of WEU. The record of WEU activities in 
1983 is as .follows: in economic matters, nil; in 
social and cultural matters, nil; in political 
matters, nil; in defence matters: (i) Article V of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, (ii) arms limita-
tions and controls. 
In the case of defence, there is also of course 
the work of the SAC. But while this activity is 
a fact, it is on a very small scale and limited to 
specific matters. Is this comment contradicted 
by the current study of the armaments sector of 
industry in the member states of WEU? Far 
from it, having regard to the unacceptable 
dragging out of the study. 
In the present circumstances and state of 
ideas, many people feel that the limitation and 
control, of conventional armaments at least, are 
somewhat antiquated and that they introduce a 
contradictory and out-of-date element into an 
alliance for legitimate collective defence. I 
would observe, however, that their cancellation 
and the consequent elimination of a major part 
of the ACA's activities would mean reducing 
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the activity of WEU to a point which might put 
an end to its practical activities unless it deve-
lops in another direction at the same time. 
The other activity which might breathe fresh 
life into WEU is called for by the needs of the 
day: the standardisation of armaments and 
co-ordination of the production and procure-
ment of arms. This is the field of the SAC. 
Nevertheless, despite member governments' 
declarations of good intentions towards WEU, it 
is an undeniable fact that they lack a suffi-
ciently clear and coherent political will on the 
subject. For example, the SAC was instructed 
in 1977 to study the armaments sector of 
industry in the member countries of WEU. 
That was six years ago, and the study has still 
not been completed; the work done is now 
having to be brought up to date. 
This raises a question regarding Mr. Prus-
sen's otherwise apposite proposal for an exten-
sion of the SAC study: how long will such an 
extension further delay the completion of the 
study? 
Consequently, without questioning the 
Assembly's important role as a debating body 
only, or the importance of the military assis-
tance clause in Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, it is essential, if WEU is to 
continue to have any meaning for Europeans, 
that our organisation does not shed its duties in 
the matter of armaments limitation and control. 
Furthermore, any extension of WED's role as 
the European pillar of western defence must be 
achieved in particular by obtaining from the 
governments of member states an adequate 
guarantee of their commitment in the now 
essential area of co-operation on the production 
and procurement of armaments, despite the 
cancellation of Annex Ill, paragraphs IV and 
VI of Protocol No. Ill, which would be one 
more step towards destroying the activity of 
WEU as an organisation and sooner or later 
towards the disappearance of the active ele-
ments in the organisation and its final trans-
formation into a debating society. 
Mr. President, I shall wait to hear the Rap-
porteur's reply before deciding how I shall vote 
on the whole recommendation; I repeat that I 
am opposed to the first paragraph of the recom-
mendation and reserve my position regarding 
paragraph 4. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). -
May I first congratulate the Rapporteur on his 
thoughtful and excellent report. 
However, in view of what Mr. Dejardin has 
just said, it is perhaps - no certainly - to be 
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regretted that no reference is made to what 
WEU does. Moreover, our authorities and 
institutions were deserving of more attention 
and respect. 
Mr. Prussen's report has positive features, 
particularly as regards the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the possibility of its collabora-
ti_ng with our Assembly. At the same time, it 
should perhaps be regretted that this collabora-
tion is slow to take effect and that difficulties 
which could easily have been removed still per-
sist. This is a major new development which 
will be positive for both the Standing Arma-
ments Committee and for the Assembly. 
I would, however, like to refer to a specific 
point in the draft recommendation in Mr. Prus-
sen's report which raises a problem for French 
socialists. 
The draft recommendation calls on the· 
Council of WEU, in application of Article 11 of 
Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, to cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the 
list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill. The pro-
posal is for the lifting of the permanent ban on 
the possession by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many of the weapons and factories earmarked 
solely for their production, listed in those para-
graphs. 
I would remind the Assembly that para-
graph IV is concerned with long-range missiles 
and guided missiles, which today means long-
range missiles, while paragraph VI is concerned 
with bomber aircraft for strategic purposes. 
This relates to categories of weapons and means 
of production which the countries with nuclear 
weapons now possess. As things stand at 
present, both are still banned to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
The draft recommendation also calls on the 
Council " to submit to the Assembly in the 
near future the results of its consideration of the 
technical, military and political aspects of 
varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol 
No. Ill in application of Article V of Protocol 
No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, while 
taking into consideration the possibility of 
deleting the list concerned except for atomic, 
biological or chemical weapons ". 
Variation or deletion of the list would there-
fore involve lifting the ban imposed by Sec-
tion 8 of Protocol No. IV: "All warships 
powered by means other than steam, diesel or 
petrol engines or gas turbines". This means 
nuclear-powered warships, which completely 
change the dimension of a war at sea. Long-
range missiles, bomber aircraft for strategic 
purposes, nuclear-powered warships: every one 
of these is capable of striking from a distance. 
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And this seems inappropriate to us in the 
light of the situation in Central Europe. 
We must respect the powers of our Council 
and the nature of our Assembly. The organis-
ations which claim to defend our countries as a 
whole through defensive structures, within 
which Germany like the other countries has 
obligations, supplement each other. As 
Mr. Cheysson, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, recalled a short time ago, WEU, 
Atlantic Alliance and NATO are not super-
imposable terms but cover different sets of facts. 
European and global defence, of course, but 
our experience shows us that the overall struc-
ture is still necessary and that one must not be 
confused with the other. There must be no 
major disturbance of the balance of systems 
which has provided a deterrent and ensured the 
defence of the West in a wholly satisfactory 
manner for almost forty years. 
This analysis is confirmed by the evolution of 
the situation in Europe. In view of the radical 
changes involved in the measures proposed by 
Mr. Prussen - I fully recognise that this is not 
the first year that the proposal has appeared in 
a recommendation - and in view of the way it 
could be exploited politically - it is sufficient to 
note what is going on in some European coun-
tries - the French socialists for whom I speak 
call on the Assembly to pay particular respect 
to the roles of the two organs of WEU and to 
leave to the Council matters within its 
authority. 
We shall therefore not vote for the draft 
recommendation before the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The gen-
eral debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- In reply to Mr. Dejardin, I would observe 
that the report was very fully discussed in com-
mittee and that the final approval of the recom-
mendation by fifteen votes to one shows that 
the decision was clear and definite. 
Mr. Bassinet seems to be in error in referring 
to Section V of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill 
concerning warships with the exception of 
smaller ships for defence purposes. This para-
graph was in fact cancelled two or three years 
ago. 
In my view, the cancellation of paragraphs IV 
and VI is no more than doing justice to Ger-
many by removing the last restrictions and 
putting it on the same footing as the other 
member countries of WEU. The retention of 
this paragraph could lead to arguments and 
might even cause distrust. I would observe 
that the same recommendation was put forward 
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last year and was given a very big majority, so 
that there can be no going back on that 
decision. 
As regards armaments control, I would 
remind the Assembly that France withdrew 
from control of nuclear weapons and means of 
launching such weapons. It would not there-
fore appear to be in a very good position to 
criticise this article in the recommendation. 
I have no further comments and I urge the 
Assembly to approve the draft recommendation 
in the form approved by the committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. PIGNION (France) (Translation). - I 
must apologise for the fact that the Chairman of 
the committee has not much to say: he cannot 
at this stage speak for the committee because he 
was not involved in dealing with the question 
as the person responsible for the committee. 
What Mr. Prussen said concerning the vote 
in committee is correct. I myself in fact voted 
in favour of his report. Members involved in 
the committee's work know that I submitted a 
number of amendments; since they were accep-
ted, I would have found it hard to argue against 
Mr. Prussen's conclusions and not to admit at 
least the excellence of his report. 
When anyone agrees to discuss a draft, he 
must if his proposals for amendment are 
accepted, also accept the report as a whole. 
That is why I find myself greatly embarrassed, 
Mr. Prussen, because I have taken a further 
close look at the question. It is correct that 
remarks were made by my compatriots. I shall 
not commit either the committee or myself as 
its Chairman. If I had to speak as a member of 
the Assembly, I would prefer, in view of a 
certain lack of precision pointed out by 
Mr. Bassinet and of the fact that Mr. Dejardin 
added a number of points giving the committee 
a clearer view, that the question be referred 
back to the committee, if no one objects, so 
that the obstacles can be removed, if possible 
according to the rules. But I am, I repeat, 
speaking for myself only. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Are you, 
Mr. Chairman, formally requesting reference 
back to the committee? 
Mr. PIGNION (France) (Translation). - As 
you put the direct question to me, my answer is 
" Yes ". I insist, however, that I am speaking 
not as Chairman but as a member of the 
Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As a 
formal request has been made, I must observe 
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that under the terms of Rule 32(3) of our Rules 
of Procedure : " In a debate on the above 
matters, the following only shall be heard: the 
proposer of the motion, one speaker against the 
motion, the Rapporteur and the Chairman of 
any committee concerned". 
Does anyone wish to speak against? 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- The draft recommendation differs very little 
from last year's which was agreed to by a big 
majority. You will remember all our discus-
sions on the subject. 
The present report has been considered twice 
in committee, once at Pisa and once in Brussels 
and the draft recommendation was adopted by 
fifteen votes to one. 
I see no reason why the report should be 
referred back to the committee and I maintain 
my request for a vote on the report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now ask 
the Assembly to vote by sitting and standing on 
the reference back of the report to the commit-
tee. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The motion for reference back is agreed to. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, I ask for a count of members 
present. I do not believe that there is a 
quorum. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Prus-
sen, as there has been no request for a vote by 
roll-call, I refer to Rule 36(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure under· the terms of which all votes 
other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, 
whatever the number of representatives or sub-
stitutes present, unless, at the request of a 
representative or substitute before the voting 
has begun, the President has ascertained that 
the number of representatives or substitutes 
who have signed the register of attendance is 
less than a quorum. 
As this is not the case, the procedure has 
been properly carried out. 
7. Political activities of the WEU Council -
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee and rote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 944 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs 
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Committee on the political activities of the 
WEU Council - reply to the twenty-eighth 
annual report of the Council and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 944 and 
amendments. 
I call Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur of the commit-
tee. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the report which I have to present 
on the political activities of the Council of 
Western European Union is one of the perma-
nent features of our deliberations and is always 
discussed at the first part-session. Last year's 
report, which you have before you, was 
prepared by Mr. V ecchietti, and mine can 
follow on from his. 
I have the impression that for about a decade, 
since the United Kingdom joined the Common 
Market, WEU has been living in a kind of 
limbo. The lively criticism of our organisation 
exemplified by the remarks of Mr. Bassinet and 
Mr. Dejardin is, in my view, an expression of 
frustration, That is something we have all 
experienced. 
Of late, however, I seem to have perceived 
some signs of greater activity, no doubt because 
in our countries generally as well as in national 
politics the issues of defence and peace policy 
have become more central topics of discussion. 
But views have also been expressed in our 
Assembly - yesterday for instance and again 
this morning - which leave us in no doubt that 
WEU will have to play a more active role in 
future. The most encouraging comments are 
the ones we have heard from the French 
Government. 
This morning the Foreign Minister of the 
French Republic said that if WEU did not exist 
it would be necessary to invent it. We may be 
sure that he was thinking not just of the Assem-
bly but of the Council as well, since the various 
organs of WEU constitute a whole. 
Yesterday we listened to the Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, who said that 
the French efforts to strengthen WEU should be 
supported. Things therefore seem to be on 
the move, although we are still very far from 
making full use of the potentialities of WEU. I 
am sure you will not object if I do not here 
recite in repetitive detail the points contained 
in my written report. I simply want to 
comment briefly on the relationship between 
Council and Assembly. 
I would like to revert here to two examples 
quoted in my report. Eighteen months ago, 
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Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State, told us 
in this place that he considered it proper for the 
Standing Armaments Committee to be concer-
ned with the preparation of the decisions and 
resolutions of the Assembly, and that the 
committee should be placed at the disposal of 
the Assembly. We thereupon approached the 
Council, which gave what I would call a very 
evasive response. The Council drew attention 
to the undisputed fact that the Standing Arma-
ments Committee was created by the Council 
for the purpose of promoting collaboration in 
the area of armaments. The Council said that, 
while the international secretariat might from 
time to time render assistance to the Assembly, 
this would have to be done by a procedure 
calling for the intervention of the Council on 
each occasion. 
That is what I call an evasive response. In 
the Assembly we shall observe very closely how 
the initial activity of the Standing Armaments 
Committee on behalf of our Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions operates in practice. We are not aiming 
at any organisational or structural change; we 
simply want this committee to be allowed to 
work for the Assembly as well, along the lines 
proposed by Mr. Lemoine. 
The second example which makes the 
relationship between Council and Assembly 
appear in an unsatisfactory light is the proce-
dure adopted in respect of the study of the 
European armaments industries, which the 
Standing Armaments Committee has been sub-
mitting to the Council in instalments since 
1978. The Assembly has now received a copy 
of this report, but it is not a copy of the 
complete report. What we have received is an 
abridged version intended for publication from 
which important passages have been excised. 
This means that we have to ask further ques-
tions, which may already have been answered 
in the report. Nor do we feel to be fobbed off 
with a version intended for publication is 
compatible with the self-respect or political 
weight of the Assembly. 
There is, then, much room for improvement 
in the relationship between the Council and the 
Assembly, especially in the light of the state-
ment by the French Minister for External Rela-
tions this morning to the effect that this Assem-
bly is the only venue in Europe where parlia-
mentarians discuss the most important ques-
tions currently confronting our continent -
those of defence and peace. 
My feeling is that an observer and well-
disposed onlooker might detect a few good will 
gestures towards improving co-operation - but 
no more than that. The Assembly, and its 
General Affairs Committee in particular, will 
carefully monitor developments. We shall 
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have to check up again next year, to see whe-
ther the expectations expressed in our report 
have been fulfilled or not. 
Mr. President, as the previous committee 
chairman is not present and a new chairman 
has not yet been appointed, may I perhaps 
mention that the report has twice been discus-
sed in detail in the General Affairs Committee 
and that the committee unanimously recom-
mends its acceptance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call 
Mr. Forma, the only speaker registered for the 
general debate. 
Mr. FORMA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Mr. Ahrens's report was discussed 
several times in committee and I believe that it 
will meet with our approval. It seems to me 
that the tone of this document is rather less 
indulgent in its arguments, which I can largely 
endorse, as compared with the previous report, 
particularly as regards the progress of relations 
between the Assembly and the Council. The 
report highlights a number of points which jus-
tify the request for clarification and more than 
purely formal replies to the questions and 
proposals included in the reports submitted last 
year, for example by Mr. Vecchietti. 
In fact - and here I think I am quoting the 
words of the Rapporteur - it cannot be said 
that the report for 1982 throws much light on 
the obscure points raised last year, on which 
clarification was sought. In my view, the very 
clear remarks made last year by the German 
Minister and this morning by Mr. Cheysson, 
taken together with Mr. Colombo's earlier 
proposals, pinpoint exactly what was requested 
and what should be done. Defence integration 
inevitably raises the issue of political integra-
tion; which comes first is an old question, but 
reticence in some quarters clearly hints at 
divergent attitudes to aid for the common 
defence and the promotion of a political 
community of the people who would have to 
provide that defence. The establishment of a 
defence capability matched by a realistic Euro-
pean spirit might well upset some existing insti-
tutions; on the other hand it might transform a 
possible area of disagreement into a contribu-
tion to equilibrium. I believe that these things 
are understood by the members of the Council 
of Ministers, which as the embodiment of the 
treaty should progressively seek to increase 
effective action through the parliamentary insti-
tutions. 
I realise that to talk of "unity" may be 
asking for the impossible at the moment; let 
us therefore use the word " union " instead, but 
we should at least like to be able to believe that 
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such union, without which there can be no 
security, is visibly on the way to being 
achieved. To quote the German Secretary of 
State, when we think of European security we 
must think of the integration of all of its 
constituent parts and of NATO. In my 
opinion, the only political body through which 
integration can be achieved is WEU, which 
furthermore is alone qualified to debate arma-
ments control and therefore peace in a respon-
sible manner, particularly in the present situa-
tion, as was clearly described this morning. 
In my view all these arguments must give due 
consideration to the practical achievement of 
integration, which will take account of present 
circumstances, including the financial situation, 
and, beyond mere words, will avoid certain 
pressures, which at this very moment give the 
lie to very recent statements on the subject and 
are adding further to Europe's difficulties by 
diverting funds from research and from the 
creation of the instruments required for the 
defence we are seeking to establish. 
In this context, Mr. Ahrens draws attention 
to a number of obstacles, including some of a 
legal nature, which distort proper collaboration 
on an equal footing. On the same point, he 
remarks that the Council of Ministers makes 
friendly gestures towards the Assembly but that 
in reality the time has come for the political 
organ to shoulder the tasks assigned to it by the 
treaty. It cannot be denied that there has been 
a definite thaw and our Rapporteur stressed the 
fact that there is some convergence on foreign 
policy and that some decisions within the 
Council's competence have been referred, for-
mally at least, to the WEU Assembly on such 
issues as the Polish, Afghan and Falklands 
crises and certain aspects of relations between 
Europe and the United States. 
Mr. President, in approving this report we 
cannot but endorse the Rapporteur's statement 
that it remains to be seen what the real out-
come will be of the Council's close attention to 
the Assembly's debates, which are said to assist 
the Council in its deliberations. It also 
remains to be seen what the outcome will be of 
another request to consider relations between 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
the Standing Armaments Committee; and lastly, 
it remains to be seen whether and how our 
suggestions for removing some obstacles to 
European armaments production will be imple-
mented. 
My conviction has been strengthened by one 
of the remarks made this morning by the 
French Minister for External Relations. The 
great fear of a conflict in which we should be 
the battlefield and the need to prevent such a 
conflict, which will certainly not be achieved 
by peace marches, should urge us towards the 
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integration of defence and the fuller measure of 
integration whereby our Europe of separate 
countries will be transformed into an entity 
which, while retaining all the special characte-
ristics and traditions of its parts, will be a real, 
united force among the major forces on the 
world political scene. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Rapporteur to reply to speakers. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I should 
like to place on record my thanks for the 
appreciation of the report expressed by 
Mr. Forma. I am pleased that he shares my 
views and considers it right that this report 
should have been framed in a more critical 
spirit than reports of past years on this subject. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The gen-
eral debate is closed. 
Before taking the vote on the draft recom-
mendation, we have to consider two amend-
ments in the order in which they refer to the 
draft recommendation. They are Amendments 
1 and 2 tabled by Mr. Lagorce and others. 
Amendment 1 is worded as follows : 
1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out " the latest 
decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence 
plans " and insert " all the latest technological 
developments in this field ". 
I call Mr. Lagorce to speak in support of the 
amendment. 
Mr. LAGORCE (France) (Translation). - I 
will speak in support of both amendments toge-
ther because they have the same purpose; one 
applies to the last paragraph in the preamble to 
the draft recommendation and the second links 
this paragraph to the recommendation proper. 
We agree that the SAC should carry out in 
full its task of promoting European armaments 
co-operation. However, in line with our coun-
try's policy, we consider that it cannot be 
required to take account of the decisions of 
NATO, an integrated organisation to which, as 
you know, France does not belong. 
Instead of this specific reference to NATO 
alone, we propose that the SAC should take 
account of all the latest technological develop-
ments in the armaments field. This we believe 
will be completely in accord with the role of 
the SAC which, like the Rapporteur, we do not 
wish to see reduced, but progressively extended. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? 
What is the committee's view? 
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(Translation). - Mr. President, I cannot state 
the committee's views on the two amendments 
as we have not discussed the subject in 
committee. I would just like to say that this 
additional text and the reference to NATO 
were not contained in our original report. 
They were adopted at the final meeting at the 
suggestion of a French colleague, though not a 
member of the same party as my friend Pierre 
Lagorce. 
However, as I perceive that the French react 
variously to references to NATO and as we are 
not changing the substance - it has been 
expressly stated that this new version is more 
comprehensive than the wording in the report -
I believe the sense of the committee would be 
to agree to these amendments. I should there-
fore like to recommend acceptance of both the 
proposed amendments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I put 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Lagorce to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Lagorce, is 
worded as follows: 
2. In paragraph 3 ofthe draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "the decisions taken by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee in 
December 1982 " and insert " all the latest 
technological developments in the armaments 
field". 
The author has already spoken in favour of 
this amendment. 
I now put it to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
I now put to the vote the amended draft 
recommendation as a whole. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted•. 
8. Change in the membership of a committee 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Italian Delegation proposes the following 
change in the membership of the Committee on 
l. See page 24. 
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Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. V aliante 
to be a titular member to fill a vacant seat. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The nomination is agreed to. 
9. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following 
orders of the day: 
1. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
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Armaments, Document 94 7 and amend-
ments). 
2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe. 
3. Burden-sharing in the alliance (Resumed 
debate on the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments 
and votes on the draft recommendation 
and draft resolution, Document 947 and 
amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone else wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
.is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the substitutes attending this sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Burden-sharing in the alliance 
(Presentation of the report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, Doe. 947 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The first 
order of the day is the presentation of the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments on burden-sharing in the 
alliance, Document 94 7 and amendments. 
I welcome Mr. Wilkinson, the Rapporteur, 
who has made the effort to be here with us 
today even though he is involved in an election 
campaign. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- It is a 
pleasure for me, Mr. President, to be invited to 
1. See page 26. 
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move this report on burden-sharing at so early 
a stage in your presidency, which I whole-
heartedly endorse and to which I extend every 
good wish. 
I earnestly believe that the report is one of 
the most important to be presented to our 
Assembly in recent years. It has the support of 
the great majority of the Defence Committee, 
with the particular exception of one member 
who voted against it on the ground that he 
opposed paragraph 3 of the draft recommenda-
tion and its endorsement of the twin-track 
decision of the NATO Alliance of 12th Decem-
ber 1979 on INF modernisation. 
On a subject as significant to the relationship 
between the European and North American 
components of the alliance, consensus is the 
touchstone of the credibility and authority of 
any report. That is why we in the Defence 
Committee worked so long and hard to secure 
agreement. It is noteworthy that this report, 
which was referred back for me to reconsider by 
the committee at an earlier stage in our delibe-
rations, was eventually passed by fourteen votes 
to one with only two abstentions. 
I am particularly grateful for the positive and 
constructive contributions of my colleagues on 
the committee, whose enhancement of the 
European dimension of the report may prove of 
especial value and particular significance for 
the future of this Assembly and for the rest of 
WEU in European defence. 
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I thank the Clerk to the committee, Stuart 
Whyte, and his staff, for their tireless help and 
assistance. The knowledge and expertise of 
Stuart Whyte were invaluable to me and on 
more than one occasion he put me on the right 
lines. The wise advice that he gave, as well 
as the copious briefings of many members of 
governments, serving officers and officials, both 
here in Europe and in the United States of 
America, were invaluable. I trust that all who 
study this report, its draft recommendations, 
resolution and accompanying explanatory 
memorandum will acknowledge that this is a 
carefully researched document that does not 
jump to any hasty conclusions. 
The inspiration of much of what I have 
written has its origins in the Defence 
Committee's highly informative visit to the 
United States, which took place in March. We 
should all be aware of the strength of public 
and Congressional feeling on the issue of 
burden-sharing in the United States, although 
there is no doubt that, as the last Eurogroup 
communique, which I quote in paragraph 4. 7 of 
this report, makes clear : 
" Eurogroup countries participating in 
NA TO's integrated military structure make a 
substantial and significant contribution to the 
alliance's military forces. Their active 
armed forces .. . provide approximately 7 5 % 
of NATO's readily available ground forces in 
Europe, 75% of the tanks, 65% of the air 
forces and 60 % of the warships ... " 
The fact is that in the United States these 
figures are not fully comprehended and there is 
a considerable credibility gap between what we 
provide for our common defence in Europe, 
which contributes so much to the defence of the 
alliance, and what is acknowledged and under-
stood by our friends on the other side of the 
water. 
In percentage terms, since the advent of the 
Reagan administration, the United States 
defence expenditure has grown significantly 
more than it has in the European alliance. 
That is not the full story, because during the 
1970s the reverse was so. In that decade the 
European build-up was greater than the improve-
ment in American preparedness. It is appro-
priate that in Paris we take into account the 
considerable contribution by France to the total 
defence effort by the Atlantic Alliance. It is 
impossible to attempt to construct a realistic 
and credible defence for Europe without a 
contribution by France, which is of key signifi-
cance to our security in Western Europe. 
The new booklet published by the Eurogroup 
in the past few days, " The Defence of 
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Europe ", produced in co-operation with the 
French authorities, makes it clear that, if we 
include the French armed forces, the European 
contribution in percentage terms is an even 
greater proportion of the sum of the alliance's 
defence effort. That booklet states: 
" Concerning ready forces in Europe who are 
stationed there in peacetime, Europe provides 
90 % of the ground forces, 80 % of the 
combat aircraft, 80 % of the tanks and 90 % 
of the armoured divisions. " 
We recognise that in emergency or war we 
are dependent on rapid reinforcement by the 
United States. We are equally dependent on 
the ultimate nuclear guarantee for our security, 
which is the backbone to our deterrent. None 
the less, in peacetime we Europeans provide 
the greater part of our own defence. 
In United States political circles, and gen-
erally in the United States, that fact is not fully 
recognised. How should we address ourselves 
to the problem? First, we must make a politi-
cal and informational effort. In the United 
States, this should be through the embassy of 
the Eurogroup chairman-in-office - at present 
the Norwegian Defence Minister - and through 
the embassy of the nation which provides the 
Eurogroup secretariat, the United Kingdom. 
In Europe, there is also a political and 
informational effort to be made. This is where 
the Western European Union Assembly should 
come in. It is the natural interlocutor 
between the national parliaments and public 
opinion. 
We could use the Assembly more effectively 
to propagandise and to provide information 
about European defence efforts, and particu-
larly to explain to Europeans who do not fully 
appreciate in the widest sense the nature and 
extent of the United States' contribution to the 
defence of Europe and the importance of the 
United States' nuclear guarantee for Western 
European security. 
In an era of depressing anti-Americanism, 
which is a cancer among the free democracies 
in Western Europe, I hope that members of the 
Assembly will address themselves vigorously to 
explaining in full to our more sceptical friends 
back home the extent and nature of the United 
States' contribution to our defence. 
Secondly, a practical effort must be made by 
Europeans to meet our alliance commitments 
in full. The political and informational effort 
is the natural course for parliamentarians, but 
we also have a duty to ensure that our govern-
ments execute our commitments to the full. 
I shall explain some of the ways in which we 
can practically assist our common defence 
effort, enhance it, and improve our relationship 
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with the United States. I do not shrink from 
putting this at the top of the list, but first we 
must support the twin-track decision on INF 
modernisation. Secondly, in Western Europe 
we must meet the alliance's target for increased 
defence expenditure in real terms. We must 
also meet the biennial force goals agreed by the 
governments on the recommendation of the 
Supreme Allied Commander, who honours us 
with his presence this afternoon. 
Thirdly, we must improve combat sustain-
ability. A total of thirty days' stocks of fuel, 
ammunition, stores and consumables is surely 
not too much to ask of an alliance that believes 
in flexible response, wishes to keep the nuclear 
threshold as high as possible and to make its 
conventional defences credible. For conventio-
nal defences to be credible effective reserves are 
important, as Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, the 
former Commander, North, observed in The 
Times yesterday when he urged the United 
Kingdom to build reserves on the lines of the 
United States air national guard squadrons 
which are so critical to reinforcement for 
Western Europe in emergency or war. 
Fourthly, we must maximise our conventio-
nal fire power by using new technology to the 
full. That should have great appeal to those 
who are anxious about the apparent need of 
NATO to resort to nuclear weapons early in a 
conflict. Of course that will be a costly process 
and the procurement of such weapons systems 
must be on an equitable and alliance-wide 
basis. 
As has been so eloquently and cogently 
argued in many other forums, that must surely 
be one of the ways to evolve tactical and 
war-fighting doctrines to enhance our overall 
deterrence. We must also improve the flexibi-
lity, effectiveness, mobility and readiness of 
European conventional forces to improve the 
value of the contribution to the allied mobile 
force and to compensate for any requirement by 
the United States to deploy elsewhere in 
Europe forces originally earmarked for NATO. 
It would be foolish to ignore the increasingly 
global nature of the Soviet challenge. The way 
that Soviet forces have evolved in the twenty 
years since the Cuban crisis means that it is 
that global intervention capability on which 
they place so much emphasis - the develop-
ment of a blue-water navy, the use of sea power 
as an adjunct to political influence and the 
creation of large mobile air forces. We ignore 
such developments at our peril. We Euro-
peans cannot cast a blind eye at these develop-
ments if we value our security and the security 
of our economies, which are even more depen-
dent than that of the United States upon access 
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to the energy resources of the Arabian Gulf and 
South-West Asia, upon access to the raw mate-
rials of Africa and elsewhere and upon access to 
worldwide markets. 
To make a reasonable and proper response to 
that global challenge we should facilitate 
deployments of our allies out of the area. Why 
should the Soviet Union have a monopoly of 
the projection of military force beyond the 
NATO theatre to underpin its political aspira-
tions ? If there are instances, and we know 
that there are, where the Europeans can assist 
in peacekeeping out of area - where they have 
a particular expertise, perhaps where they have 
developed a relationship from imperial days or 
where they have an appropriate force structure 
- it is reasonable that our American friends 
should expect us to share with them some of 
the burdens out of area. In this regard I have 
in mind the French and British, who have been 
particularly active. 
Reciprocally, we should reasonably expect 
our American friends to remove some of the 
apparent inequities - and there are inequities -
in the relationship. These are most glaring in 
the procurement sector, and we have stressed 
that in many forums, not least the symposium 
that this Assembly held in London last 
spring. We ought to bring about a genuine 
two-way street. Interestingly enough, the 
Eurogroup meeting earlier this month stressed 
that point very clearly. 
The new Chairman of Eurogroup, Mr. 
Sjaastad, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, at 
a press conference on 1st June referred to this 
imbalance and stated that the ratio of equip-
ment trade between the United States and 
Europe ranged between one to five and one to 
fifteen, averaging one to ten in favour of the 
United States. He said that Western Euro-
peans were "very impatient" with United 
States' restrictions imposed by Congress, such 
as the Speciality Metals Act and the Export 
Administration Act, although he rightly 
admitted that the Reagan administration was 
trying 'to remedy the situation. I entirely 
endorse those remarks. 
A more equal political relationship between 
the Americans and the Europeans demands 
some institutional reforms on our part in 
Europe to build up the European pillar of the 
alliance. The Eurogroup has its advantages, 
and Mr. Lagorio, the outgoing Chairman, the 
Italian Minister of Defence, writing in NATO 
Review for April 1983, said: 
" Eurogroup is in fact the most representative 
assembly of the European Ministers of 
Defence", 
and referred to the way in which 
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" European NATO countries have increas-
ingly come to realise the value of having a 
forum for frank and informal discussion of 
military and strategic questions. " 
The problem is that our French friends do not 
regard Eurogroup in quite the same light as the 
other European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance. That being so, we must use other 
institutions as well. The one that springs to 
mind here is Western European Union itself. 
It could be the inner council on European 
defence. The Brussels Treaty has more expli-
cit and binding mutual defence commitments 
than the NATO treaty, and five of the Brussels 
Treaty signatories - all the WEU countries 
except France and Luxembourg - have on their 
soil the new Pershing lis, and ground-launched 
cruise missiles are to be deployed. 
The report suggests that we should enhance 
the role of the Council of WEU, but we do not 
think that it is practical to invite other 
countries within the Eurogroup to sign the 
Brussels Treaty and to join Western European 
Union. We feel that the role of this Assembly 
can most definitely be built up for example, 
by inviting observers from the parliaments of 
other Western European countries that are 
members of NATO to take part in our delibera-
tions. There is the fairly modest and practical 
suggestion that they should help with our deli-
berations on Sir Dudley Smith's important new 
study on European security. In fact, we cannot 
envisage a valid study on European security 
that does not take into account the position of 
the Norwegians on the northern flank, of the 
Turks isolated on the far side of the Aegean Sea 
and of the Greeks. This is a valuable initiative 
and I hope that it will be a precedent upon 
which we can build. 
I hope that members will not feel that this is 
too over-ambitious a report. It has not 
attempted to be. It has attempted to be a 
moderate, middle-of-the-road, pragmatic study 
that has had the virtual consensus of our 
Defence Committee and upon which I hope 
this Assembly can agree. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Wilkinson. 
3. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate will now be interrupted for the address 
by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Comman-
der Europe, whom I welcome to the Assembly. 
85 
THIRD SITTING 
I should like to thank General Rogers for 
agreeing to answer questions put to him. I 
should also like to thank him for attending the 
proceedings of this Assembly for the second 
time in two years. In view of the major events 
we shall be witnessing in the days and months 
to come, we shall listen to what he has to say 
with special interest. 
Your personal friendship with many mem-
bers of this Assembly - who greatly respect you 
- is an indication of the atmosphere, General 
Rogers, in which you will be speaking to us. 
I call General Rogers. (Applause) 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe). - Ladies and Gentlemen, members of 
the Assembly, it is a great pleasure for me to 
have this opportunity to address this distin-
guished Assembly for the second time during 
my period as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. It is a privilege for me because this 
influential Assembly makes a valuable contri-
bution to the defence efforts of Western 
Europe. As one of the men in uniform who 
has the opportunity to implement agreed allied 
defence policies, I respect the open, analytical 
and often tough debate that is customary in this 
chamber. While complementary to other simi-
lar assemblies within the alliance, the special 
European base of this Assembly provokes the 
study of security issues that are peculiarly 
European-orientated and which would, perhaps, 
in other circumstances not be subjected to the 
scrutiny that they merit. 
How best to provide for West European 
security will continue to hold the centre of the 
stage within and among our western nations. 
However, the differences that exist do not 
reflect any fundamental disagreement over the 
ends that we wish to achieve. We have a solid 
consensus within our western nations about the 
future that we want - a future in which we 
maintain peace with freedom, in a world 
environment in which there are lower tensions 
and reduced and balanced levels of forces. If 
that is the future to which most of us aspire, 
how do we achieve it? It is on that question 
that we encounter the divergent views as to the 
approach that can lead to our goals. 
It is my conviction that the future that I 
describe requires that we in Western Europe, 
and specifically within the alliance, achieve two 
tightly intertwined security objectives. First, 
we must maintain a credible and robust 
deterrent to deter overt aggression but also to 
deter political intimidation, which may result if 
we are perceived by the other side to be 
incapable or unwilling to defend our security. 
The second objective, which is mainly depen-
dent upon the first, is that we must negotiate 
successfully equitable and verifiable arms 
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reduction accords for all categories of forces 
and arms. Only such accords can halt the 
military growth on each side, start to reduce it 
in a balanced way and put some predictability 
into the military position. 
I do not need to tell this group that neither 
of those objectives - deterrence or arms 
reduction and control - can be achieved from a 
western posture of weakness and unilateral 
restraint. The major obstacle to the future that 
we seek is the continuing threat to our security 
posed by a nation that does not embrace our 
western values and does not practise our 
restraint. However, the Soviet Union is a 
nation that respects strength, if nothing else, 
and can be expected to recognise in the future, 
as it has in the past, that negotiated restrictions 
on armaments can be in its best interests. 
Thus, we must provide the Soviets with 
adequate incentive to negotiate seriously. 
The achievement of our security objectives 
requires that our alliance be viewed as politi-
cally cohesive and militarily strong. More 
specifically, the political imperative of unity 
requires that, as the previous speaker noted, we 
must first implement NATO's decision of 
December 1979 on the modernisation of its 
intermediate-range nuclear forces - the INF -
while we continue to try to negotiate their 
elimination. Secondly, the political imperative 
requires that we overcome the transatlantic 
tensions that are caused in the main by 
different perceptions about how to deal with 
East-West relations. As some of you have 
heard me say on other occasions, those tensions 
can be reconciled if we are patient enough to 
listen to each other, but more especially if we 
are wise enough to take into account the 
problems and the interests peculiar to indivi- • 
dual nations. 
I hope that I shall contribute a small amount 
to this afternoon's theme of the sharing of 
security burdens. The fulfilment of the politi-
cal imperative that I have described can provide 
our nations with a requisite foundation for 
maintaining a strong deterrent and successfully 
negotiating arms reduction accords. 
There is a military imperative that must be 
met. We must be viewed as being strong, 
resolute and capable of implementing our 
strategy of flexible response. I wish to talk 
about that deterrent strategy of flexible response 
for a few minutes, because it is sometimes 
misunderstood. I want to remind you that 
three possible responses are envisaged in that 
strategy. First, the preferred response is direct 
defence to defeat an attack or to place the 
burden of escalation on the shoulders of the 
aggressor. The second response is voluntary 
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escalation on our part. The third response is 
the general nuclear response, which is the 
guarantor of our deterrence. 
We also envisage the triad of forces - the 
strategic nuclear, the theatre nuclear and the 
conventional. That deterrence strategy of 
flexible response is still as appropriate today as 
it was in the 1960s, provided that adequate 
forces are furnished for each leg of the triad. 
Today, I must say to you that, in contrast with 
the 1960s when we adopted the strategy, 
NATO has been surpassed in all three catego-
ries of forces necessary to implement it. Do 
not misunderstand me ! Allied Command 
Europe, with which I am associated, gets 
stronger every year because of commitments 
that are met, but the gap between the NATO 
forces' capabilities and those of the Warsaw 
Pact continues to widen every year. Fortuna-
tely, the United States and the United Kingdom 
are taking action to restore the deterrent value 
of our strategic forces. If we are to follow 
through that two-track decision of December 
1979 we shall fill the gap in our spectrum of 
deterrence which caused us to make the 
decision to modernise our forces within NATO. 
However, it is in the conventional, non-
nuclear arms area of NATO that the nations 
have not shown similar resolve to overcome 
their deficiencies. While nations continue to 
fail to meet commitments to improve conven-
tional forces, NATO has mortgaged its defence 
to the nuclear response. Instead of possessing 
genuine flexibility, our current military posture 
will require us, if attacked conventionally, to 
move fairly quickly to the second response of 
our strategy - deliberate escalation on our part. 
The plain fact is that if conventional war comes 
we shall be unable to sustain ourselves for long 
with the manpower, ammunition and war 
reserve stocks to replace material loss on the 
battlefields. 
For me that judgment is a sobering view of 
the alliance's current military posture, but it is 
by no means hopeless. Though it is unfavour-
able, NA TO's military situation is not yet 
unmanageable; nor is it beyond restoration. 
We are a defensive alliance. We do not need 
to match the Warsaw Pact one for one in any 
area of force comparison. 
But we must resolve to act before it is too 
late. There is an alternative to the posture 
that we find ourselves in and that is what we 
have established as our objective in Allied 
Command Europe to provide a credible 
adequate conventional capability by the end of 
this decade that will bolster our deterrence by 
providing a reasonable prospect of frustrating a 
conventional attack without initiating the use of 
nuclear weapons. 
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What are the implications of bolstering 
conventional defence along those lines ? Trans-
lated into specific terms, what does it 
mean ? Let me begin to answer that by saying 
what it does not mean. It does not mean, as 
one European newspaper put it yesterday, that 
Europeans should be the " footsloggers " of 
NATO. Although as an infantryman I may 
have different views of footslogging from others, 
since I have personally done a lot of it, there is 
no implication in what I am seeking that 
European nations should be relegated to any 
lesser, more mundane, role than their American 
allies. On the contrary, the steps that I 
recommend should, and indeed must, be shared 
by all if they are to be effective. 
What developing an adequate conventional 
deterrent does mean, however, is that we must, 
as a first priority, do better with the forces 
already committed by bringing them up to the 
Allied Command Europe standards that have 
been agreed in manning, equipping, training, 
sustaining and reinforcing. 
Secondly, we must continue to modernise our 
forces, as we are, with new tanks, aircraft and 
equipment, and as we do and as was 
recommended by Mr. Wilkinson, we must take 
advantage of the technology that is emerging 
and exploit it in order to give us a capability to 
look deep into the enemy's rear, to locate his 
targets and to attack them with conventional 
weapons before the forces that continue to 
follow on get to our general defensive positions, 
so that we can make manageable the numbers 
of those forces that reach a general defensive 
position. That capability is there today to be 
exploited when we decide to do so. We should 
exploit that technology to ensure that we have 
what we refer to as the electronic warfare capa-
bility in order to disrupt the very centralised 
control of the forces in the Warsaw Pact from 
the operational units. 
The conventional capability that I have 
described can generally be met if nations will 
fulfil their force goals on the timescales set out 
therein. The force goals that are current today 
are 1983-88. The force goals comprise the 
only tool available in NATO to cause nations 
to commit themselves to reaching out to fulfil 
force improvements. I therefore plead with 
nations to meet their force goals. 
They ask me how much it will cost. We 
calculate that, if every nation fully meets its 
force goals in that six-year time frame, it will 
require an average annual real increase in 
defence expenditure per country of 4 o/o for each 
of those six years. I ask them: " But what does 
the 4 % mean for those of us who have to pay 
taxes? " It means that, for every man, woman 
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and child in the alliance in 1983 - the first year 
- meeting those force goals with the increase by 
nation would require $23 additional sacrifice 
for every one of us. 
It is $11 additional sacrifice for every man, 
woman and child in the West European nations 
of the alliance. That is an average; it is more 
for some nations, less for others. It is $38 in 
the United States because of the force goals 
which it agreed and the base from which it 
started. I happen to believe that, despite the 
economic problems of nations, the citizens of 
our countries would find the amount that I 
have described as being affordable and reason-
able as a small additional premium on an 
insurance policy for the maintenance of peace 
with freedom. 
If we achieved such conventional forces, what 
would be the result? First, we would enhance 
our deterrence; secondly, we would raise the 
nuclear threshold; thirdly, if the Soviets decided 
to attack with the Warsaw Pact and we were 
successful in frustrating that attack, they would 
have two options- first, to withdraw; secondly, 
to be the first to escalate to the use of theatre 
nuclear weapons. They are no more anxious 
to do that than we are because of the mutual 
uncertainty as to whether that will lead to 
further escalation, to a strategic nuclear 
exchange, which is something that they abhor 
as much as we do. 
In calling for an adequate conventional 
capability which will reduce our dependence on 
the nuclear response I am in no way implying 
that NATO should declare a "no-first-use" 
policy for nuclear weapons or eliminate those 
weapons from its inventory. Improving our 
capability will not allow us to forego an 
adequate and appropriate spectrum of nuclear 
weapons for deterrent purposes which, coupled 
with the uncertainty of our first-use policy, will 
in fact continue to deter a potential aggressor 
by pointing out that the risks of aggression 
outweigh any advantages to which he might 
aspire. 
Meeting the political and military impera-
tives in the manner that I have discussed will, I 
believe, permit us to achieve those security 
objectives - deterrence of aggression and intimi-
dation against us and the successful negotiation 
of arms reductions - which lead to our long-
term goals of peace with freedom and reduced 
levels of forces. 
As is recognised by the report before you on 
burden-sharing, the consensus which is so 
important to successful deterrence is under-
mined by several misconceptions which have 
unfortunately gained a hold in the minds of 
many of our fellow citizens. As I travel in the 
United States, I sometimes hear it said that, 
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after almost forty years of the United States' 
postwar involvement in European defence, 
now is the time to leave the security of Europe 
to Europeans. 
That view fails to recognise, first of all, that a 
free and independent Western Europe is a vital 
American interest and essential to the defence 
of the United States and the values that it 
treasures. Secondly that view is often fostered 
by the belief that European allies are not 
bearing their share of the common defence 
burden. That misconception underestimates 
the substantial contributions that Europeans are 
making today to their own defence. Many of 
the European costs are not readily apparent, 
such as the human and social costs of relying 
on conscription to man their forces and the 
hidden economic costs of using European real 
estate without reimbursement, on a continent 
where real estate is scarce, for stationing and 
training allied forces. For example, there are 
about nine hundred military facilities provided 
to the United States free of charge by nations in 
Western Europe. 
Also, many Americans do not realise, as 
Mr. Wilkinson said, that during the 1970s, 
while United States defence spending was 
declining in real terms, its European allies 
increased their defence spending by about 2 % 
per year in real terms. While the European 
allies have only about half the total population 
and gross national product of the alliance, as 
Mr. Wilkinson said, 90 % of the land forces and 
three-quarters of the sea and air forces initially 
available to SACEUR would be West Euro-
pean. When all factors are weighed, I believe 
that European NATO nations as a group - as I 
have told the Congress - are shouldering their 
fair share of the common defence burden. 
That judgment was confirmed by the con-
clusions of the Eurogroup meeting in Brussels 
last week. 
All that having been said, my travels also 
have confirmed that the two perceptions that I 
have mentioned - that European security 
should be left to Europeans and that European 
allies are not bearing their share of the common 
burden - are firmly held in many sections of 
my country, and particularly in the Congress. 
Therefore, I believe that we must all take 
every opportunity, as Mr. Wilkinson said, for 
the sake of cohesion within the alliance and in 
the West, vigorously to disprove those ideas and 
avoid giving opinion-makers in the United 
States any reason either to encourage a United 
States withdrawal of its contribution or to 
doubt European nations' commitment to the 
collective defence of the West. We must also, 
as he pointed out, take into account the world-
wide commitment of the United States to 
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protect the collective vital interests of its allies, 
irrespective of where they may be found and 
may be aggressed against on the globe. The 
challenge facing NATO this decade is not to get 
Europeans or just Americans to do more for 
defence; our challenge is to get all NATO 
nations to do more. 
In the immediate future there would be no 
more unmistakable display of allied willing-
ness to share the burdens and the risk of 
deterrence than the deployment of the interme-
diate-range nuclear forces. NA TO's INF deci-
sion was taken in order to modernise our INF 
and fill a growing gap in our spectrum of 
deterrence caused mainly by the Warsaw Pact's 
growing capability in nuclear systems that 
directly threatened Western Europe. At the 
time of NATO's decison, in December 1979, 
450 SS-4s and SS-5s and 140 SS-20s had been 
deployed. Now, over 350 SS-20s and approxi-
mately 250 SS-4s and SS-5s are deployed; with 
retire missiles for the SS-20, this exceeds 2,350 
warheads, over two-thirds of which can reach 
Western Europe. NATO's response to the 
Soviet INF build-up is the planned deployment 
of 572 nuclear warheads, linked to the provi-
sion that for every new warhead deployed 
NATO will remove a nuclear warhead curren-
tly in Europe, so that there will be no addition 
to nuclear forces. In addition, when NATO 
made that decision in December 1979 it made 
another decision to withdraw one thousand 
nuclear warheads from Western Europe. In 
my United States role as Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Forces Europe, I was charged 
with that withdrawal, and we completed it in 
November 1980. My point is that, far from 
increasing its nuclear capabilities after the 
December 1979 decision, as the Warsaw Pact 
has done, NATO will have significantly fewer 
warheads on European soil, even after the INF 
deployment. 
It is with respect to the arms reduction track 
of the INF decision that one finds misunder-
standings that undermine NA TO's chances for 
successful negotiations. Everyone seriously 
interested in such successful negotiations must 
realise how the Soviet Union views arms 
control in general and the INF talks in 
particular. The Soviets do not share our goal 
to promote stability and to achieve the deepest 
possible mutual arms reductions. For them, 
arms control is an effective means to secure 
western restraint and codify Soviet advantages. 
In the INF negotiations two dominant Soviet 
objectives are apparent : first, through skilful 
propaganda and manoeuvring, to split the 
United States from its western allies; secondly, 
to prevent or reduce NA TO's INF deployments 
with few or no concessions on the Soviets' part 
and thereby force the Soviet view of European 
security upon Western Europe. If NATO's 
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leaders and public will keep these Soviet 
objectives in mind, they will understand the 
reason equitable arms reductions are difficult to 
achieve and what we must do to give our side 
the greatest chance of reaching acceptable 
accords. 
The major incentive for the Soviets to 
negotiate seriously will come only from their 
viewing the Atlantic Alliance as politically 
cohesive and unified and militarily strong and 
resolute. It is wishful thinking to believe that 
arms reduction negotiations can be successful 
without our demonstrating the will to take the 
necessary actions to preserve our security. The 
events leading to the current INF negotiations 
confirm that it was only the resolve the allies 
displayed in the December 1979 decision which 
brought the Soviets to the bargaining table and 
caused them to abandon their initial intract-
able position. Continuing to convey that 
determined and unwavering resolve to put those 
INF missiles on our soil will, more than 
anything else, promote eventual success at those 
talks. Even if the Geneva deadlock continues, 
it will be neither necessary nor desirable to 
postpone deployment in order to give the 
negotiations more time to succeed. The obsta-
cle in the negotiations is not lack of time. 
Postponement would serve only to remove the 
incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously 
and would hand the Soviets a gratuitous 
negotiating success at no sacrifice to them. 
They could then resort to their well-rehearsed 
ploys for dragging out negotiations, as they 
have for nearly a decade at the Vienna talks on 
reducing conventional forces. Thus, postpone-
ment would allow the Soviets to prevent both 
deployment and success in the negotiations. 
If one sorts through the various western 
criticisms of the American INF proposals, one 
finds that the most frequently cited criticism is 
not that the United States proposals themselves 
are flawed or inequitable. The most frequent 
criticism is rather that the United States 
proposals are not being accepted by the Soviets, 
and therefore, by some strange logic, the United 
States proposals are too idealistic and unrealis-
tic. Such a double standard leads to pressure 
on the United States to abandon its position, 
when, of course, no similar pressure can be 
applied to the Soviets. 
I am convinced, in both my United States 
and my international roles, that the United 
States and its allies are negotiating in good 
faith and will seriously consider any reasonable 
Soviet proposal. But those voices in Europe or 
the United States calling for greater United 
States concessions and failing to point out the 
patent and pronounced inequities in the Soviet 
proposals do not help us to achieve an 
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equitable agreement in Geneva. More atten-
tion needs to be drawn to the fact that in the 
one and a half years since the INF negotiations 
began, the Soviets have fielded more SS-20 
warheads than the grand total of 572 that 
NATO plans to deploy eventually, between 
December 1983 and 1988, should the negotia-
tions fail. 
If, within our NATO nations, we promote 
dispassionate and realistic judgments about the 
INF negotiations, we can dispel the incipient 
notions that the United States and its allies will 
be to blame if no agreement is reached in 
Geneva. Simply by being fair and factual, we 
can thwart Soviet efforts to split the Atlantic 
Alliance, to retain its INF monopoly and 
thereby hope to hold Western Europe hostage. 
But negotiations will be long and difficult. 
We must be patient. We must maintain our 
patience and resolve, remembering that the 
overall goal of the INF decision is NA TO's 
security. The preferable way to achieve that 
goal would be an arms reduction agreement 
that would reduce or eliminate our need to 
deploy new missiles. But the worst outcome is 
not that in the absence of an agreement we 
must begin deployment; our quest for mutual 
arms reductions can continue after deployment 
begins. The worst outcome would be a 
collapse of our resolve to deploy these missiles 
if need be. Such a collapse would: leave 
NATO with a serious gap in its spectrum of 
deterrence and mean NA TO's acceptance of a 
major INF imbalance; decisively undermine our 
chances to achieve mutual arms reductions and 
controls; lose the opportunity to eliminate an 
entire category of nuclear weapons; signal that 
NATO is unable to carry out a decision 
deemed vital by its members but opposed by its 
potential adversary; equate to giving the Soviets 
a veto over what weapons systems NATO 
should deploy in order to deter Soviet use of 
nuclear weapons it has already deployed. 
Surely we do not want to establish that 
precedent. 
However, I remain optimistic that our 
alliance will maintain its resolve for INF 
modernisation. With it, we can negotiate an 
INF reduction agreement that will preserve 
western security while reducing significantly the 
number of nuclear warheads. 
The sustaining of favourable public attitudes 
requires the efforts of leaders and influential 
citizens like yourselves. Defence issues, parti-
cularly nuclear issues, undeniably strike sensi-
tive chords with our people. But that sensiti-
vity need not lead to timidity on the part of our 
political leaders. Supporters of NA TO's 
defence policies have the moral high ground; 
our cause is just. We will never resort to the 
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first use of any weapon to attack any nation. 
That is the moral high ground. 
We must deal forthrightly with our people, 
speak out loud and clear, and lead them along 
the path that is in their best interests. I would 
earnestly solicit your support energetically to 
encourage your own governments, as appro-
priate, to act on the peoples' behalf in the 
manner I have proposed. I believe that our 
people will respond to such leadership and 
candour and will see the wisdom of maintaining 
NA TO's cohesion and strength, the crucial 
ingredients for the achievement of the goal we 
all seek: peace with freedom with reduced levels 
of forces. The path to that goal passes through 
Geneva and Vienna at the negotiating table. 
The gateway to that path is constructed from 
the political and military imperatives which we 
must and can meet, if we resolve to do so. 
Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. Those 
are some of the things that are on my mind. I 
look forward to hearing what is on yours. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, General, for dealing in your -statement 
with many of the interpretations, some far from 
correct, of your strategy. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with the tradition 
of our Assembly, some members would like to 
put questions to you. I would ask them to 
confine themselves to asking their questions and 
to avoid making comments. 
I call Mr. Blaauw. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - I have two 
questions. At present we have the START 
negotiations and the INF negotiations. One of 
the reasons for the latter has to do with what 
are called grey area weapons. By neglecting 
the new family of weapons such as the SS-22 
and SS-23 we create a new area. Should not 
the alliance decide quickly to start negotiations 
in that area ? 
My second question is about battlefield 
weapons. Many people believe that their main 
value is political but others believe that it is 
taking too long to take a decision. What is 
General Rogers's opinion of the political value 
of battlefield weapons and of how a battlefield 
commander may make use of nuclear battlefield 
weapons? 
The PRESIDENT.- General Rogers, do you 
wish to answer now or later ? 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe). - I shall answer later. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Reay. 
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Lord REAY (United Kingdom). -There was 
nothing in General Rogers's brilliantly argued 
and convincing speech with which I disagreed, 
but if the deployment of SS-20s continues at its 
present rate, could not the planned numbers for 
the deployment of land-based cruise and 
Pershing missiles between now and 1988 prove 
insufficient ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - General, in the Federal 
Republic of Germany you are reported as 
saying that the Pershing 11 missile could have a 
flight time of up to fourteen minutes. This 
leads to the conclusion that the missile has a 
potential range of 2,400 kilometres" May I 
ask you if you have been quoted correctly, as 
other figures are being mentioned here ? 
Secondly, still on the subject of Pershing 11, 
on which I am concentrating because we 
consider it to be particularly hazardous, I 
would like to ask two further questions : 
To what extent are you able to confirm or 
deny the statement that the Pershing 11 repre-
sents an entirely new standard in high-
precision, high-velocity nuclear weapons and 
consequently marks the transition from a 
deterrent strategy hitherto considered stable to 
an unstable first-strike strategy, inevitably 
conducive to war ? 
My next question : to what extent can you 
confirm or deny my contention that thanks to 
their short flight time a surprise American 
attack with Pershing lis launched from the 
Federal Republic of Germany against the vital 
centres of the Soviet command structure could 
paralyse any Soviet reaction for the critical 
half-hour needed by the United States for the 
subsequent destruction by its own missiles of 
the Soviet IBMs and missile submarines 
targeted on the United States? 
I have many more questions but I will limit 
myself to two: to what extent can you confirm 
or deny my contention that the deployment of 
the first Pershing 11 missiles in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the consequent 
abrupt reduction of the warning time for an 
attack on the Soviet Union to only a few 
minutes will result in the automation of 
response decisions hitherto taken by humans 
and hence in an enormously increased technical 
fallibility of the Soviet command structure ? 
And my last question: we suspect, indeed 
fear, that the United States might force us to 
deploy these weapons against the growing 
opposition of the peoples of Europe and against 
the will of the majority in the Federal Republic 
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of Germany. I should like to have your 
opinion on this, as military commander. 
Finally, there are fears that the actual 
stationing of Pershing lis, not just the prelim-
inary work, might start as early as September 
this year, well before the results of the Geneva 
talks can be assessed. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - General, I have four questions. 
In the first place I would like to ask whether 
it is realistic to provide for a budget increase of 
4 %, in view of the fact that for years - since 
1978 in fact - we have had a 3 % target which 
has not been achieved by anyone in Europe. 
Would it not be more reasonable, instead of . 
straining to achieve objectives which in the 
practical circumstances of all our countries now 
appear unrealistic - a case of pride leading to a 
fall - to introduce graded qualitative objectives, 
which would, of course, differ from country to 
country ? I think that would be an important 
step forward. 
Second question: I am very much in 
sympathy with your plan to raise the nuclear 
threshold by improving conventional capabili-
ties. I think you were wrongly criticised for 
your previous speech on the subject in this 
place. The question which occurs to me is this: 
the interdiction concept of frustrating a conven-
tional attack which you advocate seems to me 
to be questionable in one respect, as conceived 
at present. If interdiction weapons of the same 
type can be fitted with either conventional or 
nuclear warheads, this could operate against the 
aim of raising the nuclear threshold and might, 
indeed, have the opposite effect by rendering 
arms control and verification still more diffi-
cult. I would therefore be pleased if you 
would expand on this point. 
A third point: I do not know where your 
main emphasis lies in the negotiations. On the 
one hand, as planned in 1979, you have made 
the issue of deployment conditional upon, or 
even subject to the outcome of the negotia-
tions. You have stressed this more than 
once. On the other hand you have stated that 
a breakthrough in the disarmament negotiations 
may be possible only after the new weapons 
have been deployed. Is that now the alliance's 
view as you see it ? If so, it is not strictly 
compatible with the emphasis which in 1979 
was laid on negotiations prior to any weapons 
deployment. We have constantly reiterated the 
need for the most strenuous efforts. 
A fourth point: at the end of your address 
you insisted on the no-first-use policy, and I 
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warmly welcome this declaration. But the 
question then arises: how can this be reconciled 
with your previous repudiation of western ideas 
about no first use, as voiced by McNamara, 
McGeorge-Bundy and other recent speakers? 
A no-first-use policy naturally calls for changes 
of concept, and this you have hitherto rejected. 
If you now enunciate it as clearly as you have 
just done, this means that it would be only a 
short step to making renunciation of first 
use into a basic concept for the West. This is 
the question I would like to put to you. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Scheer, your questions are always very interest-
ing, but I would appreciate it if you could put 
them a little more briefly. 
I call Mr. Pignion. 
Mr. PIGNION (France) (Translation). -
General, my question will be brief and in fact 
follows on from the last question put by Mr. 
Blaauw. 
How can your proposals regarding conven-
tional equipment, which have come to be 
known as the " Rogers doctrine ", be reconciled 
with recent statements by President Reagan, 
which, in view of the development of the 
advanced technologies in the armaments field, 
have come to be known as Star Wars? 
Does not the option of developing conven-
tional weapons and thus, through the force of 
circumstances, prolonging indefinitely the 
flexible response, conflict with the idea of the 
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, to which 
France is committed, as are all our allies, if the 
197 4 Ottawa declaration is to be believed ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
have two questions to ask General Rogers, one 
concerning Turkey, the other INF. 
NATO claims to be the organisation which 
defends democracy, which includes human 
freedoms and rights. One of NA TO's member 
countries is today violating human rights and 
the fundamental principles of democracy 
common to us all. Torture by the so-called 
forces of law and order is common-place, and 
ethnic and cultural minorities are being cruelly 
persecuted. 
Is this consorting with the Turkish dicta-
torship not harmful to NATO's credibility, and 
do you not think it would have been better not 
to hold large-scale NATO manoeuvres in 
Turkey while the Turkish armed forces were 
engaged in a military operation against the 
Kurdish minority ? 
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With regard to INF and the balance of 
nuclear weapons, what do you see as the 
optimal threshold ? The ability to destroy the 
world twenty-five times ? Twenty-six times ? 
Would once not be enough ? In other words, 
how important is the number of SS-20s 
aimed at Europe ? What difference is there 
between five hundred and two thousand 
warheads threatening Europe ? What value 
should Europe today attach to the possibility of 
being protected by American strategic missiles ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Four 
members still wish to put questions. I would 
ask them to be brief. 
I call Mr. Haase. 
Mr. HAASE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - General, thank you for your 
lucid exposition. I have a supplementary 
question, however. What is your opinion of 
the build-down proposal made by the three 
American Senators Nunn, Cohen and Percy 
that multi-warheaded missiles should be 
replaced by single-warheaded missiles ? Do 
you think this is a practical and reasonable 
suggestion in military terms and that the 
remaining medium-range missiles should then 
be further discussed within the ambit of the 
START negotiations ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Biefnot. 
Mr. BIEFNOT (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
have two brief questions to put to General 
Rogers. 
He has referred to the financing and infiltra-
tion of the peace movement by foreign powers. 
Could he be a little more specific on the 
subject ? I should like to hear his views on the 
trend in American political opinion, specifi-
cally on this peace movement, on the position 
of the churches and the bishops, the Senate, 
Canada and the statements that have been 
made by Elliot Trudeau. I am not talking 
about the unanimous agreement reached in 
Williamsburg but about shades of opinion 
before and after this summit meeting. 
I should also like to hear General Rogers's 
views on the differences in the positions held by 
Presidents Reagan and Carter and their admi-
nistrations and what he thinks of the positions 
adopted by the Carter administration and 
confirmed by President Carter's collaborators. 
I am thinking specifically of Paul Warnke, 
who once occupied an important post and now 
believes that the Geneva negotiations will fail, 
that they are strictly political and that deploy-
ment will be considered a factor in the negotia-
tions. In his opinion, the only useful discus-
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sions will be those which begin after Geneva, as 
part of global negotiations, the START talks. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de V ries. 
Mr. de VRIES (Netherlands). - I have only 
one question concerning flexible response. This 
morning the French Minister for External 
Relations, Mr. Cheysson, told us that nuclear 
weapons made war unthinkable. But today, as 
he has before, the General has told us that in a 
flexible response strategy we need a whole 
range of nuclear weapons. 
Does the General agree that one of the 
greatest anxieties of our population at the 
moment is how this flexible response strategy 
concerns nuclear weapons ? How does he 
conceive that that strategy will be implemented 
should the need occur ? 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - I do not understand the 
question. Please will you repeat it ? 
Mr. de VRIES (Netherlands). - Do you 
understand that much of the anxiety in Western 
Europe about nuclear weapons is created by the 
adoption of a flexible response strategy, which 
includes nuclear weapons? Do you under-
stand why many in our population do not 
believe that nuclear weapons fit into a flexible 
response strategy ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim. 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - General, 
in the context of our defence, what importance 
do you attach to the AWACS early warning 
system ? How satisfied are you with the 
progress of AWACS as part of our defence 
build-up so far? To what extent does the 
AWACS system necessitate close co-operation 
with the British Nimrod system ? How do you 
assess the present state of co-operation between 
Nimrod and AWACS? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Holtz. 
Mr. HOLTZ (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen. After listening to the General's 
speech, I have the impression that the concept 
·of peace is being defined purely in military 
terms. I would like to ask you, General, 
especially now that you have told us about the 
additional per capita military expenditure to be 
borne by the populations of Western Europe 
and the United States, whether it is not 
crucially important to improve the social and 
economic well-being of our peoples, thereby 
also making a major contribution to the cause 
of peace? 
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Briefly, peace is surely not merely the 
absence of war; it also means the creation of 
fairer, friendlier and more caring relationships 
and conditions between nations and also 
between military blocs ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- I ask 
one last question to clarify General Rogers's 
admirable and comprehensive speech. He 
referred to retire missiles for the SS-20. Includ-
ing those notional retire missiles, he made the 
total of warheads against NATO as 2,350. We 
have read in the press that the launchers could 
be reusable. They could have a second, · 
perhaps even a third, missile. Are second 
missiles operationally deployed by the Soviets 
on the SS-20 system ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - Thank you for the ques-
tions. I hope that I have understood their 
gist. I have depended upon the interpreters, 
but it is my fault not theirs if I have 
misunderstood. 
The first question, as I understood it, related 
to the START and the INF negotiations. We 
started the INF negotiations to remove what 
was described as a grey area. I was asked 
whether, by ignoring missiles of shorter range 
than the SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s, such as the 
SS-21 s, SS-22s, SS-23s and those which they 
are replacing, we were not creating another grey 
area. It may well be that such an area is 
created. There is no question but that some-
where in the negotiations attention must be 
paid to missiles that can be placed on East 
European soil and that have a range from 
17 5 kilometres to 97 5 kilometres - almost 
1 ,000 kilometres - and that are modem 
weapons systems with great mobility and 
accuracy. Therefore, we must pay attention to 
that. At some time in the negotiations some 
consideration must be given to putting some 
kind of control on such weapons systems on 
both sides. 
If I understood the next question, I was asked 
how we could reduce battlefield ·weapons and 
how we could use them. First, we do not need 
to wait until we have reached the kind of 
conventional capacity that I have described 
before the SACEUR considers whether we can 
reduce the number of warheads that we have 
deployed here in Western Europe. Most 
people do not realise - there is no reason why 
they should - that every year the SACEUR 
must look at the type and number of warheads 
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in what is known as the nuclear weapons 
requirement study. As SACEUR, every year, I 
must submit that study to the nuclear powers. 
If you were in SACEUR's position, I submit 
that you would wish to have a fairly high 
confidence in the rationale that you have 
developed and from which you draw your 
guidance to send to major subordinate 
commanders so that they can tell you of their 
requirements according to type and distri-
bution. 
The SHAPE staff spent two years - finishing 
almost a year ago - developing a rationale in 
whose logic I have a high level of confidence 
and from which I can determine for my nuclear 
weapons requirement study the numbers that 
we need by type and by location. Whether 
that rationale, in the next nuclear weapons 
requirement study, will call for a reduction 
in the number of warheads believed to be 
required, I cannot say, but I can say that since 
1974 those requirements have been reduced 
from almost 1 ,500 to less than half that 
number. Through this system, I expect that 
before I leave my present position - I now have 
a minimum of two years left to serve - I shall 
be able to stand before my political authorities 
and say that I am not asking for one more 
warhead than I need. I have not been able to 
say that in the past, but I expect to be able to 
do so. I hope that that rationale will lead to a 
reduction. 
The second question was whether, if the 
deployment of the SS-20s was continued, 572 
would be a sufficient number for us to 
deploy. In my opinion, it would. When I 
became SACEUR in mid-1979, as the high-
level group was reaching its conclusions on 
what should be done to deter the use of the 
Soviets' intermediate-range nuclear forces, the 
question came up: "Will 572 be enough for 
you, SACEUR, from a military point of 
view?" The answer was: "Yes, 572 will be 
enough. It is not as many as we would have 
liked to have for strictly military purposes, but 
it achieves the political objective which was set, 
that of deterring the use of weapons systems 
from their soil on to ours in the belief that we 
could not respond from our soil to theirs -
which ends up achieving deterrence". 
The deployment of the SS-20s continues 
despite the moratorium announced in March 
1982, at which time there were thirty-two sites 
each having nine launchers. Today, there are 
thirty-nine sites each having nine launchers, 
and we are watching the fortieth being comple-
ted; there are others that we expect to be 
opened. 
The third question, which I may have 
misunderstood, was about the flight time of the 
Pershing 11. It is correct, as was suggested, that 
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the flight time is about fourteen minutes. The 
time that is often given is six minutes and it 
continues to be reduced. One speaker the 
other day said that it had a flight time of only a 
couple of minutes. In fact, it takes closer to 
fourteen minutes if it is fired at its extreme 
range, which is about 1 ,800 kilometres. The 
flight time for the Pershing 11 at that range is 
about equal to the flight time of the SS-20 if 
fired at that range. 
I was asked whether the Pershing 11 did not 
make the military situation unstable. I should 
like to put this in the perspective of the real 
world as it exists today and has been existing. 
We in Western Europe have been under a short 
flight time threat for a number of years. The 
United States has been under the threat of a 
very short flight time for many years from the 
nuclear submarines of the Soviet Union with 
nuclear warheads aboard just off the east and 
west coasts of the United States -a flight time 
which is shorter than the maximum flight time 
of the Pershing 11. The United States has been 
living for many years under the threat of a very 
short warning time. I cannot feel sorry for the 
Soviet Union, since it has placed us in that 
condition for a number of years, if it now 
finds itself, when the Pershing 11 is deployed, 
under that short flight time threat. That is not 
inequitable or unfair to it. 
I believe that one part of the question was, 
could the Americans fire the Pershing 11 from 
Federal German soil by surprise, which might 
paralyse the Soviet Union? Let us put that 
also in perspective. In the first place, no 
weapons will be fired until SACEUR asks his 
political authorities for the release of nuclear 
weapons. Neither the United States nor the 
United Kingdom, nor any of the other major 
nations, has the ability or the power to release 
those weapons unilaterally. I must go to the 
political authorities and the political authorities 
must make the decision, and give their advice 
on whether nuclear weapons should be released 
to SACEUR for use on targets which he has 
designated for the political authorities with 
weapons systems designated by him for the 
political authorities' information, which lays 
out which nations have the capability within 
their inventory of weapons to attack those 
targets. 
I must lay out what information I have in 
terms of what will be the civilian casualties 
and I will lay constraints on myself in the type 
of warheads I use associated with civilian 
casualties. Finally, the targets that I select 
must be militarily significant to us and to the 
other side, so that we do not strike population 
centres with our weapons systems; my guidance 
does not permit that. As I go forward, I must 
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list all these things each time - not just the first 
time - that I request the use of theatre nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, I think that the scenario 
which has been suggested is not possible. 
The same questioner asked, is it planned that 
these weapons systems should be stationed on 
our soil in September of this year ? There has 
been no change in the decision that was made, 
that, if there is no breakthrough in the 
negotiations between now and December 1983, 
those weapons systems will then be deployed 
upon the soil at Greenham Common and the 
Pershing lis in Germany and those ground-
launched cruise missiles at Camiso. We are 
not talking about September, November or 
October. It still is December. 
If I had been asked, do preliminary steps 
need to be taken to prepare to receive those 
missiles and base them on our soil in Decem-
ber, I would answer that of course there has to 
be some preliminary training and construction. 
That is being done and will continue to be 
done. But do not let what you have read in 
the press over the last two or three days mislead 
you. There is no intention of putting those 
missile systems on our soil until December of 
this year. I do not expect that there will be 
any change in that. What you have read 
recently in the press has been misleading, in my 
opinion. 
Another questioner asked whether 4 % was 
realistic when we had not been meeting the 3 % 
target. Again, I want to put into context what 
the 4 % really means. I told you that the only 
tool we have for force improvement is the force 
goals in our planning procedures and that every 
two years my staff and the staffs of ministries of 
defence develop force proposals for a six-year 
period. Today, we are working with nations 
on the 1985-90 period. 
As we move through this decade, I expect 
that those force improvements will still require 
about a 4 % real increase - but remember that 
the 4% was suggested for meeting fully the 
force proposals for 1983-88. If those are fully 
met, which will give us generally, as we move 
through this decade, the kind of conventional 
capacity that I think we should have by the end 
of the decade, that would require a 4 % real 
increase on the average per year. 
Is it realistic to meet the 4 % target ? That is 
up to the people whom you represent. You 
have to make a choice of priorities. We have 
not yet convinced the people - on either side of 
the Atlantic, I think - that there is in fact a 
threat to their freedom - not of an attack out of 
the blue from the East, although we must be 
prepared for that, but rather a threat to their 
freedom from political intimidation and econo-
mic coercion and blackmail as a result of the 
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widening gap which I mentioned and which 
continues every year until we one day wake up 
to find that the military situation has become 
unmanageable unless we do two things. 
The first is to show the resolve in December 
of this year to follow through on the decision of 
December 1979 if we do not get a break-
through. The second is to show the resolve to 
start taking action to overcome our conventio-
nal deficiencies and to be perceived by the 
other side as being prepared to do what is 
necessary to implement our strategy. If that 
resolve is perceived, I think that incentives will 
be provided for serious negotiations by the 
Soviets at the negotiating table, and therein, I 
believe, lies the answer to the kind of future 
that we all want. 
As to the interdiction concept, I am advocat-
ing an ability to locate a mobile target in the 
enemy rear and, secondly, once located, the 
ability to target it and to bring it into a joint 
tactical fusion centre where human judgment 
can be exercised as to which weapons system 
has the better capability of dealing with that 
target. Should it be manned aircraft, which is 
all that we have today and which find it increas-
ingly difficult to penetrate the Soviet air 
defences, or should it be - and this is what I am 
seeking - surface-to-air missiles with area 
coverage submunitions or terminally-guided 
submunitions and surface-to-surface weapons 
systems of the same type ? We must be able to 
strike the bridges, tunnels, defiles and choke 
points that cause those forces to bunch up and 
which present them as a lucrative target at 
which we can strike. 
Some have maintained that this Allied 
Command Europe concept of the attack of 
follow-on forces means what they read in the 
United States air-land battle 2000. That is not 
our concept. We do not envisage masses of 
forces attacking eastward across the inner 
German border towards Prague and Warsaw. 
My mission is not to gain one additional foot of 
territory for Western Europe. It is to give up 
the least amount with the fewest civilian and 
military casualties and to regain what territory 
we lose. We should use these weapons systems 
to interdict. 
Can they be identified by the other side as 
such types of conventional weapons ? Yes. I 
am not asking that Trident missiles be buried in 
the ground of Western Europe to be used for 
such missions. One would be confused about 
whether they had conventional or nuclear 
warheads. 
I was asked whether it would be automatic 
that we would deploy these weapons systems if 
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there were not a breakthrough in Geneva. 
That question has been answered by our 
political authorities, which in a number of 
communiques have said that, if there is no 
breakthrough, they will be deployed. That was 
said only last week at a meeting of ministers. 
I was asked how I reconciled the no first use 
of weapons with my argument that the gang of 
four in the United States was wrong to advocate 
no first use. Let this be understood. I said 
that the moral high ground is ours because 
NATO will not use weapons first against any 
nation in an offensive mode. We shall not 
attack any nation by the first use of weapons. 
But as we defend our territory, we must 
retain the first-use option for a number of 
reasons. First, nothing is certain in time of 
war. Secondly, uncertainty associated with 
the first-use policy equates with deterrence. 
Thirdly, there are tactical military reasons why 
the first-use option should be retained. One 
happens to be that Soviet doctrine calls for 
massing its forces for attack. They must decide 
whether it makes sense to mass their forces if 
they are uncertain about the first-use policy and 
whether we shall use it. Does it make sense to 
amass such forces, thus making them a lucra-
tive target for the other side ? 
Fourthly, if we adopt a no-first-use policy, it 
could be viewed here as a lessening of United 
States commitment, which could lead to the 
decoupling of the strategic nuclear umbrella for 
the protection of Western Europe, and we 
cannot permit that. 
The gang of four and I agree that in our plan 
we should include the development of the 
conventional capacity that I have described. 
They say that once we reach that point, we 
should give up the first-use policy. I say that 
we must retain it and the uncertainty associated 
with the array of nuclear weapons that I 
mentioned so that we can deter their use. 
Another member spoke of the Rogers doc-
trine. It is not. It is the Allied Command 
Europe concept for the attack of follow-on 
forces. No matter what it is called, I was asked 
how I reconciled it with the Star Wars concept. 
Today we have nuclear weapons. We cannot 
wish them away. They can only be negotiated 
away. How do we defend our nations against 
the use of nuclear weapons ? There are two 
ways. First, either we develop a defensive 
capability that can strike those nuclear weapons 
systems before they strike the homeland, or, 
secondly, we have a counter-offensive capa-
bility. That is the policy that we have adopted 
in the West for many years. Weapons are put 
on our soil to deter their use by the other side. 
By deterring them, we shall never have to use 
them. 
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We can also try to defend ourselves with 
weapons systems that can interrupt flight before 
the enemy's weapons reach our soil. That is 
what the Star Wars concept is. But let me 
hasten to add that the United States has pointed 
out that if ever that concept comes into being 
- at the end of this century at the earliest, if it 
is feasible - it may well be feasible to use such 
a defensive weapons system here in Western 
Europe, thereby reducing the number of 
weapons on our soil for the counter offensive 
purpose of deterrence. 
We must understand the conditions that 
existed in Turkey at the time of General 
Evren. I say that with some personal know-
ledge, because in those days I visited him about 
once a month as we worked together to 
bring the Greek military forces back into the 
integrated military structure of Allied 
Command Europe. I was aware of General 
Evren's great anxiety about what was happen-
ing to his country. Parliament could not 
function, anarchy existed and thirty of his 
citizens were killed every day. 
I cannot give advice to the Assembly, but I 
submit that we should not try to create Turkey 
or any other nation in the image of another 
nation. Conditions in Turkey are different 
from those in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the United States or England. Condi-
tions in Turkey must be dealt with in the 
manner decided by those who are determined 
that what happened in 1980 should never 
happen again. 
General Evren will bring back the democratic 
principles that Atatiirk introduced seventy 
years ago. We are talking of an Islamic 
country that has made mind-boggling progress 
in the last seventy years. 
I may be asked whether it makes sense to 
conduct exercises such as those by the ACE 
Mobile Force in eastern Turkey when the 
military is still supreme there. It may not 
make sense to some, but it does to me. My 
mission is to prevent war. The intention is 
that the force be used on the flanks. Air and 
land troops from seven nations are involved. 
Their purpose is to put across the message: 
" We know that you are up to something; we 
do not like it and we shall do what is necessary 
as an alliance to prevent it. " That is a 
deterrent to be deployed only with the autho-
rity of the political leaders. 
We send two messages in the use of that 
force. We send a message to ourselves to 
reassure us that we have that capability. The 
second message is to the other side so that it 
knows that we have the capability and are 
exercising it. I think that that makes sense. 
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I have been asked about the build-down 
proposal to modernise our forces. As we 
modernise we can reduce the number of 
warheads but have no major impact on our 
deterrent capability and therefore upon our 
security. That argument is often lost on those 
who advocate freezes. Imbalance and freezes 
are bad enough, but they reduce our opportu-
nity to modernise the weapons systems so that 
they are more stable, reliable, penetrative and 
able to survive. I am not prepared to say 
whether build-down is applicable to other 
areas. 
I do not remember saying today that we have 
been infiltrated by the pacifist movement. 
That is not in my text, which I followed fairly 
carefully. However, if asked I should say: 
. " Yes, intelligence confirms that in various 
movements one segment consists of front 
personnel who are the dupes of the Soviets. " 
We know that they are there, but we do not· 
need to pay attention to them because they are 
not important. Another segment comprises 
activists who are exhilarated by demonstrating 
for pacifism or unilateral disarmament, often 
not knowing what they mean. We can ignore 
that group. 
We must pay attention to a third group. I 
refer to the large group of adults and young 
people who are thoughtful, concerned, intelli-
gent and worried about war, particularly 
nuclear war. They cast about to find a 
solution. They often believe that pacifism or 
unilateral disarmament is the answer. They 
are neutralists. They fail to reflect on history, 
which confirms that pacifists can maintain 
peace, but at what price ? We want peace with 
freedom. We could maintain peace but lose 
our freedom. By unilateral disarmament we 
disrobe ourselves of military might in the 
presence of an iron giant. We then have to 
depend on the good will and grace of the other 
side. History confirms that unilateral disarma-
ment is not followed by disarmament by the 
other side. 
The 1930s should convince most Europeans 
and Americans that just because a country 
declares itself neutral does not necessarily mean 
that it will not become involved. Geography 
plays a part in neutrality. A country must 
demonstrate its will to do whatever is necessary 
to defend sovereignty from whatever direction 
and in whatever manner it is threatened. We 
must have a dialogue with the neutralists. 
The Soviet Union understands the history of 
unilateral disarmament and neutralism. Peo-
ple who attach themselves to such movements 
do not provide the incentive for the Soviets 
to negotiate seriously. That must be our 
objective. I hope that by showing the resolve 
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that I have described we shall provide the 
incentive so that we can negotiate seriously. 
Mr. Cheysson said this morning that nuclear 
weapons made war unthinkable. I have been 
asked whether I understand that much of the 
anxiety is caused by our strategy of flexible 
response. I understand that. I dislike the 
thought that if we are attacked conventionally, 
because we may be unable to sustain ourselves 
for longer than a few days in ammunition, 
manpower and tanks to replace losses in the 
battlefield, I must request the release of nuclear 
weapons. I do not like that. 
As a minimum I should like us to improve 
our forces and take advantage of the emergent 
technologies to bring us to the point where it is 
not the early use of nuclear weapons that we 
face. I should like to create a perception in 
the other side's mind by the end of the decade 
that we have the capability to frustrate a 
conventional attack and that if it attacks, it has 
only two options - to withdraw or be the first 
to escalate. 
What is our option if we do not escalate ? It 
is to capitulate. That is just as unviable as the 
first use of nuclear weapons. To me the 
answer is to try to prevent any kind of war 
through raising the nuclear threshold by enhanc-
ing our conventional capacity. 
If Mr. Cheysson were here this afternoon he 
would agree that his government's strategy is 
different from that which I must implement in 
NATO. Were it not so the French forces 
would still be integrated in our military 
structure. I am trying to build a firebreak 
between peace and any kind of war - conven-
tional or nuclear - rather than a firebreak 
between conventional and nuclear war. I want 
the firebreak to be between peace and any kind 
of war. Doing these things requires resolve. 
By building up our conventional forces and 
putting these weapons systems on our shores 
this December we can create the perception on 
the other side that will help deter war. 
You have heard me say before what I believe 
to be the greatest menace that we face. It is 
not a war that comes out of the blue from the 
East. Rather it is political and economic 
intimidation that arises from being viewed ~s 
being incapable or unwilling to defend 
ourselves. 
I ascribe considerable importance to the 
airborne early warning system in NATO. I 
was asked whether it would be feasible to 
function with Nimrod. The answer is yes. I 
was also asked whether I was satisfied with the 
progress being made on building up to the 
eighteen A W AC aircraft and the eleven Nim-
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rods. Again the answer is yes. One of the 
major successes in the alliance today is the 
airborne early warning programme. It is a 
commonly funded weapons system met by 
twelve nations that is coming in on schedule 
and below cost. That latter is surprising to 
many people. The cost was set by the political 
authorities. 
Someone said that from what I had said I had 
suggested that peace was determined by military 
means. Our goal is peace with freedom at 
reduced and balanced levels of forces. I did 
not mean that it can come only through 
military means. My mission is the deterrence 
of war. That is a political mission, a mission 
assigned to a military man. 
I was also asked whether the economy played 
a part in deterrence. Do politics, social pro-
grammes, diplomacy and psychology have a 
part to play ? Yes, they do. Do political 
leaders have to deal with all of those aspects? 
Of course. One can say that SACEUR, not 
being responsible for those other factors within 
a country, is speaking only in military terms. 
There are arguments on both sides. I agree 
with Sir John Slessor, who told us that in a 
democracy it is customary to be unhappy about 
the allocation of resources for security purposes 
because that tended to be counter-productive in 
terms of social progress. He also pointed out 
that the greatest social programme a nation can 
have for its people is to keep them alive and 
free. I believe that. Others can argue, on the 
economic side, that such matters must be 
solved before we can allocate additional resour-
ces to security. I maintain that, if you do not 
have your freedom, you will not be able to be 
in charge of allocating national resources or 
trying to take care of economic problems. I 
recognise that there are others who take a 
contrary view. 
I mentioned 2,350 warheads. There are 250 
SS-4 and SS-5 systems still deployed. They are 
single warheads. There are over 2,100 SS-20 
warheads deployed. There are 351 launchers 
deployed today. There are three warheads to 
each launcher and there is a second missile 
deployed at the launcher site. Multiply 351 by 
three by two and that gives the total number of 
warheads attributable to SS-20s. It has been 
pointed out that there is some uncertainty 
whether there may be three missiles deployed at 
each launcher, one on the launcher, a second 
one that we know of and, perhaps, a third. 
I have enjoyed this opportunity to be with 
you. I appreciate your patience, your attention 
and your questions. I hope that I can join you 
again some time. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - General, 
the warmth of the applause which followed 
your concluding remarks is proof of the interest 
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our Assembly has taken in what you have to 
say and of our appreciation for the lucidity with 
which you have answered the questions put to 
you. 
Thank you once again, and I hope to see you 
again soon, during forthcoming debates. 
4. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accord-
ance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
5. Burden-sharing in the alliance 
(Debate on the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 947 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the debate on the report of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments on burden-sharing in the alliance, 
Document 94 7 and amendments. 
I call Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - I cannot 
speak this afternoon without first referring to 
three ancillary matters. First, I congratulate 
you, Mr. President, on your election as Presi-
dent of this Assembly. You have devoted great 
service to WEU, and your friends in the 
·Assembly applaud the actions of the entire 
Assembly in voting you into office. I offer you 
my warmest congratulations. 
Secondly, I cannot follow the one and a half 
hours that General Rogers has devoted to our 
Assembly this afternoon without saying how 
impressed I was by how he replied to our 
questions and how those questions manifested 
his deep anxiety for world peace and the 
philosophy that he brings to the heavy burdens 
that he bears on behalf of all of us. 
I was particularly impressed by the way in 
which he dealt with Mr. Dejardin's question 
about Turkey. I shall have occasion to refer to 
that again. 
Further, I want to congratulate my friend, 
Mr. Wilkinson, on a report that is thoughtful, 
cogent, well-reasoned and a mine of informa-
tion. He deserves the thanks of the entire 
Assembly, as, indeed, do those in the secretariat 
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who have aided him in its preparation. He 
also deserves our gratitude for having come 
here at what could be great cost to himself this 
afternoon to present his report to the Assem-
bly. Everyone here knows that the day after 
tomorrow is polling day in my country. 
Mr. Wilkinson has done what a great many 
parliamentary candidates would not have done: 
he has left his country forty-eight hours before 
the poll to come here to present this important 
and valuable report to the Assembly. It shows 
the value that he, and we in the British 
Delegation, attach to the Assembly. I should 
like to congratulate him warmly and I am sure 
that in doing so I echo the sentiments of all 
those here. We are all parliamentarians and 
we all know what it is to leave our country at 
the moment when we are seeking the suffrage of 
our people once again. 
This is almost certainly the last time that I 
shall address the Assembly as one of its 
members. It has been a source of pride and 
pleasure to me to serve WEU for the best part 
of fourteen years. That is a long time in a par-
liamentary career and I attach enormous value 
to the work that the Assembly does. Did I not 
attach such value to the Assembly and to the 
Council of Europe, which those present also 
serve, I should long ago have abandoned 
it. However, I believe that we are here playing 
our part in maintaining peace in Europe and in 
the Council of Europe we are playing our part 
in achieving, however remotely, the more 
united Europe that is the hope of us all. 
I desire to make only three points on this full 
report. One could not possibly discuss it in 
detail and nobody would thank me were I to do 
so on this rather hot afternoon. I agree 
entirely with the statement in paragraph 9.7 on 
the British and French nuclear deterrents. 
They are not negotiable. It says: 
" The British and French independent 
nuclear forces constituting an additional cen-
tre of strategic decision and national riposte 
to potential Soviet aggression afford an extra 
dimension to overall western deterrence and 
must not be bargained away. " 
That must be made clear by all who partici-
pate in all the negotiations which are rightly 
going on for force and nuclear arms reductions. 
As Mr. Cheysson said this morning, they are 
the independent means which our two countries 
are lucky enough to have to deter aggression 
from outside. We should maintain them and 
they are not negotiable. I am sure that I speak 
for nearly all my fellow countrymen in making 
that point to this Assembly. 
Curiously enough, my second point relates to 
the question that Mr. Dejardin asked and with 
which General Rogers dealt so effectively this 
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afternoon. It relates to paragraph 3. 7 and the 
extremely valuable Appendix 11 to this report. 
It is pointed out that three of the poorest 
countries of NATO - Turkey, Portugal and 
Greece - contribute well beyond the average of 
their gross national products to the defence of 
the free world. I am glad to read, and I 
entirely support, that part of the draft resolu-
tion which calls on the parliaments of Den-
mark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Turkey to appoint observers to the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments to parti-
cipate in the preparation of its forthcoming 
report on the state of European security. They 
should have the right to speak and we ought to 
hear from them. 
Those countries make an invaluable contri-
bution to the peace of Europe. That is a peace 
which we, of the Brussels Treaty, are obliged to 
defend. In that connection I hope that those of 
my colleagues who have reservations about the 
position in Turkey - and I understand them, 
but they were fully answered by General Rogers 
this afternoon - will cease this continual 
sniping at a Turkish regime which took office 
to deal with a state not of democracy but of 
utter anarchy, which was bringing about the 
dissolution of the state and society and ruining 
the economy. General Rogers referred to the 
thirty murders a day but not to the inflation 
which was running at 120 %. That was not 
democracy; that was anarchy. General Evren 
has gradually shown that he is fulfilling his 
pledge to restore democratic government in 
Turkey, as military regimes since Atatiirk 
westernised the country have done more than 
' once before. 
(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President ofthe Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
It does no good to the defence of the free 
world and Europe that there should be such 
continual sniping at Turkey and, indeed, the 
effort in some quarters for a purist concept of 
democracy to drive Turkey out of the comity of 
Western European nations. Turkey wishes to 
be a part of Europe. The Turkish ministers 
and politicians whom I saw when I visited 
Turkey several times last year all said, even 
those who were most bitterly opposed to the 
present regime, that we should not drive them 
out. 
Finally, it is obvious that Turkey is an indis-
pensable bastion in the defence of Europe. 
General Rogers made that point this after-
noon. One must recognise the backwardness 
of Turkey in many ways, but those who snipe 
at Turkey on human rights are doing no service 
to the free world. The present regime must be 
judged by its results and it has so far fulfilled 
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the promises which it made to the people when 
it took over. Last year General Evren set 
about establishing the constitution which, in 
November last year, resulted in free elections. 
The PRESIDENT. - Will you please con-
clude? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Yes, I am 
about to do so. I did not realise that I had 
taken any time at all. That shows that I have 
been carried away, but I hope not inebriated, 
by my own verbosity. Having made those two 
points, I am invited by the President to con-
clude and I am happy to do so. 
I have been deeply interested in the problem 
of Turkey for the past two years. I invite my 
colleagues to give the report their firm support 
and to unite with me once again in thanking 
our Rapporteur not only for his report but for 
coming here in the circumstances in which he 
has presented it. 
As this is my valedictory speech, may I say 
how happy I have been to serve with my 
colleagues in WEU. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Grieve. I should like to thank you for all 
the years that you have spent in WEU. You 
have been a member since 1970, which means 
that you have served for more than twelve years. 
You have served on many committees and 
not having you with us will be a great loss 
to the Assembly. You have produced many 
reports and for a couple of years you have been 
the guardian of rules and procedure in the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges. We wish you the best of luck after you 
step down as a parliamentarian. It is because 
you are not seeking re-election that we are 
lucky enough to have you here. I wish you all 
the best in the name of WEU. That is why I 
allowed you a couple more minutes to make 
your speech. 
(Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
(Translation).- I call Mr. Linde. 
Mr. LINDE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, as a newcomer 
to this esteemed Assembly it is a great honour 
for me to speak after Mr. Grieve, who has just 
made his farewell speech. I hope you will 
bear with me if I differ from the previous 
speaker not only in the fact that I am speaking 
here for the first time but also in my assessment 
of Mr. Wilkinson's report. Naturally, I endorse 
the thanks, already expressed, for the work of 
the Rapporteur and the committee itself. I 
also believe that this report provides a good 
foundation for further efforts. After all, the 
subject is central to the purpose of Western 
European Union and, properly handled, can 
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help to enhance the activities and the signifi-
cance of WEU in the areas of defence, security 
and peace policy. . 
Nevertheless - and please give me your close 
attention here -I feel that the draft recommen-
dation is not yet ready for adoption, as impor-
tant questions which have lately gained in poli-
tical significance have not been included. If 
we are to agree here to a recommendation on 
"burden-sharing in the alliance", then all 
members of this Assembly should, if possible, 
be given a chance to support the recommenda-
tion and the report. This would greatly enhance 
the effectiveness of the report. 
Properly handled, the subject should be 
considered not merely in relation to defence 
burdens within the alliance but in the wider 
context of its defensive function, security and 
the maintenance of peace in the world. I 
therefore give notice now that, before a decision 
on the draft recommendation is taken here, a 
motion will be tabled to the effect that the 
draft recommendation and the report should be 
referred back to committee so that certain 
points which I shall now mention may be 
included in the discussion. 
There are a number of objections to the 
report, quite apart from its highly quantitative 
approach, which I should like to see accom-
panied by a qualitative analysis of the defence 
situation in the Western European sector of the 
alliance. I also note a failure to make distinc-
tions between the various national positions, as 
for instance whether countries have compulsory 
military service or not. Looked at from the 
standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
this report should also take account of the spe-
cial constitutional position in an internally 
divided country, especially as regards action 
outside the NATO area proper. 
I could also wish that greater emphasis had 
been laid on the European defence contribution 
as compared with the burdens borne by the 
United States of America, which seem to me to 
be described here more fully than the European 
contribution. Finally, the point should be 
made that a report on defence burdens must be 
incomplete if it does not also address itself to 
the question of disarmament, since, according 
to the Harmel report and the current NATO 
doctrine, security is guaranteed by defence and 
detente by disarmament. However, they con-
stitute an indivisible entity, and this essential 
unity should therefore also find expression in 
the report. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me turn my atten-
tion briefly to three specific points. Para-
graph A.1 (a) of the draft recommendation pro-
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per states quite dogmatically: " increase in 
defence expenditure ... as long as the Soviet 
military build-up continues". I take it that 
this should be read in conjunction with para-
graph 3, which curtly restates the terms of the 
NATO twofold decision. As of now - early 
June 1983 - nobody can predict whether it 
may not yet be possible, on the basis of the 
NATO decision of December 1979, to bring 
about the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's 
intermediate-range missiles and thereby avoid 
an arms build-up in the West. But it is just 
because no verdict can be pronounced at this 
time that reference must be made to the possi-
bility here. It would well become Western 
European Union to encourage both parties to 
the negotiations to do their utmost to reach a 
successful outcome and to avoid an arms 
build-up. 
I think we should try to dispel any impres-
sion that a different interpretation is now being 
placed on the NATO twofold decision, in that 
the West might be moving closer to an arms 
build-up simply with the passage of time. As 
I understand the NATO twofold decision, cru-
cial factors are: substantial negotiating offers 
and equality of security, with the additional 
object of removing the threat of the SS-20s. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would 
remind Mr. Linde that it was decided yesterday 
that speaking time would be limited to five 
minutes during this part-session. I would 
therefore ask him to conclude. 
Mr. LINDE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Then please allow me to sum-
marise briefly. 
We think a great deal of time has been 
wasted. On the subject of disarmament, this 
report is incomplete unless it says something 
about the current general discussion of an arms 
freeze. This should be included as a matter of 
urgency. 
My second point is that it is crucial to ensure 
that the subject of the use of NATO troops out-
side their own territory arises only on condition 
that vital interests are at stake. Clearer and 
more explicit premises need to be defined here 
to avoid any risk of automatic horizontal esca-
lation. These material conditions would have 
to be satisfied. 
My third and final point is this: any discus-
sion of the defence of Western Europe in rela-
tion to trouble spots throughout the world is 
incomplete unless it brings home the point that 
genuine freedom from dependence on blocs is 
of the utmost importance to international stabi-
lity. Concern for that freedom, if it is to be 
achieved, takes precedence over the kind of 
defence plans emphasised in this report. A 
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reference to ensuring freedom from dependence 
on blocs should be added to the report. 
To sum up: I proposed reference back to 
committee in preference to a controversial vote. 
Then there is, firstly, the question of our 
attitude to the Geneva negotiations; secondly, 
definition of the procedure to be followed in 
the event of an external crisis; and, thirdly, 
emphasis on freedom from dependence on 
blocs. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Linde, for your understanding. I 
would ask the remaining speakers to follow his 
example. The discussion with General Rogers 
was a long one, and we must keep strictly to 
the speaking time that has been fixed. 
I call Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, like Mr. Grieve 
I should like to take the liberty of referring 
quite briefly to what General Rogers said. 
Unfortunately, and I take it that the lack of 
time was chiefly to blame, he failed to answer 
my last question, which I have before me in the 
official report. Politically speaking it seems to 
me to be a central issue. The wording was: 
"We suspect, indeed fear, that the United 
States might force us to deploy these weapons 
against the growing opposition of the peoples of 
Europe and against the will of the majority in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. I should 
like to have your opinion on this, as military 
commander". No answer was forthcoming, 
and I should like to state here why this 
issue is central to the discussion. 
If, as General Rogers said, the purpose of 
NATO is to secure peace with freedom, it 
would be a perversion of this objective to 
deploy a weapons system for the defence of 
freedom against the will of the majority. The 
end would be traduced by the very means used 
to achieve it. That is why it seems to me so 
important to have answers to questions of this 
kind in future. 
As far as the rules of procedure are con-
cerned, I am in agreement with Mr. Linde, so I 
will be brief. Another motive for brevity is 
that I would like to take a little more time 
tomorrow over the subject of the problems of 
pacifism and neutralism on the simple grounds 
of fairness. As there are not so terribly many 
people in this Assembly who share my point of 
view it would be fair to allow more than a mere 
five minutes to expound a philosophy which 
differs from the prevalent one in this Assem-
bly. I would therefore prefer not to use up all 
my time now and would ask for adequate time 
to speak tomorrow. Thank you. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
important thing about a debate is not the length 
of statements but the arguments advanced and 
their validity. It is the same whether one or 
more members express their views. The mem-
bers of this Assembly are sufficiently attentive 
to understand the validity of the arguments put 
forward. We must abide by the rules of proce-
dure which we have adopted. 
Thank you for your understanding. 
I call Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, I am glad to be on my feet in 
view of the wretched seating, which you know 
about. 
I should like to make a few brief comments 
on the Wilkinson report. I have not been clo-
sely involved in the debate within the commit-
tee, but on 14th February I did mention to 
Mr. Wilkinson that he should take heed of a 
passage from an address by the President of the 
World Bank to the United Nations in Decem-
ber. The President drew attention to the 
"absurd relationship between the expenditure 
on all kinds of military projects and the ease 
with which such expenditure was sanctioned 
when compared with so many other vital 
issues". 
As you know, our Assembly was based on 
collaboration in three spheres: social, economic 
and cultural. These areas of collaboration 
were transferred to the Council of Europe in 
the belief that economic issues, especially, 
would be effectively handled by the Council. 
That is why little attention has been paid to 
this area, which probably explains the absence 
of a clear and straightforward economic section 
in the Wilkinson report. I refer to a kind of 
political economics covering all aspects of 
armaments. This may possibly have been 
thought unnecessary, now that economic 
matters have been passed over to the Council of 
Europe. I regret that. 
Every national budget raises questions as to 
the allocation of resources: shall we, and can 
we, increase or reduce expenditure? Where is 
the money to come from, and which other 
worthy causes will suffer? I am glad that during 
the discussion with General Rogers just now, 
someone said that peace was not simply some-
thing that could be maintained by the interest 
and resources of the military. Peace also has 
to be supported in innumerable other quarters 
of society in order to create a peaceful commu-
nity correspondingly less in need of military 
support. 
However, this report is redolent of a kind of 
militaristic attitude which, in my opinion, 
conflicts with the spirit of the WEU treaty. 
The WEU treaty brought the former axis 
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powers into the union, which precluded any 
harmful militarism on their part. Nevertheless 
we must be on our guard against other kinds of 
militarism which might threaten us. The tech-
nocratic militarism implicit in the Wilkinson 
report is incompatible with the spirit of the 
treaty. 
I would further draw attention to national 
economic circumstances, to the question of 
public opinion, which must become more 
aware of what is happening in WEU, and to the 
inevitable cost increases - that is to say, the 
familiar 4 o/o from Brussels. I feel we should 
take another look at the three areas of econo-
mic, cultural and social collaboration which we 
handed over to the Council of Europe - I refer 
mainly to the way in which these questions are 
being handled. In considering the twenty-
ninth report - WEU will then have been in 
existence for thirty years - we should assess and 
evaluate the consequences of having handed 
over responsibility for these matters. This will 
enable us to refer explicitly to these issues in 
our deliberations. There is no compelling 
reason why military should mean militaristic, 
something divorced from many other issues. 
This area must be reintegrated with the other 
vital questions necessarily involved in the 
achievement and maintenance of peace. 
Equally important is the elimination of any 
threat to peace. I shall table a formal motion 
by way of a resolution calling attention to this 
topic for the twenty-ninth report. 
I find it highly regrettable that the above 
issues were not automatically included in the 
Wilkinson report. I am also sorry that the 
reference to the statement by the President of 
the World Bank was not properly understood. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
must admit that I agree with a great deal of 
what Mr. Tummers said. 
This report is undoubtedly very interesting 
and very complete. But, as I said at the 
meeting in Pisa, the North Atlantic Assembly 
would have been a more appropriate place for 
it than the Assembly of WEU. I appreciate, of 
course, that, since the Pisa meeting, Mr. Wil-
kinson and the secretariat have made a great 
effort to add a number of paragraphs and to 
modify certain others. Nonetheless, I do not 
feel that a proper balance has yet been struck. 
Mr. Tummers referred to the militaristic tone 
of this report. It is something which I too 
regret. 
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Furthermore, having been unable to attend 
the meeting in Brussels owing, as you know, 
Mr. President, to a prior engagement - I was 
attending a meeting of the Steering Committee 
on Migration in Strasbourg on the Assembly's 
behalf the same day and obviously could not be 
in Brussels and Strasbourg at the same time - I 
was surprised to find that paragraph 7 .2, 
which concerns Belgium, had not aroused any 
comment. 
Mr. Wilkinson, the Belgian forces do not 
consist solely of conscripts. The operational 
units include 50 %, sometimes as many as 70 o/o 
or 80 %, volunteers, even if they are " short-
term " volunteers. I mention this for what it is 
worth, but I hope that references to my country 
will be accurate in future. 
When, moreover, you say that there is some 
doubt about continued Belgian participation in 
the vital Hawk SAM screen, you are right and 
you are not right in that, according to a recent 
statement by the Belgian Minister for National 
Defence - who does not have my political sup-
port since I am a member of the opposition -
Belgium is going to dismantle certain Nike 
units and is considering the replacement of the 
Hawk network, possibly with the Patriote 
system. This is also an important point if you 
want to get a full picture of the situation. 
Another criticism that can be made of this 
report, following on from what I have just said, 
is that, if we Europeans agree to organise the 
defence of Europe simply because the United 
States of America has taken it upon itself to 
play the role of world policeman, we are vir-
tually endorsing, in our view, what the Ameri-
cans have done in the recent past in Santo 
Domingo and Vietnam, what they may now be 
doing in Nicaragua and El Salvador and, let us 
not forget, what they did in Chile almost ten 
years ago. 
If we are going to talk about the world role 
played by the United States of America, I feel 
something should be said about its own global 
concept of its role. It is not for us to assign 
this vocation to the United States of America or 
to recognise it. 
In the same context, when I hear all these 
little phrases, all these asides about the possible 
consequences of events outside the NATO area 
and the commitment to deploy forces outside 
this area, I cannot help thinking of Williams-
burg and the idea toyed with there - which 
aroused some resentment in this Assembly not 
so long ago - of extending the NATO area 
beyond its present limits. 
Think back, Ladies and Gentlemen, to a 
debate we had on South Africa and the 
Southern Atlantic. And now we are supposed 
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to look to the Far East. Is it for us to become 
involved in such schemes ? 
It is for the British or French naval forces to 
decide, at their sole discretion, whether they 
should defend, as Mr. Cheysson said, vital 
interests of their countries which may lie 
outside their respective territories. It is for 
them to take this decision. But must we follow 
them down the same road? That, I think, 
would be extremely dangerous. Frankly, it is 
not my concept of defence. 
The more so as we shall be starting the 
debate on the law of the sea tomorrow. I 
know that Belgium is very interested in the sea, 
by virtue of the interests of such hyper-
capitalist companies as Union Miniere and 
Societe Generale, but I say that the interests of 
these companies are not the interests of the 
people and the working class in Belgium. Let 
there be no mistake about that either. There 
should be no question of a commitment to 
operations outside the NATO area to safeguard 
the privileges of private and capitalist compa-
nies which do not do their duty by the 
taxpayers of the country to which they claim 
allegiance. That is a point to be remembered. 
General Rogers has now come up with a 
figure of 4 %, instead of 3 %, but I find that in 
the final version of the report Mr. Wilkinson 
and the committee have deleted " 3 % " while 
continuing to refer to an increase in defence 
spending in real terms. 
Let us therefore be realistic, as another 
speaker has said. In Belgium with its right-
wing government, which I would say is neo-
Thatcherite and a very firm supporter of the 
Atlantic Alliance, defence spending in 1983 
underwent negative growth, declining by 2.4% 
in real terms. 
If this is the situation with so firm a 
supporter of the Atlantic Alliance as the 
present Belgian Government, what would it be 
like for a government which took a different 
view of the economic and social problems we 
face in our countries today ? 
I should also like Mr. Wilkinson to go into 
greater detail in his study or to tell us what he 
really thinks of the two-way street. I seem to 
remember that an appendix to the report says 
that the European member countries of the 
alliance will soon have used thirty American 
systems, whereas the Americans, in their gener-
osity, have accepted five European systems. 
Is that a two-way street? Is that what is meant 
by co-operation between the United States and 
ourselves in this area ? 
I do not agree to the reference in paragraph 
A.3 to "vigorous united support" for the 
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United States' efforts in Geneva. What is at 
stake is the future of Europe, which does not 
have a say in the negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on INF. It 
would be preferable to look at the problems 
from the other angle and perhaps to talk about 
the concern felt by the public and the pressure 
that must be exerted if \he discussions in 
Geneva are to be brought to a successful 
conclusion. It was Mr. Helmut Schmidt who, 
in an interview with the Washington Post, cast 
doubt on the willingness of the United States to 
join in genuine negotiations and to reach an 
agreement in Geneva. 
I shall end with a quotation with which you 
are familiar, Mr. President, because we both 
applauded it. Mr. Pertini, the President of the 
Italian Republic, said in Strasbourg on 
27th April: "Today, Gentlemen, peace is 
based on the balance of nuclear forces of two 
superpowers, but it is absurd to speak of peace 
over which the threat of a nuclear catastrophe 
hangs." 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). -
Mr. Wilkinson's report is both very interesting 
and very disappointing. In view of the many 
criticisms that have been voiced, it would 
therefore be wise, in my opinion, to refer it 
back to the committee. 
Why is it disappointing? Because it does 
not place sufficient emphasis on WEU's essen-
tial role. We are not at the Conference of 
NATO Parliamentarians, which will be taking 
place in Copenhagen in eight days' time, but in 
the only organisation which discusses European 
defence. And I wonder what mysterious pro-
cess has resulted in WEU having so many 
scruples and being so modest about asserting its 
defence role. Could this be due to the original 
sin of its creation or to the fact that some of its 
members will accept it only if it is weak, 
defenceless and without resources ? That is a 
question that might be asked. 
We for our part take the opposite view that, 
in addition to the marked imbalance between 
East and West, there is the equally marked 
imbalance within the western camp itself. In 
other words, thirty years after the establishment 
of this alliance, which is needed and must on 
no account be dismantled, it would be 
unnatural for a desperate effort not to be made, 
right here, to strengthen the European pillar so 
that the defence of Europe may be assured with 
Europeans who are willing to defend 
themselves. 
This is the problem with WEU. Western 
European Union includes, on the one hand, old 
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nations with a sense of their history, a national 
vocation, the will to defend themselves and, on 
the other, a number of small nations that 
willingly accept the protection of a remote 
country, which allows them to make no effort 
themselves. 
How long will this unbalanced system conti-
nue? At all events, it seems to me that it 
should be brought to an end as quickly as 
possible either by revitalising WEU - as succes-
sive French Governments have demanded here 
regardless of the expense involved - or by 
changing the relations between certain member 
countries of WEU. I am increasingly in favour 
of a Franco-German understanding on military 
matters that leads to agreements on planning, 
the merging of general staffs, the pursuit of 
clearly defined objectives, so that the national 
sanctuary may become a European sanctuary. 
What European statesman will have the 
courage to say that the integrity of the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is 
as important as that of his own country ? But 
it is a fact. What European statesman will 
dare to state publicly in his country that any 
aggression against German territory will be 
regarded as aggression against the whole of the 
European alliance and his own country ? Who 
will it be ? I look, I listen, I hear no one. 
I believe this is the direction we must 
take. Such a Franco-German military agree-
ment is the cornerstone of security in Europe. 
We must all give it our support, particularly 
the British, for there are three major military 
countries in Europe: France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Europe's security is largely ensured by France's 
independent nuclear force, the German army of 
infantrymen - I ,200,000 strong - the British 
fleet and, to a great extent, its nuclear force, 
which is not independent. Everything else 
plays a subordinate role. How much longer 
will it be before these three elements combine 
to provide our continent with the guarantee it 
needs ? That is the real question in our debate 
on Mr. Wilkinson's report. It concerns the 
future of WEU. 
We must give the matter some very serious 
thought. At all events, people in France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom are increasingly thinking along these 
lines. 
Of course, whatever the course adopted, there 
is absolutely no question of disturbing Europe's 
security system, which is based on respect for 
the frontiers drawn in 1945 and non-access for 
German forces to nuclear weapons. Let there 
be no mistake about that. It does not mean 
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that France will share nuclear weapons with the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It means that 
the nuclear and conventional forces of France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and probably 
the United Kingdom, if the British could stop 
dreaming of their special relationship with the 
United States of America and become rather 
more European, should be combined. We 
shall then have a defence base that is far more 
effective than the present WEU system. 
These are the reasons, Mr. President, why I 
personally request that this report be referred 
back to the committee, because I feel that, if 
the Assembly approved it in its present form, it 
would do so without enthusiasm. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. de V ries. 
Mr. de VRIES (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I greatly appreciate the opportu-
nity of speaking in this Assembly today for the 
first time on so important a subject. I have 
had to overcome some hesitation, after hearing 
my colleague Mr. Baumel explain that only 
three countries are actually important to the 
defence of Europe. I take the liberty of disso-
ciating myself to some extent from this view. 
Of course, France is not an unimportant 
country, neither is Germany and neither, again, 
is Great Britain, but there are a number of 
other countries in Europe which are not 
unimportant. I do not believe that the way 
ahead for us entails a few European countries 
inflating themselves to proportions which have 
more to do with the past than the future. I 
believe that we in Europe must try to find a 
collective answer to the problems of security 
and neither I nor many others in Europe would 
like to see any one of the three countries 
mentioned in a dominant role. 
Mr. President, at one of the WEU committee 
meetings I had an opportunity to give my 
opinion on the report before us. I complimen-
ted the Rapporteur on the abundance of detail 
in the report. Nevertheless, I have one funda-
mental criticism, which dovetails with previous 
remarks by fellow delegates. This report gives 
a very one-sided analysis of burden-sharing and 
at the same time broaches subjects which have 
very li~tle to do with burden-sharing. 
When we talk about burden-sharing, we 
generally mean the relationship between the 
United States and Europe, but this relationship 
does not imply identical security situations. 
The security interests of the United States are 
different from our own, and we must realise 
this. If this were not so, this Assembly and 
Western European Union should be disbanded 
forthwith. There are great differences, and 
these are not related to the problem of burden-
sharing. Burden-sharing - as the report itself 
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shows - is a theoretical problem. If we look at 
the figures, it is obvious - irrespective of the 
criterion applied - that the Europeans are 
making an extremely significant contribution to 
the defence of the alliance. The point at issue 
is the foreign policy pursued by Europe in 
general and the foreign policy advocated in the 
United States, as well as the military policy 
pursued on the two continents. 
Talking about foreign policy and thinking 
about the future, let me observe at once that if 
before long the United States should feel 
obliged to elect for military intervention in 
Central America, this would not be understood 
by most Europeans and many would be 
provoked to strong opposition. 
As far as military policy is concerned, we 
have had the pleasure this afternoon of listening 
to General Rogers, whom I greatly admire; I am 
happy to say so publicly. I must, however, 
point out that his argument in favour of a 
flexible response is one which can only dismay 
us Europeans. We cannot live with that 
quantity of nuclear weapons and that strategy. 
What is the Rapporteur now asking of us in 
his recommendation? Support for the Ameri-
cans in Geneva. It may well have to come to 
that, but where will this support lead? To a 
new treaty which will not be ratified? To 
negotiations begun two years too late and with 
no time to reach fruition ? Must it lead to 
negotiations which are artificially divorced from 
each other? 
I would remind you that a joint resolution by 
the United States Congress also states that the 
two rounds of negotiations must be combined if 
a solution is to be reached. Must it - and this 
is a question which concerns us Europeans -
lead to negotiations which are unrealistic as 
regards European nuclear weapons ? 
Paragraph 8.16 of the report contains a 
reference to the fact that in Europe it has 
always been recogni~ed, as it is by the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments, that 
any attempt to measure "nuclear balance 
between East and West can only be done 
globally, taking account of all categories of 
nuclear weapons on both sides". That means 
that negotiations about INF are artificial unless 
they are related to the total quantity of nuclear 
weapons - not only the American ones, but 
also those of our friends, France and England. 
Mr. President, I know you would like me to 
conclude my comments. I shall do so forth-
with, though not without observing that the 
draft resolution calls upon the Turkish Parlia-
ment to send delegates to our committee as 
observers. I find this an offensive proposal. I 
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am strongly opposed to it and I consider that as 
no amendment will suffice to rectify it, the 
proposal should be rejected immediately. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Jager. 
Mr. JAGER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, may I first of all say a word of 
thanks to the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, for 
his excellent, comprehensive and - in my 
opinion - balanced report, which presents an 
accurate picture of the subject under discus-
sion. I should like to endorse what has been 
said by Mr. Grieve. It is a great sacrifice for a 
parliamentarian to come here on the eve of his 
country's elections, and I wish to express my 
very personal thanks to him for doing so. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the report points out 
the danger implicit in isolationism in the 
United States, a danger which has always been 
present in a latent state and which could 
increase unless the Europeans show sufficient 
appreciation of the American contribution to 
our joint security. The report is right in saying 
that appreciation of this contribution is incum-
bent on us. The reception given to General 
Rogers in this Assembly, partly as an American 
officer, has no doubt served to give some 
practical expression to this appreciation, and 
that is a cause of satisfaction to me. However, 
we must also speak out clearly on the subject of 
the growing anti-American propaganda which 
is gaining ground in most of the countries of 
Western Europe, including the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, and which is quite plainly 
under communist control from Moscow. It is 
a regrettable fact that the pacifist trends which 
call themselves peace movements have not so 
far found the courage and strength to dissociate 
themselves with sufficient forthrightness from 
this communist-inspired anti-American propa-
ganda. This point has not yet been grasped by 
many of our fellow citizens or by many politi-
cians, or even by many of our fellow parlia-
mentarians. I should therefore like to take this 
opportunity of placing on record my thanks to 
the Congress and Government of the United 
States for its protection and for guaranteeing 
the security of Europe. 
On 17th June this year, that is to say in a few 
days' time, it will be the thirtieth anniversary of 
the crushing of the popular rising in central 
Germany. On that occasion, thirty years ago, 
the Soviet army suppressed the German 
people's desire for freedom with unprecedented 
brutality. Since then we have all known what 
fate would be in store for us in the free part of 
Germany and Europe if we should be deprived 
of the protection and guarantee of security of 
our allies, and of our American allies in parti-
cular. It follows that this security, these gua-
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Jiiger (continued) 
rantees and this protection must be maintai-
ned. In this respect Mr. Wilkinson's report 
makes, in my opinion, a specially important 
contribution to our joint deliberations on 
burden-sharing in Europe. 
There is just one minor critical comment I 
should like to add. We are aware, Mr. Wilkin-
son, that developments may occur in the world 
which confront us with problems beyond the 
frontiers of the alliance. I refer here to para-
graph 2(a) of section A of the draft recommen-
dation proper. This causes us some concern. 
You all know that it is particularly difficult 
for us Germans to commit ourselves to the far-
reaching implications of this demand. It is our 
view that what is needed first of all is a 
consistent joint allied strategy which takes 
account of likely future developments and 
ensures that the military measures which would 
have to be taken in such cases would also be 
weighed against the security interests of the 
territory of the alliance. Not until a joint 
strategy of this kind has been agreed could we 
endorse the far-reaching recommendation made 
in paragraph 2(a). 
I would also like to make it very clear that 
we are grateful to the Rapporteur for having 
addressed and considered this problem, even 
though we may be unable to go along with him 
on each individual point. 
May I say in conclusion, Ladies and Gentle-
men, that I cannot share the opinion of those 
who wish to refer the report back to the 
committee. In spite of a few difficulties I think 
it is a good report and I recommend that it be 
accepted in its totality. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I should 
like to begin by thanking Mr. Wilkinson for the 
contribution he has made to this very important 
debate and particularly for his efforts to take 
account of the opinions that have been expres-
sed, sometimes presenting both sides of the 
argument in a way that has probably been 
beneficial. 
I' say " probably " because, of course, every-
one has his own way of seeing things, and I 
·have the good fortune to have my own. The 
way in which each of us views this report 
depends on his basic outlook. 
Allow me to quote a very simple sentence we 
heard in Brussels a fortnight ago at the joint 
meeting with the Council, when Mr. Tinde-
mans, speaking on these matters, said: " There 
is the defence of Europe and there is European 
defence. " Everything depends on how we 
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look at things. He had his opinion, and each 
of us has his. 
In fact, this draft recommendation is strictly 
·in keeping with one concept of the defence of 
Europe, within the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance, but it does not answer the basic 
question that some people ask: European 
defence itself, within the framework of NATO, 
of course. 
I shall confine myself to two observations, 
Mr. President, in order to keep to the time I 
am allowed. 
The first concerns paragraph A.2 of the 
recommendation, to which Mr. Jager referred in 
his typical way of looking at things, with which 
I for my part do not agree. 
Events outside the NATO area are, of course, 
covered by the NATO treaty. The explanatory 
memorandum explains at length how these 
matters should be handled in accordance with 
the provisions of the treaty. But as we see it, it 
is not the allies but the members of Western 
European Union who are concerned here. I 
would fully agree to these questions being 
discussed at the level of the Atlantic Alliance, 
but we sit here by virtue of a treaty, and once 
again I shall refer to our treaty, our protocol, 
and ask you to look at paragraph 3 of Article 
VIII, which says that the Council - and this is 
the Council of WEU - shall be convened and 
must consult with regard to any situation which 
may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever 
area this threat should arise, or a danger -to 
economic stability. 
Is that not, Ladies and Gentlemen, a basic 
point of reference that allows us to determine, 
at procedural level and on the basis of the 
treaties, the equal commitment of each member 
country of Western European Union? There 
is absolutely no need to resort to the contor-
tions of attempting to distinguish the allies who 
are affected from those who are not, joint action 
from individual action, thinking now of France, 
then of the United Kingdom and later, as the 
draft resolution does, of Portugal or other 
countries which are not, for the moment, 
members of Western European Union, because 
that is the subject that interests us. 
Mr. Jager referred to sub-paragraph (a) of 
paragraph A.2. As a Frenchman, I must refer 
to sub-paragraph (b). But that would take us 
outside the confines of this debate. 
The draft resolution meets our request to Mr. 
Wilkinson in Brussels in that it seeks to 
strengthen the European pillar. That is very 
good, Mr. Wilkinson, but here again, we should 
emphasise the need to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through agree-
ment among all the European allies. But what 
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of the mandate to be given to W estem Euro-
pean Union? It would be a pity if we did not 
put our house in order before calling on others 
to join us. We speak only of NATO, of the 
allies. But what are we going to do about 
W estem European Union, the Council of 
WEU, the Council of Ministers which was 
not even convened at the time of the Falklands 
crisis ? This is the question that interests us, 
committed as we are to European defence and 
to European union, and respecting the promises 
we have made. 
But Mr. Wilkinson knows all this. I am 
repeating myself, but I shall not be the one who 
brings the proceedings of this Assembly to a 
standstill. We must make progress. When I 
see the work that has been done by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, our Rapporteur's efforts, the progress 
that has been made, I am convinced that we 
shall go further. That is why I shall back the 
Rapporteur to encourage him to go further 
down the road which, I believe, is the right one 
for us. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - There are 
no more speakers listed. 
I wish to inform the Assembly that I have 
received a motion from Mr. Stoffelen request-
ing that this report be referred back to the 
committee. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- On a 
point of order, Mr. President. Do I not have 
the right of reply to the speakers in the debate 
before we vote on the reference back to the 
committee? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -My inter-
pretation of Rule 32(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, this being a question of procedure, 
is that this motion takes precedence since it 
seeks to suspend the debate. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. I tried to say 
that I intended formally to move the reference 
back after the debate and before the vote. I 
meant it to be after the reply by Mr. Wilkin-
son, which I would be very happy to hear first. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Stoffe-
len, if you prefer to present your motion after 
Mr. Wilkinson has replied to the speakers, I 
can agree. 
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speeches made by my friends and colleagues in 
a debate that will be critical for the future of 
our Assembly. 
First, I cannot adequately repay the generous 
tribute paid to me by Percy Grieve, but I share 
all his views about the excellence of the speech 
by SACEUR. It was particularly fortuitous 
that this debate should have coincided with his 
visit. 
I am glad that Percy Grieve referred to 
paragraph 9. 7 of the report, in which I said that 
the French and United Kingdom nuclear forces 
should not be negotiable in SALT. I am glad 
also that he welcomed the proposition that 
representatives of Turkey be observers at the 
sitting of our Defence Committee, because 
Turkey is especially important for security and 
for Europe. 
Mr. Linde made an impressive and fluent 
maiden speech and I thank him for his 
generous remarks about me. I am pleased that 
he hopes that the work of WEU will grow in 
importance and significance, but I must take 
exception to his suggestion that this report 
should be thrown back to the committee. I 
shall talk about that later, when Mr. Stoffelen 
moves his motion. 
Conscription in the Federal Republic of 
Germany is mentioned in paragraph 
3.4. Throughout the report I was particularly 
aware of the special circumstances of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, both over con-
scription and because it has to have foreign 
troops stationed on its soil, with all the 
attendant social and infrastructural costs. 
As for there being no mention of the need for 
disarmament, I refer specifically in paragraph 
A.3 to the twin-track decision, the basis of 
which is that we seek mutual and balanced 
reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces 
- reductions which are acceptable to both 
sides. That will surely be a major step towards 
disarmament, if it comes off. 
Mr. Linde then spoke about intervention 
forces. The Bonn communique, to which I 
referred in the text, makes it clear that the allies 
jointly recognise that there can be issues that 
affect their vital interests out of area, but an 
ally can decide that he does not wish to partici-
pate or help. The communique is printed in 
full in paragraph 2. 7 and it is well worth 
referring to in this context. 
Mr. Vogt may have a different way of looking 
at things, and I shall not deal with his interven-
tion here. 
I call the Rapporteur. Mr. Tummers admitted that he did not take 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- I am an active part in the committee. It is a pity 
grateful, Mr. President, because I wanted the that he could not do so, but I do not believe 
courtesy of being able to answer the important that the report neglects the economic aspects of 
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defence: far from it. Nor is it in any way 
militaristic. It is based on the essential require-
ments for our security in terms of manpower, 
the common foreign policy of the alliance and 
the dispositions which the several member 
states make for their common defence. 
Mr. Dejardin was his usual flamboyant self 
and also accused the report of being militarist. 
He said that it should have been a North 
Atlantic Assembly report. I do not accept 
that. We had valuable contributions from 
Mr. Caro, Mr. Baumel and others, which 
greatly modified the content of the report, very 
much for the better. 
I am extremely glad that we had that modi-
fication and that earlier reference back in 
committee. 
Mr. Dejardin then spoke about the SAM 
belt. I have related in the report merely what I 
was told by SHAPE. If SHAPE is wrong, I am 
prepared to be corrected, but I stand by the 
advice that I was given. 
As for America being a world policeman with 
a global role, determining our strategy in 
Europe, that is 180 degrees wrong. The com-
mitment of the United States to NATO has 
always been recognised by it as its prime 
commitment outside the defence of its own 
sovereign territory on North American soil. 
Mr. Dejardin's somewhat intemperate 
remarks betrayed what Mr. Jager called the 
all-too-prevalent anti-Americanism which is 
increasingly poisoning our analysis of security 
and disarmament questions. I am always 
struck by the fact that there are many refugees 
trying to get into America but not very many 
trying to climb over the Berlin wall from West 
to East. 
Mr. Dejardin then spoke about the double-
track decision and was against paragraph 8.3 of 
the report. So be it: let us take it to a vote on 
a specific amendment, but that decision is 
fundamental to NATO's present strategy, as 
SACEUR himself so amply demonstrated. 
Mr. Baumel is a law unto himself. He is 
always immensely stimulating and I greatly 
admire his experience and the originality of his 
mind, but I do not believe that a Festung 
Frankreich based on a Franco-German axis 
with perhaps an English appendage is the way 
to ensure Europe's security. It is, as Mr. de 
Vries made clear, in a sense to downgrade the 
important contribution of the other members of 
the Atlantic Alliance here in Western Europe, 
not least the Dutch, but of course the threat 
could equally well be on the northern or 
southern flank. The Mediterranean zone is 
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just as crucial to France, perhaps, as the central 
zone itself. 
Mr. de Vries asked what was the purpose of 
backing the United States in Geneva. Well, 
really ! If we want the negotiations to succeed, 
as we do, and if we want a general and 
balanced and verifiable agreement before 
December, that is much more likely if the 
alliance gives our American friends the full 
support they deserve. 
I welcomed the generosity of Mr. Jager's 
remarks about the report and his warning about 
the dangers to us in Europe if isolationism in 
the United States became more prevalent. I 
accept what he said about the increasingly 
strident anti-American propaganda here and I 
am glad that he reminded us that 1983 is the 
thirtieth anniversary of the tragically suppressed 
uprising in East Berlin. 
As to paragraph 2(a) of the draft recom-
mendation about the facilitating of out-of-area 
operations by the allies, I understand the 
German view. However, in that sub-paragraph 
there is no question but that we are putting the 
defence of Europe first. That should be clearly 
understood. 
Mr. Caro was a most generous spirit as ever, 
and I welcome his constructive and valuable 
contributions both in committee and here this 
afternoon. It is not just a semantic issue 
whether we are talking about " defense de 
/'Europe " or " defimse europeenne ". There is 
a genuine distinction. Given that WEU as it 
now exists has a limited membership, and given 
that when we attempted to enlarge it previously 
we failed - for example, the Danes turned down 
an invitation to join - it is not realistic to go 
beyond the somewhat modest proposition that I 
have put today. 
As for consultation on out-of-area emergen-
cies that could affect our security, I suggested in 
the Defence Committee at the time of the 
Falklands war that the Council might meet by 
invoking Article VIII.3 of the treaty. That 
never happened, because presumably the 
governments, particularly the United Kingdom 
Government, did not wish it. The consulta-
tion process as envisaged under Article VIII.3 
of the Brussels Treaty is in essence in no 
way different from that in the NATO treaty, 
except that joint action only is limited in the 
NATO treaty, and paragraph 2.7 of the report 
refers to that important question. 
I very much hope that I have answered some 
of the points that were made. This has been a 
valuable and useful debate. If we were not 
now to proceed to a satisfactory conclusion 
- in my judgment, the passage of this report -
it would be a regrettable precedent for the 
Assembly. 
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Mr. Stoffelen to speak in support of his 
motion that the report be referred back to the 
committee. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - I rise as 
Chairman of the Socialist Group. On behalf of 
that group, and taking into account Rule 32(1), 
I request reference back to the committee. I 
do so because, as the debate has demonstrated, 
for various reasons socialists and many other 
colleagues have serious objections to the draft 
recommendation and resolution. In fact, they 
are so serious that we cannot accept them and 
we shall be obliged to vote against them. 
There is no doubt that the report, the draft 
recommendation and draft resolution are extre-
mely controversial. As examples I cite the 
following five passages from the draft recom-
mendation and draft resolution. The first is 
the recognition of deterrence made by the 
independent nuclear forces of France and the 
United Kingdom. Secondly, recommendation 
A.l (a) refers to " maintaining collectively the 
NATO target of a real increase in defence 
expenditure ". It takes into account the 
defence expenditure of the Soviets but not the 
alarming level of unemployment and the diffi-
cult economic situation in our own coun-
tries. Thirdly, in more than one part of the 
draft recommendation there is a positive atti-
tude to the developments and tasks of NATO 
and of member countries outside NATO. 
Fourthly, the report contains vigorous and 
united support for the United States on behalf 
of the alliance to secure satisfactory arms 
control agreements and, failing that, by the end 
of 1983 to proceed with the deployment of 
cruise and Pershing 11 missiles. 
Fifthly, a passage in the draft resolution calls 
on the parliament of Turkey to appoint 
observers to the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments to participate in the 
preparation of its forthcoming report on the 
state of European security. 
At the last meeting of the Presidential 
Committee we discussed the likelihood that at 
this session the composition of the Assembly 
would not reflect its normal composition 
because of the absence of most British and 
Italian members. During that meeting - the 
Rapporteur is well aware of this - most 
members came to the conclusion that it would 
be wrong if the Assembly as composed at this 
session took decisions on really controversial 
matters. We must face the fact that as a roll-
call vote will be needed, it is doubtful whether 
more than half the representatives are present. 
Secondly, I doubt whether anyone could 
predict the outcome of a vote in this Assem-
bly. If any member can ensure that such a 
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vote taken today will reflect the normal 
composition of the Assembly, I admire his 
genius. Thirdly, several aspects of the draft 
recommendation and draft resolution are so 
controversial that they require further discus-
sion in committee. 
For all those reasons, and bearing in mind 
Rule 32(1), I request reference back. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Blaauw, who wishes to oppose the motion. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - On behalf of 
the Liberal Group, I oppose the reference back, 
not because of the thoughts behind the Socialist 
Group's idea but because we must abide by the 
rules. It was decided in the Presidential 
Committee that we should continue with this 
session, and yesterday enough members were 
present to elect a new President. 
Many circumstances may mean that our 
Assembly is not fully attended. Next time, for 
example, there may be elections in two other 
countries or a flu epidemic. That is no reason 
to refer a report back to a committee. If 
members are against parts of a report or parts 
of a recommendation, they can table amend-
ments and seek to change them. But, accord-
ing to the rules, reference back means that a 
report must be rewritten. This report has 
already been accepted by the committee. It 
was debated in Pisa and Brussels, and it was 
accepted by fourteen votes to one, with two 
abstentions. 
It was entirely correct to produce the report. 
Some members may not agree with it, but 
that is a political consideration. That is why 
we are here. If it is felt that not enough 
members are present to vote, let us have a 
roll-call, but do not let us refer the report back 
to the committee. That means that we shall 
have to start again on a report that has already 
been adopted. I call on the Assembly not to 
refer back the report. Let us have a roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I have to inform you that, accord-
ing to the register of attendance, a quorum does 
not exist. 
But I should like to know if ten members of 
the Assembly wish to request a vote by roll-
call. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. I formally 
moved the reference back and, according to 
Rule 32, you invited a delegate to speak against 
it. I am curious to hear the Rapporteur's 
comments, but afterwards we should vote. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Mr. Stoffe-
len, you are being too hasty. I simply wanted 
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to clarify this point before giving the floor to 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- With 
his usual charm and courtesy, Pieter Stoffelen 
gave me notice that he intended to move the 
reference back. I shall take the argument in 
two stages. First, what would be the effect on 
the NATO commitment of the deployment of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces from Decem-
ber if we did not come to a conclusion on the 
report today ? The matter would still be 
hanging over us at the next session in Decem-
ber. That would be the worst time to debate 
the issue. The move is an attempt at political 
procrastination. If we approved the reference 
back, we should assist those who hope to prove 
that we do not have the resolve and will to 
carry through the twin-track decision of 
December 1979. 
The move is almost an insult to SACEUR 
himself, because much of his speech was geared 
to the report and its contents. It would be an 
insult to the Defence Committee, which consi-
dered the whole question at great length and 
with •immense care, trying to accommodate the 
views of all its members. I spoke in my speech 
of the consensus that I sought. 
Mr. Stoffelen talks about the United 
Kingdom Delegation being absent. Delegates 
who wanted to be are here. The leader of the 
British Delegation, Sir Frederic Bennett, wanted 
the report to be put through. He knew that I 
was coming here and was delighted that that 
should be so. The report has the implicit 
support of the Italian Delegation. The former 
Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, supported the report 
and wished it a fair wind in Brussels in May 
when he knew that the Italian election was to 
take place in June. 
Mr. Stoffelen referred to purely political 
matters, such as the annual increase in expendi-
ture in real terms, whether the issue should be 
included in the SALT talks, out-of-area deploy-
ment, the Bonn Declaration and whether 
Turkish members of parliament should sit on 
the Defence Committee as observers. Those 
political matters should be dealt with by 
amendment and not by a procrastination ploy. 
Of course we cannot predict the outcome of 
votes, but I have an idea that after 1Oth June 
when the votes are counted back home fewer 
socialists will be in the British Delegation. 
That might make it even harder for Mr. Stoffe-
len's view to prevail in December. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now vote on the motion tabled by Mr. 
Stoffelen. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands).- On a 
point of order, Mr. President, I am a little 
embarrassed by the information provided by 
Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Blaauw. Is there any 
information about the decision by the Presiden-
tial Committee on whether a controversial 
report should be voted upon? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. yan 
der Sanden, I can answer your question. It was 
decided to hold the part-session on the sche-
duled dates, but no specific decision was taken 
on this point. 
The procedure adopted by the committee and 
the inclusion of the report in the orders of the 
day are a clear indication of the desire that the 
report should be presented to the Assembly. 
We shall therefore now vote on the motion 
that the report be referred back to the 
committee. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands).- May we have 
a roll-call? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does this 
request have the support of ten members of the 
Assembly? ... 
It does not. 
I therefore put the motion tabled by 
Mr. Stoffelen to the vote, which will be taken 
by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The motion for reference back is agreed to. 
Document 94 7 will consequently be referred 
back to the committee. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 8th June, at 
10 a. m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. The law of the sea (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 946 and amend-
ments). 
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2. Analysis and evaluation of the action 
taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 
on the problems of nuclear weapons in 
Europe and 388 on the problems for 
European security arising from pacifism 
and neutralism (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments, Document 943). 
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Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6. 40 p.m.) 
FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 8th June 1983 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the minutes. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. The law of the sea (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommenda-
tion, Doe. 946 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lenzer (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Fourre, Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, Mrs. den 
Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Beix, Mr. Lenzer (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, Mr. Fourre, Mrs. den 
Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Fourre, Mr. Spies von 
Biillesheim, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, 
Mr. Fourre, Mr. Spies , von Biillesheim, Mr. Lenzer, 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, Mr. Beix, Mr. Lenzer. 
4. Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly 
Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear 
weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for Euro-
pean security arising from pacifism and neutralism 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 943). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Dejardin (Rapporteur), 
Lord Reay, Mr. Vogt, Mr. MUller, Mr. Enders, 
Mr. Dejardin (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman of 
the committee). 
5. Adjournment of the session. 
The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. De Poi, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accor-
dance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the substitutes attending this sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of representatives 
appended to the minutes of proceedings•. 
3. The law of the sea 
(Presentation of and debate on tire report of 
tire Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and 110te on the draft 
recommendation, Doe. 946 
and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for the presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on 
1. See page 29. 
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Questions on the law of the sea and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 946 and 
amendments. 
I call Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the commit-
tee, to present the report. 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, for the second time I have the 
honour of presenting a report on the law of the 
sea on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. I 
should like to begin by expressing my thanks 
for the help I received from the other members 
of the committee when drawing up this report. 
We discussed the subject matter very thoroughly 
several tim~s. My thanks also go to the 
committee's secretary, Mr. Huigens, for his 
valuable help. 
In this context, I must also mention the 
French expert, Admiral Labrousse, who 
addressed the committee and helped us to come 
to grips with this extremely difficult and 
complex subject matter. Almost unbeknown 
to the public, something that has major 
political implications has been going on over 
the last few years. Without the general public 
being aware of the fact, a new regime has been 
introduced to govern and redistribute a large 
part of the earth's surface. 
Perhaps the whole thing can be brought 
under three heads: firstly, the general political 
aspect; secondly, the defence aspect, which is 
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of particular interest to us here in the WEU 
Assembly, and lastly, the economic considera-
tions which have to be linked with some of the 
provisions. 
I will begin with a brief resume of the most 
important results of the third United Nations 
conference on the law of the sea. As regards 
the general international law of the sea, 
coastal states were granted the right to extend 
their coastal waters to twelve nautical miles 
from what is known as the base line. Of the 
one hundred and thirty-four coastal states, some 
seventy-six have so far taken advantage of this 
right in various ways. This coastal zone is 
extended by a contiguous zone, also of twelve 
nautical miles, where coastal states may apply 
their customs, fiscal, emigration and sanitary 
regulations. 
Over a hundred important straits, which may 
now be regarded as coastal waters as a result of 
the extension of the territorial sea limit, are 
now governed by an arrangement that is stra-
tegically very important, the right of transit 
passage. The archipelagoes, of which there are 
seven, mostly in the Pacific, are granted the 
right to draw limits round certain outer 
islands. In addition, and this is also especially 
important, an exclusive economic zone of up to 
two hundred nautical miles from the baseline is 
introduced. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I could, of course, 
now go on to detail the various provisions of 
the law of the sea at great length, which would 
undoubtedly be extremely boring. However, in 
the context of the report before you, I do not 
think this will be necessary. Of primary 
importance are what I would call the economic 
aspects: that is, the provisions governing deep-
sea mining. This is the widest-ranging regime 
to come out of the conference, governing 
access to natural resources on the seabed off the 
continental shelf bordering coastal states. This 
regime is based on United Nations Resolu-
tion 2749, adopted as long ago as 1970, when 
the General Assembly unanimously approved 
the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind in respect of natural marine resources. 
It is a concept which, of course, requires 
interpretation in international law and. is rela-
tively imprecise. This common heritage of 
mankind should also be exploited jointly by all 
the countries concerned, that is to say, on the 
one hand, the industrialised countries and, on 
the other, the developing countries, which are 
often the ones with the natural resources. 
During the conference, neither side was, of 
course, exclusively successful in gaining accep-
tance for its demands. One side had the 
industrial know-how and the necessary capital, 
113 
FOURTH SITTING 
the other had the natural resources, which 
meant an arrangement had to be found to 
provide the legal safeguards for co-operation. 
Agreement was finally reached on the "parallel 
system ", whereby mining licences are granted 
both to the enterprise of the seabed authority 
and to private and state entities. This system 
was first applied to the mining of manganese 
nodules, to which constant reference is made in 
the public debate. They consist of several 
different minerals: 25 % manganese, 1 % 
nickel, 1 % copper and 0.4 % cobalt. These 
important resources could be, if they are not at 
present, a significant future source of minerals. 
An international seabed authority was set up 
to determine policy on the exploitation of 
deep-sea natural resources anywhere in the 
world and to decide on the allocation of 
mining licences. This seabed authority has 
various organs: the Council, on which thirty-six 
states are represented, the Assembly, consisting 
of representatives of all the countries which 
have signed the convention, the secretariat and 
the joint seabed company called the enterprise. 
The first operation undertaken by the enter-
prise is to be financed by the member coun-
tries. Start-up costs are estimated at 
$1 ,200 million. As you see, a great deal of 
capital is involved. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not give you a 
breakdown of all the costs, which are really 
substantial. Discussion on these became quite 
heated from time to time. They also became 
heated over the idea of using provisions of the 
convention to force the industrialised countries 
to exploit deep-sea resources jointly with the 
developing countries and countries which have 
natural resources of their own, thus more 
or less enforcing access by the developing coun-
tries to technical know-how by compelling the 
industrialised countries to transfer technology 
to countries with natural resources. All this 
eventually gave rise to the difficulties we 
discussed during the last debate on this subject 
in the Assembly. 
From there I should like to go on to the 
present state of the discussions as we now see it, 
and as it entered into the deliberations of our 
committee. 
We had to interrupt our discussion of this 
subject in the WEU Assembly on 3rd Decem-
ber 1981 because of the international debate on 
the law of the sea convention and also because 
the United States had decided to replace the 
head of their delegation and to adopt a new 
posture on the law of the sea. In this Assem-
bly on 3rd December 1981 we adopted Recom-
mendation 377 on the implications of the law 
of the sea conference and produced a first 
report. Even then I pointed out that the results 
achieved, expecially in deep-sea mining arran-
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gements, leant strongly towards dirigism and 
protectionism. Nevertheless, member coun-
tries of WEU were of the opinion that a new 
international convention might establish the 
rule of law on the world oceans, which might 
forestall many difficulties in the future and 
would constitute a factor in maintaining 
peaceful and friendly relations between states. 
They were also aware of the importance of 
such a convention between western indus-
trialised countries and developing countries of 
the third world. 
The Council, in its reply of 20th April 1982 
to this recommendation, stated further as its 
opinion that a satisfactory regulation of deep-
seabed mining was strategically and econo-
mically of great importance, especially for the 
Western European industrialised countries, 
which were highly dependent on imports of raw 
materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. 
WEU member governments were therefore 
prepared to take part in a constructive manner 
in the forthcoming consultations and negotia-
tions to arrive at a system which would take 
into account the interests of all concerned. 
On 30th April 1982, the last day of the third 
United Nations law of the sea conference, the 
delegates of the participating countries then 
voted on the draft convention, all efforts to 
reach a consensus having failed. The conven-
tion was approved by one hundred and thirty 
votes to four, with seventeen abstentions. 
Now for some details of the voting pattern of 
the participants. Israel, Turkey, the United 
States and Venezuela opposed the convention. 
The Soviet Union and countries of the com-
munist bloc, Belgium, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom abstained. France and Japan 
voted in favour of the convention. Turkey and 
Venezuela voted against because they objected 
to provisions on the delimitation of marine 
and submarine areas between states with oppo-
site or adjacent coasts. Israel objected because 
the text gave recognition to the PLO. Albania 
and Ecuador did not participate in the voting. 
The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc coun-
tries abstained on 1Oth April 1982 because 
they did not agree to the first investors, or 
" pioneers ", as the terminology has it - that is 
the highly industrialised countries of America 
and Western Europe- having an advantage and 
·because they thought that the establishment 
of an equitable economic order, taking into 
account the interests of all countries, was not 
assured. 
The full conference met twice more in 
1982: in New York from 22nd to 24th Sep-
tember to act on the recommendations of the 
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drafting committee and for the last time 
in Kingston, Jamaica, from 6th to 1Oth Decem-
ber for government representatives to sign the 
draft convention. 
After the convention is signed, its ratification 
by sixty states will bring it into force twelve 
months after ratification by the sixtieth state. 
The United States of America and several WEU 
member countries did not sign the convention 
in Kingston on 1Oth December 1982 mainly 
because it contained a deep-seabed mining 
regime which they could not support. They 
did agree, however, that the convention on the 
law of the sea contained many positive provi-
sions consistent with their interests and in the 
interests of all those who are maritime powers 
and use the seas. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, this brief description 
alone will have shown you that the positions 
adopted during the voting on this convention 
sprang from a wide range of interests: political 
interests, interests arising specifically from the 
geographical position of the various countries, 
and also economic interests, with certain coun-
tries wanting to encourage free access guided by 
market economy principles without any form 
of compulsion and without the compulsory 
transfer of technology. There was therefore no 
question of block voting based on uniform 
motives and, as the debate continues, it must be 
remembered that a specific voting pattern 
developed according to the specific situation 
of individual countries. 
One thing must be made clear. All the 
experts were surprised to find how many coun-
tries supported the convention and what a large 
number signed it at the conference in Kingston. 
A majority of that size had not been expected. 
I should therefore perhaps say a few words 
about the distribution and motives of the signa-
tories at this closing conference in Montego Bay 
from 6th to lOth December 1982. Of one 
hundred and twenty world countries eighty-six 
signed. There were, however, a number of 
important countries among the non-signatories, 
including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Libya, 
Madagascar, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Vene-
zuela and Zai"re. As regards the eight small 
countries which did not come to the conference 
it can be assumed that their absence was caused 
b.y limited political infrastructure rather than 
lack of interest. 
Most of the third world countries which did 
not sign were motivated by particular reasons, 
not as a group. There was thus no common 
stance. I stress this once again because it is a 
very important point. All the eastern bloc 
countries signed the convention. Here again, 
they may have been motivated by political 
considerations, simply wanting to reinforce 
their policy towards the third world. 
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Of the western countries a majonty -
eighteen out of twenty-five - signed the conven-
tion, although most of these countries are small 
and have no direct interest in deep-seabed 
mining. Of the large countries potentially 
capable of deep-seabed mining operations - the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany -
France was the only one to sign. However, 
Japan expected to sign in early 1983. Of the 
other potential deep-seabed mining countries -
Belgium, Italy, Canada and the Netherlands -
Canada and the Netherlands signed. Italy and 
Belgium have not ruled out the possibility of 
signing in the fairly near future. 
The signatories therefore fall into the 
following categories: most countries with long 
coastlines have signed, most land-locked coun-
tries have signed and about half the great 
seafaring nations have signed. On the other 
hand, non-signatories such as the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, 
both members of WEU, were prompted less by 
shipping considerations than by the economic 
aspects of the provisions on deep-seabed 
mining. 
Most of the archipelagic countries and coun-
tries bordering on important straits have 
signed. Here again, there are, of course, major 
exceptions. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, to conclude, a few 
words about the draft recommendation and 
report proper. The report and the draft 
recommendation seek to reduce the likelihood 
of confrontation arising from the differences of 
interests that undoubtedly exist among the 
various countries. There is no point in 
denying this fact or trying to sweep it under the 
carpet: differences exist and that is that. I 
consider it more important to reduce confron-
tation and strengthen co-operation than to 
point an accusing finger and try to exert 
· pressure on certain countries to make them sign 
the convention. That would undoubtedly be 
counterproductive. 
Thirdly, it is important to seek practicable 
solutions. Although these solutions must be 
based on the political realities, they must also 
take account of the technical possibilities and 
the enormous amount of capital required for all 
the activities involved in the exploitation of 
deep-seabed resources. We must not introduce 
any compulsory measures. 
Despite occasional differences of opinion, the 
draft recommendation largely succeeds in 
reflecting this attitude. It proceeds from the 
assumption that this kind of international 
convention on the law of the sea has many 
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positive aspects, since it is a universally-
accepted agreement which more firmly estab-
lishes the rule of law. It also recognises that 
the regulation of deep-seabed mining is econo-
mically and also strategically of great impor-
tance for the countries of Western Euro-
pean Union. It is fully conscious that every 
country should have a share in these deep-sea 
mineral resources, and that no country should 
be excluded, for instance because it does not 
have the technical or financial capacity to take 
prompt practical action on its own behalf. But 
it also takes account of the shortcomings of the 
convention, particularly as regards its protec-
tionism and dirigism, and it regrets the diffe-
rences of opinion that still persist among the 
industrialised countries of the West. 
It concludes by recommending the Council to 
do everything in its power to achieve the 
following goals, which I will summarise once 
again: less confrontation, closer co-operation 
among the various countries concerned and, 
lastly, practicable solutions without coercion or 
dirigism. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, a number of amend-
ments have been tabled. I shall state my views 
on these amendments after they have been 
moved. I believe we shall be able to reach a 
consensus in the Assembly today. 
I submit this report and recommendation for 
your approval and thank you for your 
attention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Lenzer, for your excellent report. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Fourre. 
(Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assem-
bly, took the Chair) 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I 
first of all congratulate Mr. Lenzer on his 
efforts and on the full report which he has just 
presented. 
The draft recommendation which we have 
before us today contains "a request" addressed 
directly to the only two WEU member states-
the Netherlands and my own country, France -
which last December signed the international 
convention on the law of the sea. They are 
requested, and I quote here paragraph 2 of the 
recommendation " to devote their efforts in the 
preparatory commission to the introduction of 
rules and regulations to govern the seabed 
mining regime in an equitable manner ... " 
etc. I therefore feel called upon, as a French-
man, to tell you of my personal reactions to 
this " request " and to the r~port in general. 
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It is true, and on this point I am entirely in 
agreement with the draft recommendation, that 
in its present form the convention has short-
comings as regards the regulations governing 
deep-seabed mining. Here, I am thinking 
especially of the compulsory transfer of techno-
logy, of the financing of the future authority 
entrusted with the management of what it has 
been agreed to call the " common heritage of 
mankind " and of the indispensable surveillance 
systems needed for this work. 
Further problems could be added to the 
list. However, these deficiencies, however 
significant, should not conceal the considerable 
value of the legal instrument which is the 
outcome of the past nine years of negotiations. 
Whether this relates to defining the concept 
of territorial waters, to the creation of economic 
zones, to shipping passing through straits, to 
arrangements for islands and states which are 
archipelagoes or to regulations governing pollu-
tion and scientific research, the result is one of 
very great import, to which France has thought 
it fitting to give solemn recognition despite the 
extent of the problems that remain. 
It is therefore a cause of regret that the 
persistance of self-seeking nationalism during 
the negotiations has prevented the unanimous 
signature of a document whose importance had 
been unanimously recognised. It seems to me 
that the draft recommendation is not suffi-
ciently clear on this point. 
The United States has not signed the conven-
tion for the reasons stated in the report, 
which relate not only to the alleged unwork-
ability of the international seabed authority but 
also, and I think chiefly, to the damage which 
private mining interests would suffer. Yet the 
United States was one of the prime movers in 
the preparation of this convention. 
The most important point, however, is that 
of the WEU member states, Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg and Italy - five coun-
tries out of seven - did not in the end sign the 
convention. Are these countries not, then, 
aware of the immense impact which these rules 
could have on improving our relations with the 
developing countries? I think this unlikely. 
What then are we to conclude? 
In every European forum, concern is 
constantly being expressed about the 
inadequacy of the North-South dialogue. Why 
in that case, when it comes to making crucial 
decisions, do the states concerned withdraw to 
positions which cannot be justified in the 'long 
term? 
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By enshrining in law the concept of national 
sovereignty over territorial waters, the commer-
cial ownership of the resources of the economic 
zone and, above all, by establishing in legal and 
technical terms the principle that the immense 
deep-sea resources should be shared, the 
convention enables the developing countries to 
manage their own affairs more effectively and 
to take a more relaxed view of their relations 
with the developed countries. Why then 
deprive ourselves of what would amount to a 
big step forward in our commercial and poli-
tical relations with these countries and would 
furthermore certainly contribute to the main-
tenance of peace in the world? 
So those who did sign the convention are 
authorised to negotiate on behalf of those who 
did not agreements which might enable the 
latter to accede to the convention once the 
controversial points are considered to have been 
resolved. On this issue, France, for its part, 
intends to participate fully in the work of the 
preparatory commission and will do everything 
in its power to ensure that the efforts to solve 
the problems concerning the deep-seabed are 
successful. This was stated on 8th December 
1982 by Mr. Le Pensec, then Minister of 
Maritime Affairs, at the final session of the 
conference. 
But would it not be more constructive if the 
states which refused to sign, were to change 
their minds and accede to the convention, and 
so play an active role in the negotiations 
instead of waiting somewhat passively until 
they feel that they can sign? 
I can think of no better way of concluding 
than by quoting the remarks of Admiral 
Labrousse to the Scientific Committee on 15th 
February 1983: "I think there is every interest 
in the countries of Western European Union 
exploiting the wealth granted to them by 
the convention. They must also set up a 
surveillance system, a means of controlling 
these European economic zones so that the 
wealth may be better protected. I am convin-
ced there is now a possibility of greater 
European co-operation centred on this new 
wealth and these new economic interests and 
also capable of leading to further military co-
operation. " 
Perhaps you will also allow me to quote from 
the reply given by the Council to Recommen-
dation 377 in April 1982: the Council said 
that it was particularly aware of the advantages 
such a convention might have with respect to a 
better establishment of the rule of law on the 
world oceans... It could forestall in the future 
many difficulties and therefore constitute a 
factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly 
relations between states. The Council went on 
to say that "a satisfactory international regula-
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tion of deep-seabed mining is strategically and 
economically of great importance ... ". 
All these arguments should persuade the 
member countries of our Assembly to sign the 
convention so that they can work more effect-
ively in the preparatory commission and we 
can together raise the barriers which allow the 
United States, among others, to maintain a 
negative attitude, which, in the long term, is 
detrimental to the interests of our planet. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you Mr. Fourre. I was becoming concerned, 
and not before time, as you had used up the 
allotted time. 
I call Mr. Spies von Biillesheim. 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, so many coun-
tries have signed the convention that the non-
signatories rather find themselves in the 
dock. As you have already heard, five of the 
WEU member countries have not signed. Nor 
has the United States. Most of the countries 
that have not yet signed are major industrialised 
countries which are expected to make a very 
considerable contribution financially and other-
wise. 
I should like to take this opportunity to 
explain the position of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, to show you why it did not sign the 
convention and why it has no intention of 
signing it in its present form. We do not deny 
- on the contrary, we should like to stress - that 
the convention contains many positive provi-
sions, which we acknowledge: freedom of 
navigation, transit passage through straits, the 
provisions on marine pollution, the regulations 
governing coastal waters and the continental 
shelf, overflight, the laying of cables, fishing 
and the freedom of scientific marine research. 
We regard all this as positive, we endorse it and 
we help to finance it. There are no problems 
in these areas. 
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everyone, not because technology should not be 
passed on - it should be disseminated - but 
because technology can only develop through 
private initiative and investment, and private 
companies which have been successful in their 
developments must be able to profit by them, 
otherwise there will be no further development. 
The danger inherent in the provisions of the 
convention is that the results will fall short of 
our common wish, which is the exploitation of 
deep-sea mineral resources to the benefit of all 
mankind. For this, private initiative is 
required. 
We would also have constitutional problems 
in the Federal Republic of Germany if we 
agreed to an arrangement which required 
companies investing in deep-seabed mining to 
pass on the fruits of their labour free of charge. 
There would also be constitutional objections 
if the German Parliament was bypassed, which 
might be the case if an amendment was 
approved by a three-quarters majority and 
consequently had to be accepted by all the 
signatories. The only alternative would be to 
withdraw, which politically would be a very 
sensational thing to do. 
Mr. President, it has often been said -
Mr. Fourre has just broached the subject again 
- that the five WEU countries and the United 
States should at least sign and then work 
together on the convention, as France is 
doing. It is a point of view, but there are some 
very cogent arguments against it. I would 
point out in the first place that France also has 
considerable doubts about the deep-seabed 
mining regime. When signing the convention, 
France stated that modifications and improve-
ments would have to be made on this score. 
To this extent, therefore, the sixth country -
France - agrees with us that changes are 
needed. 
If there are such serious doubts, the question 
is whether it would be politically wise to sign 
now and so imply that we may after all join in 
and approve this regime. We believe this 
would result in disappointment, which would 
lead to a deterioration of North-South 
relations. Having adopted such a clear 
position, it is better to wait, undivided, and 
hope that the points complained of can be 
improved. 
Like most of the countries that have not 
signed, the Federal Republic of Germany has 
objections only as regards the deep-seabed 
mining regime. This is the point we cannot 
accept, because the deep-seabed regime has 
protectionist and dirigist aspects which cannot 
be accepted as such in an international treaty To conclude, Mr. President, the Federal 
and must not be allowed to set a precedent for Republic believes that nothing is to be gained 
arrangements yet to be made in other areas. from signing the convention as it now stands. 
Nor can the compulsory transfer of technology We think it better not to sign now, raising 
be accepted, because it might have adverse hopes which we may dash later on. We 
repercussions on other international agreements believe that while fully acknowledging the 
if the outcome was what might be termed a good points in the convention in all other 
" social obligation " to pass technological areas, we shall best serve the common goal by 
know-how on to others. This would be bad for making it quite clear that something will have 
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to be changed where deep-seabed mining is 
concerned. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Spies von Biillesheim. 
I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers. 
Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (Netherlands) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, in 1609 my 
compatriot, Hugo Grotius, laid the foundations 
of an international doctrine based on the 
freedom of the seas. Over three and a half 
centuries later a new international code has 
been drawn up for the sea and its natural 
resources. The need for peaceful coexistence 
between nations also demands that the riches 
of the seabed be utilised for the benefit of the 
populations of the world as a whole. 
Years of negotiations on a worldwide basis 
finally resulted in the law of the sea. The 
common heritage of mankind can now be 
shared but it is always the wills with many 
legatees that lead to the worst conflicts. The 
establishment of the convention confronts us 
with the entire North-South problem, especially 
with regard to deep-sea mining. The deve-
loped, industrialised countries have the techno-
logy and the capital required for the exploita-
tion of the seabed and many developing 
countries are adjacent to marine areas in 
which the minerals are located. But these 
countries have to contend with a chronic 
burden of debt and lack the technological 
know-how which they would need in order to 
do any deep-sea mining at all on their own. 
Without disregarding the military and strate-
gic aspects of the convention, I wish to 
emphasise its political and economic implica-
tions. A number of industrialised countries 
are opposed to the law of the sea, as their 
refusal to sign and ratify it openly demon-
strates. Why? Because these countries do not 
believe that the convention will work. 
The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc 
countries have in fact signed it, arguing that 
since the convention will not work anyway, 
why not sign it? One evaluation, different 
conclusions. We must recognise that by signing 
the convention the Soviet Union and the 
eastern bloc countries are in fact also rejecting 
it. We must face this squarely as discussion 
and amplification of the convention proceeds. 
All the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc coun-
tries are doing is to make political capital in the 
developing countries out of signing the conven-
tion, at no cost to themselves. 
The economic North-South problem will 
thus still have to be resolved primarily by the 
western industrialised countries together with 
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the developing countries. It is therefore parti-
cularly unfortunate that the United States 
and major EEC countries reject the convention, 
missing what may be a unique opportunity of 
exerting their influence and driving themselves 
along the road of bilateral agreements and 
disastrous protectionism. 
Rejection by these western industrialised 
countries also supports the Soviet Union's 
efforts to increase its ideological power in the 
third world, which will be further encouraged 
by any intensification of the economic and 
associated social contrasts between North and 
South. The technological and capital resour-
ces of the West must be used to exploit the 
seabed. At the same time the developing 
countries must be supported in their advance 
towards independence. 
Their opportunities for participation must 
be increased so that they too have their share 
of the treasures of the sea. This is equally 
important for Europe and America; it is not 
for nothing that the interdependence of all 
countries is constantly emphasised. 
For this reason alone, EEC countries which 
have signed the convention must try to 
convince the other industrialised countries of 
the necessity to sign in the interests of the 
western world. The disunity of Europe 
weakens the future negotiating position of the 
EEC, causing it to lose its political influence. 
By not signing America is alienating the third 
world rather than promoting a greater degree 
of economic and ideological rapprochement. 
Poverty and weakness create obligations for 
rich and poor alike. That does not mean 
that we see much point in an international 
institution for administration and development. 
All that we can expect from this is a 
big, cumbersome bureaucracy which constantly 
lags behind in the economic interplay of 
supply and demand. That is certainly not in 
the interests of the third world. 
We have placed our hopes mainly in produc-
tion, taken enterprise by enterprise, and the free 
exchange of technology and goods, albeit 
subject to limiting conditions which will close 
the gap between rich and poor countries. In 
order to achieve this aim, the western indus-
trialised countries must close ranks with regard 
to the law of the sea as well. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mrs. den 
Ouden-Dekkers, you have kept well within 
the time allowed. I am most grateful. 
I call Mr. Beix. 
Mr. BEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, the conven-
tion which, it is suggested, should be signed by 
member states which have not yet done so is 
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the outcome, or rather the outward expression, 
of substantial difficulties, as indeed is every 
convention relating to international law. That 
is self-evident. The purpose of a convention of 
this kind is not totally to eliminate or smooth 
away the difficulties- let nobody be under any 
misapprehension on that point - but simply to 
propose regulations. 
Admittedly, as Mr. Fourre and Mr. Spies 
von Biillesheim pointed out, on a whole series 
of issues such as the waters of archipelagoes, 
straits opening into territorial waters, financial 
participation in the international body set up to 
apply the rules and undertake a certain amount 
of research, pollution and the real ability of an 
international authority to discharge its duties, 
we are some distance, indeed we are very far, 
from resolving or even starting to solve, by way 
of a text proposed for signature - not yet 
ratification - the difficulties which may arise 
and will no doubt continue to multiply for 
decades to come. 
However, it is my view that the positions of 
the states which have already signed and of 
those which have not yet done so need not at 
this time be considered to be entirely contradic-
tory. Mr. Fourre has just explained in 
reference to the French position a point which 
must be clearly understood. It is that we are at 
the initial stage of deciding our attitude to a 
document. We have not yet reached the end 
of the process, because we are fully aware of a 
number of difficulties. It is therefore inappro-
priate to make a hard and fast distinction 
between the states which have signed and those 
which have not. All we can do is encourage 
the states which have not yet signed to go ahead 
and do so. 
Behind the formal arguments relating to the 
difficulties involved in the application of a 
convention of this kind, which highlight the 
enormous problems which may have to be 
faced by some countries of the world, the 
expression of these difficulties of a formal cha-
racter must not be allowed to serve as a screen 
for unwillingness to agree to economic co-
operation. The economic argument needs to 
be stated clearly. 
Behind the refusal of some countries to sign 
the convention lies their wish to mine the 
seabeds which are particularly rich in nodules 
containing a variety of metals. These countries 
really cannot base their refusal to sign on legal 
grounds. 
Let us speak plainly ! The question is: who 
is going to mine these seabeds and for whose 
benefit, that is to say, to whose disadvantage? 
This is the debate now starting in the devel-
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oped countries. And for how long are these 
arguments to last ? 
Mr. Lenzer's report quoting a statement by 
Admiral Labrousse is perfectly clear on this 
point: the United States view is that the riches 
of the seabed are there and should be exploited 
quickly. Do we have the same confidence, and 
does this attitude safeguard the political stand-
ing of the developed countries, which run the 
risk, if they do not sign such an important 
document, of appearing to be ruthless specula-
tors exploiting a range of resources to the detri-
ment of third and fourth world countries? 
What, then, is the political stance which the 
developed countries should maintain ? 
Let us not forget that the economic interests 
of the third and fourth worlds are vitally affec-
ted by a convention of this kind. The future of 
two thirds of the waters of the globe and of the 
deep seabeds depends upon it. Not only the 
economic future but also the political position 
of the developed countries we represent is at 
stake. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The gen-
eral debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). -Mr. President, Ladies and Gen-
tlemen, I will begin by thanking members for 
the kind words they have used in thanking me 
for drafting this report. I thank them for their 
suggestions, which fully coincide with the line 
followed in this report and particularly the draft 
recommendation, which is that an understand-
ing should be reached without the various 
positions being in any way abandoned. 
The basic premise from the outset has been 
that there are differences of interests. This was 
inevitable with something as difficult as the law 
of the sea convention. But we also agreed that 
we would discuss these problems openly and 
then try to arrive at satisfactory provisions by 
means of an on-going study of the legal position 
and attendant discussions, without compulsion, 
without protectionism and without a confron-
tation, which would eventually have to be paid 
for yet again by the politically and also econo-
mically weaker countries. 
This being the case, I think we should try not 
to put any country in the dock, as Mr. Spies 
von Biillesheim suggested. Mr. Fourre, Mr. 
Beix and also Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers have 
once again emphasised a number of different 
points, explaining, for example, why the French 
position is as it is, that France signed the 
convention in spite of its shortcomings and that 
despite national egoism an appeal should be 
made to the member countries of WEU to 
overcome these difficulties. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Lenzer (continued) 
As I am again speaking as Rapporteur, I 
should like to take this opportunity to quote a 
few figures so that we may appreciate the eco-
nomic and financial significance of compulsory 
measures. The administrative costs of the 
enterprise, the deep-seabed mining company, 
are estimated at $ 20 to $ 40 million a year. 
The twenty-five year licence fees for mining a 
deep-sea field are put at between $ 1 ,000 and 
$ 2,000 million. There are also considerable 
discretionary powers as the provisions govern-
ing the distribution and licensing by the deep-
seabed mining authority of mining and usufruct 
now stand. 
Another factor that distorts competition is 
the exemption of the deep-seabed mining 
authority from the payment of any fees or costs 
for ten years. Against this background, it is 
hardly surprising that the industrially strong 
countries, which alone have the technical 
know-how and financial potential to mine the 
deep seabed, should have serious objections : 
these are simply the logical economic and also 
political response. It would be wrong to point 
the finger at those countries. Taking the 
Federal Republic of Germany as his example, 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim tried to make it quite 
clear how a highly industrialised country can be 
perfectly happy with the political, strategic and 
defence aspects, but still find it impossible to 
sign the convention at present. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we have discussed all 
the points raised by Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, 
Mr. Fourre, Mr. Spies von Biillesheim and Mr. 
Beix several times. I see this as confirmation 
of our efforts to arrive at common solutions. 
We intend to keep a critical eye on this subject-
matter in the future work of our committee and 
also to continue our discussions in the search 
for generally-acceptable solutions. 
However, we should again give some thought 
- and this is, of course, the object of some of 
the amendments - to converting this into prac-
tice later by means of appropriate wording in 
the draft recommendation. Perhaps I may be 
allowed to add that much, Mr. President. I 
will wait until the amendments have been 
moved before commenting further. Thank 
you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
the Rapporteur for his statement. 
Before voting on the draft recommendation 
we have five amendments to consider : Amend-
ments 1 and 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Biilles-
heim and Amendments 3, 4 and 5 tabled by 
Mr. Fourre. 
We shall take the amendments in the order in 
which they relate to the text of the draft recom-
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mendation : Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies 
von Biillesheim, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. 
Fourre, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourre, 
Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourre and 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von Biilles-
heim. 
These amendments refer to the draft recom-
mendation in Document 946. 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies von Biil-
lesheim reads as follows : 
1. In paragraph (iv) · of the preamble to the 
draft recommen~ation, after "seabed mining 
regime " leave out " but " and insert " and ". 
I call Mr. Spies von Biillesheim to speak in 
support of his amendment. 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - I can be 
very brief, Mr. President. The word " but " 
between two parts of a sentence implies an anti-
thesis, whereas the shortcomings referred to 
here are actually the consequence of the deep-
seabed mining regime and the cause of the 
policy split. On purely linguistic grounds, 
therefore, to avoid an artificial antithesis the 
word " but " should be replaced by " and ". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ... 
What is the committee's view? ... 
I note that the committee is in favour. I 
now put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Spies von 
Biillesheim to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourre reads as 
follows: 
3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out from " the 
policy split " to the end of the paragraph and 
insert " the individual and divergent positions 
which the member states of Western European 
Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as 
to whether the convention should be signed; ". 
I call Mr. Fourre to speak in support of his 
amendment. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - The 
explanation of this amendment is quite simply 
that the five countries which have not signed 
the convention have quite different reasons for 
not doing so, and that the original text gave the 
impression that there was a rupture or deep 
political split between two blocs - a fundamen-
tal divergence of view - which caused some 
countries to sign and others to refuse. 
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Having listened to the Rapporteur and read 
the document itself, it is clear to me that is not 
the case. Even though there are sometimes 
arguments which allow a number of countries 
to unite in their refusal, I do not think that this 
is why they all refused to sign the conven-
tion. I would therefore prefer the wording 
" the individual and divergent positions ... " etc. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? 
Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (Netherlands) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, it must be clear 
from my remarks that the omission of the word 
"regretting" is contrary to their purpose. We 
do greatly regret the political disunion in 
Europe. We therefore oppose the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I think, 
Madam, that you are guilty of a slight error of 
interpretation. 
The amendment relates to paragraph (iv) 
where it is proposed to leave out from " the 
policy split " to the end of the paragraph and 
insert "the individual and divergent positions 
which the member states of Western European 
Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as 
to whether the convention should be signed ", 
but the word " regretting " stands. 
I trust you are satisfied with this expression 
of regret. 
What is the committee's view ? 
·· Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I too support 
Mr. Fourre's amendment. I believe he is 
concerned to establish that the differences refer-
red to are not political but simply divergent 
opinions. And the wording he proposes 
expresses this better than the draft preamble. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Fourre to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 3 is agreed to. 
Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourre reads as 
follows: 
4. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add " more parti-
cularly in relation to the developing coun-
tries;". 
I call Mr. Fourre to speak in support of the 
amendment. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - The 
intention here is to stress the possible detri-
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mental effect of the split on Europe's strategic 
position. Paragraph (v) ·of the preamble already 
makes the point but I took the view that, 
considering the argument developed in the 
report, we should lay special stress on that posi-
tion in relation to the developing countries. 
That is why I propose that the words " more 
particularly in relation to the developing coun-
tries " should be added to the end of the para-
graph. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - I oppose 
this amendment. Although I sympathise with 
Mr. Fourre's intention, I believe it would bring 
us into greater conflict with the developing 
countries if we were all to sign, apparently 
agreeing to everything and then, later, the 
national parliaments refused to ratify the 
convention. That would put us in a very 
much worse position. I therefore suggest that 
this amendment should be rejected as over-
emphatic. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is 
the opinion of the committee ? 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, this is a difficult 
decision to make. The committee will have no 
opportunity to discuss this question in depth. 
My initial reaction is that this amendment 
does not represent any dramatic new direc-
tion. I am unable at the moment to share Mr. 
Spies von Biillesheim's anxiety. 
The subject is out in the open. There is no 
point in shutting our eyes to the problem of 
relations with the developing countries. Let us 
put it in by all means, if by so doing we can 
get on and save ourselves a long debate. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - So that 
the members of this Assembly can be quite 
clear before voting, I will read out the para-
graph in its amended form : " Considering that 
this split may be detrimental to Europe's stra-
tegic position in the world, more particularly in 
relation to the developing countries ". 
I would point out that this matter has been 
raised before and I think that the thoughts of 
the committee have been conveyed to us by its 
Rapporteur. · 
Is Mr. Spies von Biillesheim still opposed to 
the amendment ? 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I have just said that I fully under-
stand the purpose of Mr. Fourre's amendment. 
But I feel that far from improving anything it 
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makes matters worse. I shall therefore vote 
against it. But I am not seriously concerned. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I was 
trying to be conciliatory and I now put Amend-
ment 4 tabled by Mr. Fourre to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 4 is agreed to. 
Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourre reads as 
follows: 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "to adopt policies" and 
insert " to sign the convention on the law of the 
sea". 
I call Mr. Fourre to speak in support of the 
amendment. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
Presidsmt, the amendment I propose relates to a 
point which I and several colleagues raised un-
successfully in committee. 
What is proposed is that the five countries 
which have not signed the convention on the 
law of the sea should be asked to do so. The 
whole of my previous speech was in fact direc-
ted to this point, and I shall not go over the 
basic facts again. 
In the present situation, and to repeat my 
central argument only, I think it is vital that the 
WEU member states should realise that, if we 
really wish to do more than merely express 
good intentions and want to establish a law of 
the sea matching our ambitions, most of the 
countries concerned must sign the convention, 
thereby expressing a constructive and positive 
attitude, and must take part in improving the 
law within the preparatory commission. 
I therefore propose that these countries 
should be called upon in clear and unequivocal 
terms to sign the convention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - I need 
only refer to what has been said before, Mr. 
President. As the United Kingdom, Italy, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, five of our member states, have 
not signed the convention and a sixth, France, 
has done so but has serious doubts about the 
deep-seabed mining regime, we cannot, in my 
view, have a recommendation calling upon our 
countries to sign in spite of their objections. I 
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am therefore definitely in favour of rejecting 
this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly has heard the objection. 
What is the committee's view ? 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I should like to 
confirm what Mr. Spies von Biillesheim has 
said in support of his opposition to this amend-
ment. We have already discussed the same 
subject at the meeting on 18th May in Brussels 
and divergent views were expressed there. But 
it was in the interests of an agreed solution and 
in order to avoid forcing the issue that we did 
then decide in favour of the rather more neutral 
and cautious formulation. We felt we could 
make more progress by further discussion and 
by talks than by virtually requiring- not to say 
compelling - some countries to sign the 
convention. I ask you to leave it at that and 
·not to comply with Mr. Fourre's request. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Fourre to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 5 is negatived. 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von 
Biillesheim reads as follows : 
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert a new text as fol-
lows: 
" 4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation 
with the United States with a view to estab-
lishing a universally-acceptable system of the 
rule of law for the world oceans. ". 
I call Mr. Spies von Biillesheim to speak in 
support of the amendment. 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, in view of the much-mentioned fact that 
the great majority of our member countries 
have not signed, I do not think that it can be 
the job of the WEU Assembly to try, as para-
graph 4 seems to imply, to persuade the United 
States that it is right to sign when this does not 
even coincide with our own position. 
That is why I have suggested a new word-
ing. It has already been pointed out that our 
aim as WEU and the aim of our countries and 
of Europe is to reach agreement with the Uni-
ted States on this matter, in order then to 
accomplish something as regards deep-sea 
mining and generally make some progress on 
the law of the sea. But it cannot be our job to 
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attempt, as this formulation does, to persuade 
the United States that its present policy is 
wrong. We have absolutely no justification for 
this ourselves, since most of us have not signed 
the convention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment? 
Mr. BEIX (France) (Translation). - I do not 
think that the change in wording introduced by 
Amendment 2 would greatly modify the power 
structure behind the negotiation of a conven-
tion of this kind. 
No doubt this amendment relies ultimately 
on the rule of customary law, for which I have 
a great deal of respect even if it does contain 
many ambiguities. But is seems to me that we 
should keep to the wording of Mr. Lenzer's 
report. 
Consider the negative medium- or long-term 
effects of a policy pursued by a state which 
failed to abide by the rules governing the 
oceans and the seabed and thereby damaged its 
political credibility. A situation of this kind 
would not promote greater harmony in econo-
mic relationships. 
The wording of paragraph 4 of the recom-
mendation is entirely adequate. With regard 
to the United States, it is somewhat firmer than 
that suggested by Mr. Spies von BUllesheim. I 
therefore recommend that the Assembly allow 
it to stand. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Rapporteur. 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I owe the 
Assembly an explanation, especially in view of 
Mr. Beix's intervention. 
At the meeting in Brussels on 18th May 1983 
to which I referred, where we discussed this 
draft and adopted it in its present form, we 
decided, partly in view of the pressure of time, 
that this wording should be left as it was. I 
had a very uncomfortable feeling about it at the 
time, but did not insist on any further chan-
ges. In presenting this report I am again acting 
on the premise th;lt it should not point the fin-
ger at anyone, that no one should be forced to 
adopt a certain political attitude, that confron-
tations should be reduced and that common, 
generally acceptable solutions should be 
sought. I also tried at the time to use in the 
report the wording now suggested by Mr. Spies 
von BUllesheim in his proposed amendment. 
In my personal opinion his amendment should 
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be adopted. In such an important matter I 
naturally do not wish to prejudge the issue in 
any way and it is now up to you to vote on 
how the original version should read. My per-
sonal opinion, as the Rapporteur and not as the 
Chairman of the committee, is definitely in 
favour of the version suggested in Mr. Spies von 
Biillesheim's amendment. I personally, as the 
Rapporteur, shall vote for the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Spies von BUlles-
heim to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2 is negatived. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I must apologise, Mr. Presi-
dent, but I should like to make a further small 
point before we vote. We ought to make 
another minor, purely formal change. Para-
graph (iv)- of the English text of the preamble 
contains the phrase "the policy split". Adop-
tion of Mr. Fourre's amendment would cause 
the word " split " to disappear. 
But paragraph (v)- contains the phrase 
" considering that this split ", referring to 
something which is no longer in the text. I 
therefore ask you to agree to the inclusion of 
Mr. Fourre's wording here, too, so that the text 
will read: " these positions ". This is just a 
small, formal point and I apologise, Mr. Presi-
dent, for not having thought of it before. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - This 
seems to me to be a drafting amendment 
designed to clarify the text, with which I am 
sure the Assembly will be in sympathy. 
Does anybody wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I now put to the vote the amendment just 
proposed by the Rapporteur. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The drafting amendment is agreed to. 
I now put to the vote the draft recommen-
dation contained in Document 946, as amen-
ded. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amended draft recommendation is adop-
ted1. 
At this point I wish to thank and congra-
tulate the Rapporteur. 
l. See page 30. 
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4. Analysis and evaluation of the action 
taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 
on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe 
and 388 on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
(Preaentation of and thbate on the report of the 
Committee for Relatiom with Parliamenta, Doe. 943) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments on the analysis and 
evaluation of the action taken on Assembly 
Recommendations 383 on the problems of 
nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the 
problems for European security arising from 
pacifism and neutralism, Document 943. 
In the absence of Mr. Page, I call Mr. Dejar-
din, Rapporteur of the committee. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems 
to me that the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments has taken a somewhat novel step, 
firstly in choosing to analyse together the texts 
of two recommendations previously adopted by 
the Assembly and, secondly, in entrusting the 
presentation to two Rapporteurs who, as you 
are well aware, differ considerably in their 
political positions. 
On behalf of Mr. Page, and taking my cue 
from his recent statements to the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments in Birmingham, I 
can say that both he and I are delighted with 
the chosen formula - all the more so as the 
subject to be analysed is of great immediacy, or, 
as we might say, a burning issue. 
The points under consideration, if we need 
reminding, are Recommendation 383, adopted 
in June 1982, on the problems of nuclear wea-
pons in Europe, and Recommendation 388, 
adopted in November 1982, on the problems 
for European security arising from pacifism and 
neutralism - one of a number of highly contro-
versial topics. 
Interventions in parliament provided us with 
abundant material for examination: oral ques-
tions, written questions, Council replies and 
public statements made by governments. But 
we should not have such an inflated opinion of 
ourselves as to believe that this parliamentary 
activity has been due to the work of the WEU 
Assembly. That would be too much to hope. 
The topic is the subject of very lively contro-
versy in each of our member countries and we 
should recognise - my colleagues are aware of 
my habit of straightforward speaking - that the 
activities of the members of the Assembly in 
this area can certainly not be compared with 
the vigorous action of the pacifists in our 
member countries. 
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Four issues have been deliberately selected: 
negotiations on the limitation of armaments; 
the deployment of new missiles; informing 
public opinion; and, finally, concertation at 
European level. 
We should not fail to remark on what seems 
to us to be some reticence on the part of 
governments in this matter, and we shall return 
to this point when discussing the problem of 
informing public opinion. The complaint is 
heard in some quarters that public opinion is 
supplied with information from one side only. 
We have not found in the attitude of the 
authorities and governments of the member 
countries any great urge to inform public 
opinion or to seek a dialogue or public debate 
on the issue. 
As far as concertation at European level is 
concerned, you will observe that in the report 
we have used the term " Inter-allied consulta-
tions". I do not know whether, in English, the 
two terms are synonymous, but in French they 
do not mean quite the same thing, and I refer 
you here to the precise wording of the report to 
avoid speaking at excessive length. Moreover, 
Lord Reay, who is taking over from Mr. Page, 
who has had to stay in the United Kingdom 
because of the election campaign, will enlarge 
on what I have to say. 
Once again, I wish to stress the interest 
attaching to a comparison of the action taken 
on Assembly recommendations. Here I appeal 
not only to all our colleagues but also to those 
whom I would not normally be entitled to 
address, that is to say the permanent secreta-
riats of the delegations. 
While some efforts have indeed been made, I 
would like to see more spontaneity injected into 
the action taken, which, although a source of 
some satisfaction today, strike us as being 
somewhat inadequate. 
There should be a more automatic mecha-
nism for pasSing on to the WEU Assem-
bly all the information which can be gleaned 
about the relevant parliamentary activity in 
member countries, as well as about public state-
ments made by parliamentarians and members 
of government. However, this calls for 
vigorous action by parliamentarians outside this 
chamber. 
Although I may not make any new friends by 
saying so - but as you are all aware that is not 
what I am looking for - I must point out that, 
having yesterday applauded Mr. Cheysson and 
what he had to say about reviving the activity 
of the WEU Assembly, we must remember that 
such a revival depends on ourselves and on our 
dynamism in the cause of WEU. The credibi-
lity of the Assembly will depend on how far its 
members display true commitment within their 
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national parliaments and in dealing with public 
opinion, away from the annual sessions of the 
Assembly held in Paris. 
As you see, I shrink neither from contro-
versy nor, if necessary, from broaching 
provocative subjects. Please believe that it is 
not my intention to take you all to task - far 
from it. But the opportunity to say something 
really could not be allowed to pass. 
I draw the attention of members of the Coun-
cil to the terms used by the committee in its 
report to describe the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 388. We considered this to 
be inconsistent, mollifying and, in places, 
inaccurate. I shall return to this point. 
May I also take this opportunity of asking 
our executive to speed up the dialogue with the 
Assembly. In other words, it should do its 
utmost not to wait six months before replying 
to documents transmitted to it. 
There is no such thing as a dialogue between 
the Council, its various organs -the SAC and 
ACA- and the parliamentary Assembly, when 
we have to wait six months for a reply to a 
recommendation on an issue of such immediacy 
as that dealt with in the recommendation first 
drafted by our colleague Lagorce. This is 
unacceptable, and replies should be speeded up 
so as to encourage the parliamentarians them-
selves to react more quickly. 
Still on the subject of the dialogue between 
the Assembly and the Council, I must beg leave 
to repeat publicly what many fellow members 
mentioned to me yesterday in the corridors, 
that is to say, their dissatisfaction at the 
performance, here in this Assembly, of the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, who failed 
to reply to the questions put to him. That is 
not a dialogue - that is not a proper relation-
ship between an assembly and its executive, 
even if it is only consultative in character. 
Such a situation is untenable for us, and I can 
speak all the more freely as I share the 
Chairman's philosophy and political doctrine. 
Not merely have we not had replies to 
questions; we have had to witness the Chair-
man of the Council putting on a show 
here, with radio and television and, on the 
benches, a captive audience which vanishes as 
soon as the Minister leaves the chamber! This 
is a thoroughly improper relationship between 
the Assembly and the WEU Council. 
That was something I had to say with the 
utmost clarity because, if we truly wish to 
restore credibility to Western European Union, 
words must be matched by actions and the will 
to act of governments must find expression 
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beyond the statements made in this forum by 
their representatives who are kind enough to 
come and visit us. 
The problem which came to our notice while 
scrutinising this report, and which to some 
extent we suspected in advance, lies in the 
absence or the inadequacy of the information 
spontaneously supplied to members of parlia-
ment by their governments. 
Of course, we live in democracies where 
governments are accountable to parliament. 
While it is true that governments are reasonably 
faithful to this obligation, even when they are 
given special powers, it is extremely rare for a 
minister to convene a committee, say the 
external affairs committee - or foreign affairs 
committee depending on the country - or the 
defence committee, to serve as a sponta-
neous channel of information for members of 
parliament. 
This is a problem which we should look into 
closely at a later stage, as I would like to know 
the parliaments in which the government 
reports on its activity to WEU and where the 
WEU parliamentary delegation reports back on 
our activities. 
This obligation, which is embodied in the 
rules of some parliaments, is rarely respected. 
Belgium is a case in point: the standing 
orders of the chamber require a report to be 
submitted by the delegation attending the 
Council of Europe and WEU, but during my 
twelve years in parliament I have never heard a 
word about such a report! 
So, we have a problem. The work of WEU 
must extend beyond this building and must be 
brought to the notice of public opinion. A 
two-column article, twice a year, in a French, 
English, German or Belgian daily newspaper is 
not enough to alert the public to the work of 
WEU and give it credibility. 
The problem, then, lies in inadequate publi-
city and also lack of motivation among parlia-
mentarians. The question of motivation 
might, by itself, provide matter for a report. 
However, you will note that, during our work, 
Mr. Page and I have suggested that the General 
Affairs Committee should resume its study of 
the effects of peace movements on current 
allied policy. What is more, this speaker 
would have liked a report on the current state 
of parliamentary and public opinion on the 
subject of European security. 
We have felt obliged to record this evident 
impotence at political level of Western Euro-
pean Union, the future of which calls for an 
effective and speedy remedy. 
I would now like to give you my personal 
assessment, and please, Mr. President, do not 
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ask me to be brief just because pacifism is my 
theme. Never fear - what I have to say will 
not be subversive! 
As you will read in the committee's report, 
we must be mindful of the generation gap 
which is now opening up. Yesterday, we 
referred in this chamber to the generation 
which experienced the 1940-45 war and which 
still bears the scars. Some of us were born just 
before or after that war. But young people 
know nothing about the war - and it is well 
that it should be so, as those who did live 
through it remember that it was no time for 
rejoicing. Consequently they do not share the 
same attitudes towards ideas of security and 
power relationships. In the eyes of some 
people, the young are doubtless at fault in 
this. But it is not enough to tell young people 
that they are wrong, they must be made to 
understand why. 
Opinion polls repeatedly tell us that there is 
at present in Europe a large minority, or 
perhaps even a majority of those who are apoli-
tical or insufficiently politically educated, who 
are prey to a deep anxiety which finds expres-
sion in opposition to the deployment of Euro-
missiles and armaments. 
At the same time, while our governments 
remain faithful to their undertaking of 12th 
December 1979 and introduce no change into 
their publicly-declared attitudes, we may note 
that one of the effects of the action conducted 
mainly by a younger generation not wishing to 
experience the horrors of war has been, 
curiously enough, the resumption of the 
Geneva negotiations and the adoption by the 
governments of the member countries of atti-
tudes which are not entirely in line with the 
unqualified determination of December 1979. 
We must not hide our heads in the sand. It 
is, indeed, the pressure of public opinion which 
has induced our governments, some members of 
parliament and even some military leaders to 
review their positions and update their 
thinking. If the movements of 1981 and 1982 
had not happened, what would be the situation 
today? Nobody knows. 
To conclude, we must not act like ostriches 
and assert, for example, that peace movements 
are successful because they are funded by 
Moscow. That would be both untrue and 
laughable. I am sure that the CIA has as many 
resources as the KGB. With my responsibility 
for young people, I have been subject to 
influences from both sides; sometimes, they 
seem to be taking over. 
In Western Europe, those in favour of the 
deployment of Euromissiles have very ready 
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access to the free press and to all the informa-
tion media, but those who take this view have 
not yet been able to marshal a sufficient body 
of opinion to support their cause. They shelter 
behind parliament, when they should be edu-
cating the people. 
If one has faith in one's own position and the 
courage of one's convictions, one should not 
fear confrontation and discussion. We must 
act as free people, in good faith and under no 
misapprehension that the truth is entirely on 
our side, as truth is a commodity in which 
everybody has a share. It is only in the arena 
of free discussion that we may hope to find that 
common ground on which democracy in our 
countries is founded. 
I suggest that WEU should take the bold step 
of organising a colloquium and - why not - of 
inviting the representatives of movements with 
a clearly pacifist line. We should not be afraid 
of the devil. I, for my part, am not afraid of 
God. We can then have a dialogue with 
them. To say they represent nothing at all 
merely betrays ignorance of what they stand for 
and is tantamount to missing the whole point of 
all these major and concerted movements at 
national and European level. 
To those who are apprehensive, to those 
who, like General Rogers yesterday, declare 
that our aim must be peace in freedom, I say 
that there are none among us who assert the 
contrary. Unfortunately, there are those who 
hold that the stated objective of " peace in 
liberty for all " is not always honoured. As far 
as our credibility as men and women politicians 
is concerned, we must be responsive to the 
expectations of young people, who demand first 
and foremost that our actions should match our 
words and that our political attitudes should be 
consistent with what we say. Someone once 
told me that the young needed examples more 
than lectures. 
In conclusion I would like to quote the final 
paragraph of my report and declare in the most 
calm and amicable manner but with all the 
concern I can muster that: to endeavour by 
hook or by crook to impose nuclear over-
armament in Europe and to caricature the 
positions in this matter of all concerned would 
in the long ·run turn the people of Europe 
completely away from any collective defence 
system or military alliance and consequently 
would most certainly frustrate the ambitions of 
WEU and its Assembly as well as our ambition 
to restore to WEU its role as a European pillar 
in the defence of western democracy. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In the 
absence of Mr. Page, I call Lord Reay, who 
will speak for the committee. 
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consists of several chapters. First, there is an 
attempt to trace any influence which two 
selected recommendations of the Assembly 
have had on action taken in national parlia-
ments of the member states. We have heard 
what they are from Mr. Dejardin. The report 
admits that it has not been very successful in 
tracing any links between those recommenda-
tions and actions taken in national parlia-
ments. It explains that, as these matters 
were important in everyone's eyes, many 
questions were put to governments on the 
subjects raised in the recommendations without 
it being possible to know whether they were 
inspired directly or indirectly by the recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly ofWEU. 
It goes on rather poignantly to say: " The 
fact that such questions were or were not put " 
- questions in the national parliaments - " by 
members of the WEU Assembly or even of its 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments is 
not sufficient to prove that this was or was not 
the case. " The report implies that on future 
occasions the committee might be advised to 
choose a less formidable or less noteworthy 
subject. However, as the committee, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Stoffelen this morning, 
chose to pursue for its next inquiry the subject 
of the effect of the recommendation that was 
adopted here on Monday on China and 
European security, I fear that it may continue 
to have the same sort of experience. 
The committee's problem is that we adopt 
here resolutions on matters of topical interest, 
and, by definition, that implies that govern-
ments and members of national parliaments 
will also pursue those matters at the same 
time. Therefore, it will not be possible to 
establish a relationship of cause and effect 
between one and the other, and, probably, in 
all honesty, such a relationship does not exist. 
The report goes on to supply an analysis 
of the two recommendations, including a 
complaint, which Mr. Dejardin repeated, over 
the delay which customarily takes place in the 
reply of the Council to the Assembly. It 
includes a selection of various exchanges on 
the subjects which have occurred in national 
parliaments. 
Finally, there are two chapters on the 
substance of the recommendations - one by 
each of the Rapporteurs, Mr. Page and 
Mr. Dejardin. Mr. Page waves the flag of 
multilateral disarmament which he calls " the 
path of hope ", and I agree with him. He 
points out that the Soviet Union is and has 
been responsible, by its introduction of interme-
diate nuclear missiles targeted on Europe, for 
the gap which has grown up between the two 
sides on the continent of Europe and which 
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needs to be filled again by carrying out 
NATO's twin-track decision. 
Mr. Page points out that the West has made 
valid disarmament proposals. As General 
Rogers said yesterday, there is an unfortunate 
tendency amongst elements in the West to 
criticise any western disarmament proposal that 
is rejected by the Soviet Union simply because 
it is rejected by the Soviet Union, particularly if 
it is rejected with contempt. The Soviet Union 
knows perfectly well that it has the chance of 
undermining public confidence in such propo-
sals precisely by that tactic. 
Mr. Page points to the involvement of the 
Soviet Union. That was taken up in another 
sense by Mr. Dejardin. He points to the 
Soviet Union's provision of financial support 
for the various peace movements, for which 
there is considerable evidence. Of course that 
is the case. Looked at from the Soviet point of 
view, the Soviet Union has an overwhelming 
interest in seeing the so-called " peace move-
ment " travel as far as possible, and it has the 
means to assist that process. 
Mr. Page also says that parliamentarians 
must take the arguments out to the public and 
fight the battle in the towns and villages rather 
than just in the debating chamber. That is 
true and it is happening at what is the proper 
point of contact between parliamentarians and 
the public in the electoral process. It happened 
in Germany in the electoral campaign which 
ended on 6th March in the public rejection 
of an SPD which was evidently moving 
increasingly leftward and which was becoming 
increasingly less robust in its defence of the 
western alliance. It has been happening over 
the last few weeks in the United Kingdom, 
where defence has played a large part in the 
election campaign and all the evidence is that 
the general public are profoundly uneasy at the 
unilateralism of the Labour Party. 
I think that Mr. Dejardin is wrong when he 
seems to imply in paragraphs 106 to 113 of the 
report that the move towards unilateralism is 
continually gaining strength and may now even 
account for a majority of public opinion. I am 
not in favour of his proposal for a colloquy 
between WEU and elements of the peace move-
ment. The proper meeting place, as I have 
said, is in the electoral process. His suggestion 
would be a dialogue of the deaf, with parlia-
mentarians presenting themselves as willing to 
listen and be persuaded, but hearing only a 
one-sided presentation by a group entirely 
committed to a single point of view. Mr. 
Dejardin's proposal was not the agreed conclu-
sion of the committee. 
Mr. Page ends, as I should like to do, with a 
condemnation of unilateral disarmament. Uni-
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lateral disarmament supposes that the opposing 
party will also therefore disarm. All history, 
all logic and all knowledge of human behaviour 
suggest that precisely the reverse would 
happen. If an aggressively armed and expan-
sionist power sees its opponents disarming, it 
will take advantage of that fact to submit its 
erstwhile opponents to its will. 
Mr. Page quotes the words of a famous 
churchman - I wish that he had named him: I 
fear that he must be dead -
"It is futile for sheep to pass resolutions in 
favour of vegetarianism unless the wolves are 
prepared to do the same. " 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have 
received two requests to speak in the general 
debate, one from Mr. Vogt and the other from 
Mr. Miiller, who wish to overrun considerably 
the time allocated to speakers by the Assembly. 
I propose to grant ten minutes to Mr. Vogt 
and seven minutes to Mr. Miiller. 
I call Mr. Vogt. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Why does he get the floor 
for ten minutes and I get it for seven? 
Mr. VOGT (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Perhaps I could say something 
about this. As ten and seven make seventeen, 
I suggest that we should each confine ourselves 
to eight minutes. 
I should also like to make another point. I 
tried yesterday to persuade the President, 
Mr. De Poi, that it would be a good idea in the 
case of a subject like this where there is a clash 
between two different attitudes, to allow the 
side which is accused in this report of being 
damaging to European defence, the side of the 
pacifists, an equal say. I think we can demon-
strate this here. It would at the same time be 
an encouragement for the new approach to 
disarmament policy which we call the " policy 
of calculated prior concessions ". I shall 
explain what this is later. I am encouraged by 
the fact that the President has given me the 
floor today for ten minutes, and also by the 
committee's decision to appoint two rappor-
teurs, enabling them to present two opposing 
views. As Mr. Dejardin has already said 
something about the peace movement and thus 
corrected a few optical illusions - as I like to 
call them - to which our opponents are prone, I 
will confine myself to putting forward, from the 
German standpoint, the viewpoint of the 
ecology and peace movement, a few points 
which he did not make. 
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It is repeatedly asserted - and this is unfortu-
nately also reflected in Mr. Page's view of the 
peace movement - that it is Soviet-controlled 
and that there is a touch of anti-Americanism 
about it, an anti-American outlook. I should 
like to refute this. Firstly, I should like to say 
that this Soviet control does not exist. As 
proof of this I should like to give a brief 
account of how the new peace movement in the 
Federal Republic developed. It can be said 
that in 1979 there was no peace movement left 
in the Federal Republic. There were just a few 
stragglers and more or less antiquated remnants 
of the old peace movement. But there was the 
ecology movement. At that time this move-
ment, in its organised form, for instance 
via the Bundesverband Umweltschutz, took the 
initiative by urging, even before the Brussels 
decision of 12th December 1979, that the 
Soviet attitude as expressed in the Brezhnev 
appeal should be taken seriously in the first 
instance as possibly containing elements of a 
new approach to disarmament. We called this 
the "policy of calculated prior concessions". 
The point at issue then was the Soviet 
Union's proposal - since in fact implemented -
to withdraw twenty thousand men and a 
thousand tanks from the German Democratic 
Republic. At that time all parties and most of 
the press dismissed this as eyewash. We 
regretted that the offer had been dismissed in 
this way and said that the West ought to try to 
take a similar - not necessarily the same -
step. The difference between the previous 
policies officially aimed at disarmament and 
this " policy of calculated prior concessions " is 
that in the former case a proposal is made, but 
its implementation is made dependent on the 
simultaneous implementation of a similar or 
identical measure by the other side. We have 
observed that this approach has never worked, 
any more than two punctiliously polite Ger-
mans have ever succeeded in getting through a 
door together. In other words, if you make 
several attempts to build a house and never end 
up with a sensible design, you will have to 
think of a new layout. That would be a 
reasonable attitude. 
We believe that as negotiations have never in 
the whole of history actually led to disarma-
ment, the time has come to try new lines of 
approach. The policy of calculated prior 
concessions does not make a measure of disar-
mament conditional on disarmament by the 
other side; It announces a measure and carries 
it out, while, however, expressing the clear 
expectation that in the foreseeable future - the 
time-limits can be stated - the other side will 
take a similar step. This can lead to a de-
escalation of armament or, ideally, to a disar-
mament race. We are a new kind of move-
ment with a new way of looking at the dangers 
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by which mankind is beset on all sides. These 
are on the one hand dangers arising from over-
industrialisation - that is why we are an 
ecology movement - but on the other hand 
also dangers of military self-destruction of 
extinction. ' 
We have tried to find a common deno-
minator for both the environmental dangers and 
that of military annihilation. I should like to 
emphasise this following the - to my mind 
t~rrifying- arguments put forward by Mr. Wil-
kinson yesterday in connection with burden-
sharing. He said that, specifically because of 
our interests in the Arabian Gulf our oil 
supplies, we need to become militarily stronger 
and to establish a greater degree of burden-
sharing between Europe and the United States. 
We offer an alternative formula. We say 
that a life-style and production methods based 
on a constant supply of foreign raw materials 
and entailing a correspondingly wasteful use of 
these materials is also a motive for the military 
or predatory acquisition of such materials. 
Against this we contend that a different. 
ecological way of life, which is more self-
sufficient and mindful of the fact that it is 
possible to dispense to a great extent with such 
foreign raw materials - the wastage of oil, for 
instance - is in itself a contribution to the 
ma~ntenance of peace. In other words, the 
mamtenance of peace is the responsibility not 
only of institutions and governments but also of 
peoples. We make the most of this argument 
in every possible quarter, not only in the West 
but in the East as well. 
A few members of this Assembly may know 
that on Ascension Day some Bundestag repre-
sentatives of the Green Party staged a demon-
stration in East Berlin. We - including Petra 
Kelly, Gerd Bastian and myself - unfurled a 
banner in East Berlin with the device " Swords 
into ploughshares ". That is the symbol of the 
independent peace movement in the German 
Democratic Republic. This demonstration was 
intended to encourage the peace movement. 
and we shall go on trying to encourage the 
peace movement in both East and West in 
order to show that the creative powers of the 
population must come to the aid of govern-
ments in initiating new approaches to disarma-
ment. We believe that all of us, we here in the 
Assembly and the population as a whole, have 
absolutely no alternative: we must find a new 
approach to disarmament. 
I should have liked to say a little more, but 
will keep to my self-imposed time-limit. Our 
viewpoint covers not only this new approach to 
disarmament, the policy of calculated prior 
concessions, but also support for the principles 
of non-alignment and non-military defence. 
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Perhaps there will be an opportunity to present 
these views on another occasion. 
Much of this may be new to you, much of it 
may be unthinkable, but if we are to avert the 
unthinkable, namely the extinction of mankind, 
there is nothing else for it: we must reinvent 
the world. Erich Fried, a German poet living 
in London, expressed it differently: "Anyone 
who wants the world to remain as it is does not 
want it to remain at all". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Miiller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, first, a brief and purely explana-
tory comment to Mr. Dejardin concerning 
information to parliaments about the work of 
WEU. In the Federal Republic the govern-
ment regularly reports to parliament on the 
Council's activities. In addition, parliament is 
informed about the activities of our delegation 
here by a special publication, which also 
contains all the speeches made. I think that 
meets your requirements. 
To turn now to the discussion started by 
Mr. Vogt, it would be fascinating to have a 
long debate on the subject now. Mr. Vogt said 
that we shall have plenty of opportunity for this 
in the future and I can assure you that I, for 
one, will be very interested in such a debate. 
One thing I object to is that this is all 
represented as something new, as if a deus ex 
machina had been born in 1979 of the marriage 
of ecology and the peace movement. Of 
course there is nothing new about it at all. 
The idea already existed on Monte Verita in 
Ascona in the famous commune of 1914, it also 
existed between the wars, and in the post-1945 
debate many approaches to this problem were 
proposed. 
Our problem today in the debate with 
pacifism lies in the fact that the worthy aim of 
preserving peace by means of unilateral pacifist 
concessions may, in borderline cases, have the 
opposite effect. I do not wish to resurrect the 
whole debate about the extent to which the 
pacifist movement helped to bring about the 
second world war. There is the famous letter 
by Karl Barth to a Dutch parson claiming that 
the Dutch pacifists indirectly helped to 
strengthen dictatorship and increase injustice 
under Adolf Hitler. I could quote the Ziirich 
theologian, Emil Brunner, who said: " Paci-
fism is not an automatic guarantee of peace; it 
may even be the cause of war". That is 
undoubtedly true. There is no harm in our 
holding such a fundamental debate here, but it 
must be based on fact and draw on historical 
experience. 
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At this point I should like to refer to 
something that Mr. Dejardin said in connection 
with public opinion polls. I think it is a great 
mi~~ke for politicians to take any notice of 
opm10n polls. I have never taken any notice 
of them myself, any more than did Konrad 
Adenauer, who was firmly convinced that the 
policy that was right had to be organised and 
carried out. . If you heed opinion polls, if you 
want a plebtscttary democracy, you will always 
find that a country will produce majorities in 
favour of the death sentence and the persecu-
tion of foreign minorities. But that cannot be 
the purpose of a sensible policy in a represen-
tative democracy. 
With regard to the peace movement in 
Europe as such, it exists in many forms. There 
i~ no doubt, and Mr. Vogt cannot dispute this 
either, that the Soviet Union and its supporters 
are naturally interested in strengthening a 
movement which benefits them in the debate 
about armament and disarmament, because 
there is no need for them to conduct it on their 
own doorstep; it is conducted only in the 
opposite camp. There is no doubt about it 
and the proof is there; people have been caught 
red-handed passing sums of money in Norway 
and Denmark. We can see from the example 
of the Novosty press agency in Switzerland, a 
neutral non-NATO country, the influence 
exerted on the peace movement in Switzerland 
by means of this Soviet agency. We know the 
history of the World Peace Council, which was 
originally established in Vienna and was 
expelled from neutral Austria because it was a 
communist organisation. 
I should also like to make a point about the 
prior concessions which have been mentioned 
here. The Soviet Union naturally made a 
great deal of propaganda about the withdrawal 
of twenty thousand men. The West made a 
big mistake in not shouting it from the rooftops 
when the Americans withdrew four thousand 
nuclear warheads from Europe without using 
th~ move in a propaganda campaign, because 
tht~ would have been a good opportunity to 
clatm _that they, too, had made a prior 
concessiOn. 
May I make one last comment. I am afraid 
that the debate about pacifism and neutralism 
may lose its way and that there is some 
confusion here between pacifism and neutra-
lism. Switzerland, which succeeded in remain-
FOURTH SITTING 
cost to the Wehrmacht. Consequently in the 
second world war, in 1940 when Adolf Hitler 
was at the height of his power, neutral 
Switzerland was not attacked. 
That is an historical example which shows 
that peace can be maintained by a country that 
represents a deterrent force in itself. I believe 
this is a lesson which we must heed at present. 
.t\ny other course, however fine-sounding, is 
ddlic~lt to follow through successfully in 
practice. I am one of those who do not think 
much of fine-sounding philosophies which may 
lead in practice to certain consequences, 
because the originators of these philosophies 
cannot subsequently undo the consequences 
when faced by a fait accompli. We should 
therefore always keep the debate open, always 
go on discussing and setting one opinion against 
another. That is the purpose of a represen-
tative democracy and this Assembly can serve 
that purpose too. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Enders. 
Mr. ENDERS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, many generations accepted the 
proposition that "War is the father of all 
things ". This was in accordance with a great 
deal of hero-worship and also with the way in 
which history was presented in many school 
textbooks which often presented history as if it 
were nothing but a succession of battles and 
wars. What this attitude led to is familiar to 
many of us who have experienced the conse-
quences of two world wars, or at least of the 
last world war. So I think that for our time 
and our generation we should adopt the 
slogan: " Peace must be the father of all 
things ". This attitude is not as new as some 
speakers here have suggested. 
I should like to remind you that the former 
~ocial Democrat President of the Federal Repub-
hc, Gustav Heinemann, established an Insti-
tute for Research into Peace and Conflict, or at 
least contributed largely to its inception. This 
institute studies the causes of conflicts and tries 
to devise ways of preventing and forestalling 
them. Unfortunately and to my great regret 
the approp~ation for. this institute has recently 
been curtailed and It looks very much as if 
funds will be discontinued altogether after 
6th March, which would mean the end of a 
valuable organisation. 
ing neutral throughout the first and second In any case I do not see the peace movement 
world wars, was only able to maintain this as having a one-sided communist orientation 
neutrality because it represented a deterrent in when we think of what has been going on i~ 
itself. You doubtless know about the study the churches in recent times and of the massive 
made for the general staff of the German popular support for the peace policy. Perhaps 
Wehrmach~, which concluded that Switzerland you who come from neighbouring countries 
could certamly be conquered, but at too high a have been following this too. The Evangelical 
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Synod opens today in Hanover. On this occa-
sion thousands upon thousands of young people 
are going to demonstrate for peace by wearing 
violet scarves. 
I should like to add a comment of my 
own. More attention should be paid in our 
schools to active work for peace and the study 
of peace initiatives. In other words, the pre-
sentation of history which I described to start 
with should be replaced by efforts by teachers 
to impress on young people how important it is 
to work for peace, to be prepared to avoid 
conflicts and to preserve peace for mankind. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the general debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
note that, in essence, this debate has centred on 
German concerns, but that little has been said 
about the fundamental problem of making the 
work of the Assembly known outside this 
chamber or about the role to be played by 
members of parliament. 
I thank Mr. Vogt for drawing attention to the 
existence of peace movements in the countries 
of the East. These are a reality, a harsh 
reality, for those who have the courage to take 
part in unofficial peace movements, especially 
in the USSR. This morning's papers carry the 
news of the three-year prison sentence imposed 
on Mr. Alexander Chatravka, a young man of 
thirty-two, for his "anti-Soviet agitation" in 
writing and signing a petition for the elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons in both East and West, 
and for his close ties with the unofficial peace 
movement. 
I wished to report this item of news to the 
Assembly, firstly in order to condemn any 
government and any authority, whichever and 
wherever it may be, which does not respect 
freedom of opinion, freedom of expression and 
human rights, and secondly to draw attention to 
the existence of a deep-rooted movement whose 
merits are all the greater in that it entails 
painful consequences for those who are brave 
enough to voice their opinions in parts of the 
world still under an authoritarian regime. 
On the point made by Mr. Miiller, I realise 
that, as responsible politicians, we must treat 
the results of public opinion polls with reserve. 
However, on one of the few occasions when 
these results are favourable to us I beg leave to 
refer to them. 
But I also say, with Mr. Miiller: let us not 
deal with the issue in the context of an election 
campaign since, dear colleague and fellow 
Rapporteur, there are other questions which 
131 
FOURTH SITTING 
affect the choice of a candidate. Let us rather 
take the course of a public debate on the prob-
lem of European security and on the deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons, and let us end the 
debate with a public referendum. As we both 
believe that we are in the right, let us have the 
courage to carry our arguments to their conclu-
sion and consult the public. In spite of my 
reservations about referendums, this seems to 
be the least bad solution. 
If the USSR is interested in promoting the 
peace movement, I very much regret that, faced 
with the selflessness underlying the efforts as 
well as the statements and commitments of 
these movements, which are fighting in the 
cause of peace, whether we call them pacifist or 
not, the western democracies display no invol-
vement and wait for others to undertake the 
work of mobilising public opinion, if not 
actually of propaganda, in order to reverse the 
trend. 
Believe me, Ladies and Gentlemen, abusive 
language and invective never convinced anyone. 
If you think the younger generations are 
making a mistake and you want them to return 
to the fold one day, you will not persuade them 
to do so by calling them clowns, folksy drop-
outs and a string of other names. 
Just be careful! When we say that peace is 
based on deterrence, we do not mean Pax 
Romana. Force provokes force. 
In conclusion I repeat the memorable words 
uttered by Mr. Pertini in Strasbourg on 
27th April last, which we applauded so enthu-
siastically: "No peace is possible in the 
shadow of the missiles ". 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - The com-
mittee had two rapporteurs who each repre-
sented different sides of the political spectrum. 
Rumour has it that the committee has a sense 
of humour. Of course that is true. It was not 
a bad decision to ask both rapporteurs to 
report. The committee is not political. I 
have to say that even after today's debate. 
We must ensure that there is a follow-up to 
our work here in the national parliaments and 
by the public and the press. We therefore 
decided to select the two texts and to ask the 
two rapporteurs to analyse the follow-up. 
They did that eloquently. 
I thank Lord Reay, who helped us with the 
problem caused by the election in the United 
Kingdom. We all have our personal feelings, 
but as Chairman of the committee I do not feel 
competent to speak about that. I am grateful 
to Lord Reay for replacing Mr. Page. 
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I emphasise that we reached common conclu-
sions, three of which I should like to repeat. It 
would be preferable if the Council could give 
an answer sooner than six months later. 
Normally, in relations between a parliament 
and the Council of Ministers it would be 
unsatisfactory if the delay were longer than 
three or four weeks. However, we are a 
modest Assembly and merely think that it 
would be preferable if replies were given 
sooner. 
My second remark concerns the answers 
given by the Council. I shall not comment on 
the content of the speech of the Chairman-in-
Office. However, it was also my impression 
that he did not have much success in answer-
ing all the questions put to him. As an 
Assembly we must emphasise that we want real 
answers from our Council and, therefore, from 
our Chairman-in-Office. 
My final remark relates to the conclusion 
with regard to the General Affairs Commit-
tee. It was: " The committee wishes the 
General Affairs Committee to be asked to 
prepare another report on nuclear weapons and 
the reactions of public opinion. " Why at the 
same time did Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin 
agree on the text when there were some 
differences of opinion between them? Both 
must realise that a discussion is taking place in 
six of the seven member countries. There are 
discussions between politicians and those in the 
peace movements. Yesterday, General Rogers 
admitted that in the peace movements are 
many young people and adults who are worried 
about the situation. Discussions are conti-
nuing, and we as an assembly must take that 
into account. I hope that the General Affairs 
Committee will be good enough to study the 
problem of the gap that exists between parts of 
the peace movements and politicians. 
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My committee wants to see how we can 
promote a better follow-up. The tradition is 
that during the last minutes of our sessions we 
express our anxiety and compare public aware-
ness of Western European Union with public 
awareness of other European institutions. I 
shall not do so this time. We must continue to 
discuss really topical matters just as we did last 
time. If I may say so, this session may 
perhaps have been better had we restricted our-
selves to matters that have a direct relationship 
with the aim of Western European Union. If 
we discuss topical matters in a newsworthy 
way, the journalists will undoubtedly pick up 
the story. I am sure that all my colleagues 
want to promote a better follow-up for the sake 
of European security. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. You yourself alluded to 
the objectivity required of you as chairman. 
I, also, would not wish to abandon the objec-
tivity required of the chair, but as a member of 
the Assembly I recognise that your committee 
has branched out in a new direction and believe 
that its work has been appreciated. I hope it 
will lead to other things. 
The Assembly takes note of the report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
5. Adjournment of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - That 
concludes our work. 
I declare the twenty-ninth ordinary session of 
the Assembly of Western European Union 
adjourned. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.) 
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